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This dissertation examines Ulysses S. Grant’s Reconstruction policy, both the
domestic and foreign policies, as an integrated whole. He focused on the broad
application of citizenship rights, not only for African Americans in the South, but for all
peoples in the United States’ sphere of influence. The centerpiece of Grant’s
Reconstruction policy was the “Grant Doctrine,” articulated in his 1869 memorandum
considering whether to annex the Dominican Republic to the United States. In it, Grant
delineated his determination to export the republican policies of Reconstruction to the
Caribbean by the acquisition of the island territory. Grant envisioned exporting the ideals
of Reconstruction, the rights of citizenship, and the republican values of the
Reconstruction Amendments, to people never previously considered for full membership
in the body politic of the United States. Grant’s decisions to annex the Dominican
Republic and grant the Dominicans citizenship reflect the responsibilities Grant had to
enforce equal rights for those seeking to join the Union. Grant’s desire to provide a path
to citizenship for Native Americans (whether they wanted it or not) and his effort to
withhold citizenship from Mormons due to the immorality of their practice of polygamy,

added to the changing views of citizenship in this era. Grant’s Reconstruction policy also
included his desire to help Chinese immigrants break the bonds of forced labor, though
that ultimately led to their eventual exclusion. This dissertation examines all of these
initiatives as well as the position of African American leaders who questioned the
president’s decision-making and argued against his policies, while never wavering in
their political support of him or his party. Together, Grant’s foreign and domestic policies
represented a singular Reconstruction effort centered on the question of citizenship. The
Grant administration sought to export Reconstruction beyond the borders of the
American South, restoring and strengthening the Union while, at the same time, offering
republicanism, liberty, equality, and free labor, to peoples of the Western Hemisphere
writ large and the peoples of the world migrating to the United States.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Ulysses S. Grant’s presidency (1869-1877) marked the final eight years of the
period of Reconstruction that followed the American Civil War. Reconstruction saw the
implementation of important Civil Rights legislation that outlawed slavery, made
birthright citizenship a constitutionally protected right, and ostensibly secured the right to
vote for African American men. But these changes did not happen immediately following
the Civil War. They were the result of significant political upheaval that challenged the
rights of freedmen and questioned the legitimacy of Reconstruction. At the onset of the
post-war period, most Republicans and former Confederates were content with reunifying
the country, albeit without the institution of slavery, and strengthening the Union and the
federal government. Radical Republicans balked when Southern Democrats and President
Andrew Johnson took this to mean a complete restoration of the political status quo
antebellum, including Johnson’s veto of the Civil Rights Act in 1866. As such, they
pushed forward with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which radically changed
the constitutional protections for African Americans and their rights as citizens. With the
change in the political landscape came a change in the economic structures of the nation,
as well as a change in the makeup of the labor force through the freedom of millions of
enslaved African Americans and the increase in immigration from both Europe and Asia.
President Grant and his administration undertook to transition the United States through
1

this transformation by managing the rights of its citizens and by attempting to incorporate
new citizens into the body politic in an effort both to increase the reach of republicanism
throughout the Western Hemisphere and increase the electoral base of the Republican
Party at home. White Republicans viewed these efforts as intended to strengthen the
reunified nation and create a sense of national stability, while African Americans and
their allies viewed these efforts as instigating revolutionary political change. Grant’s
political enemies, and even many of his supposed political allies, resisted his attempts to
bring new citizens into the republican experiment, particularly non-whites, eventually
fracturing the Republican Party and strengthening the Democratic Party. While historian
Stacey L. Smith notes that, “Reconstruction, in short, was a thoroughly national,
continental political struggle over the federal government’s power to make citizens,”
Mark Wahlgren Summers contends that the main goal of Reconstruction “was to bring
the nation back together and this time for good, to banish the prospect of future war, to
break the power of the former slave states…to end slavery…and all this without
sacrificing the political framework that had made the Union special.” These two
perspectives on Reconstruction are not mutually exclusive, rather, Republicans, both
white and Black, sought to achieve both objectives following the Civil War. These
differing narratives of Reconstruction reflect the Grant Administration’s struggle to
develop coherent foreign and domestic policies that would advance its Reconstruction
goals in the post-Civil War era. Success to the Grant administration entailed the
reunification of the states, the integration of African Americans into the body politic of
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the United States, and the introduction of the spirit of the Reconstruction Amendments
into U.S. foreign policy initiatives toward the Western Hemisphere.1
This dissertation examines Grant’s Reconstruction domestic and foreign policies
as an integrated whole. It builds on existing scholarship of Reconstruction and citizenship
studies that examine the development of citizenship rights and equality for African
Americans in the period following the Civil War and views the ways in which the Grant
administration reexamined who should be counted in the body politic of the United
States. This dissertation shows the focus of his Reconstruction policy was in the broad
application of citizenship rights, not only for African Americans in the South, but for all
peoples in the larger American sphere of influence. Grant hoped to apply the ideals of
Reconstruction, the rights of citizenship and the republican values of the Reconstruction
Amendments, to people never previously considered for membership in the body politic
of the United States. His decision to annex the Dominican Republic and grant the
Dominicans citizenship, and his pursuit of new treaties to define how and when an
immigrant became a citizen, reflected a new interpretation of the Constitution and the
responsibilities of the president in enforcing equal rights both for the people of the nation
and those seeking to join it. Grant’s desire to provide a path to citizenship for Native
Americans (whether they wanted it or not) and his definition of who was worthy of
citizenship reflected this changing view of citizenship. Grant’s Reconstruction policy
extended to his desire to help Chinese immigrants break the bonds of forced labor,

1

Eric Foner, The Second Founding: How the Civil War and Reconstruction Remade the Constitution (New
York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2019), 67; Stacey L. Smith, “Beyond North and South: Putting the
West in the Civil War and Reconstruction,” Journal of the Civil War Era 6, no. 4 (December 2016): 570;
Mark Wahlgren Summers, The Ordeal of the Reunion: A New History of Reconstruction (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 13, 396.
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though that led unwittingly to their eventual exclusion. At the same time, Grant continued
to court the support of African American leaders who questioned his decision-making
and argued against his policies, yet never wavered in their electoral support of him or his
party.
For Grant, Reconstruction centered on the question of citizenship. His
administration sought to export Reconstruction beyond the borders of the American
South, by offering the ideals of republicanism, the notions of liberty, equality, and free
labor, to peoples throughout the Western Hemisphere and to those migrating to the
United States. This dissertation argues that the Grant administration sought to extend the
republican values of Reconstruction throughout the Western Hemisphere, first in the
Caribbean, then in the Western United States, by redefining who was worthy of
citizenship. This dissertation intervenes into the historiography of both mid-nineteenth
century foreign policy and Reconstruction studies by examining both the foreign and
domestic policies of the Grant administration as a unified effort to include previously
excluded peoples in the national experiment. It contributes to the historiography of
citizenship in the Reconstruction period by examining the question not just as it relates to
African Americans but also as it relates to immigrants and inhabitants of territories yet to
be admitted to the Union. This dissertation fits into the literature of the “Greater
Reconstruction” put forth by Elliott West. He examines Reconstruction in the United
States through the lens of western expansion, race, and the transformation of the nation
“physically, economically, politically, and culturally.” He also examines the broader
issues of the expansion of the national government, reunification, and citizenship. This
dissertation builds on many of the same themes as West by examining the Grant
4

Administration’s attempted expansion into new territories and the cultural and political
impact of including hundreds of thousands of new non-white citizens into the body
politic of the United States in the West and in the Caribbean. It also adds to the growing
scholarship of reunion and nationalism. Although Grant and many of his Republican
allies supported equal rights for African Americans, many did so as a means to an end, to
strengthen the Union through the reunification of the states and create a sense of national
identity that helped build economic growth in the South and in the expanding territories
in the West. These works show that the goals of Reconstruction differed for different
groups of Republicans and Democrats. For the Grant Administration, though, the policy
of Reconstruction was attempting to make both reunification and equality succeed in both
domestic and foreign policy. This dissertation, then, will examine the successes and
failures of the administration’s Reconstruction policy writ large.2
While Elliott West and historians studying broader aspects of Reconstruction
embrace the idea of a “Greater Reconstruction,” other historians have questioned whether
the term “Reconstruction” may no longer be effective. Gregory P. Downs and Kate
Masur argue that the term Reconstruction is lacking in usefulness for describing the
frameworks of historical analysis that look beyond the traditional definition of “a
dynamic period of political debate and social upheaval in the South that followed the

2

W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880 (New York: The Free Press, 1992);
Kenneth M. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 206-207;
John Hope Franklin, Reconstruction after the Civil War, 3rd. edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2012); Elliott West, “Reconstructing Race,” Western Historical Quarterly 34 (Spring 2003): 7-26; West,
The Last Indian War: The Nez Pearce Story (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), xiv-xxii;
Summers, Ordeal; Gregory Downs, Declarations of Dependence: The Long Reconstruction of Popular
Politics in the South, 1861-1908 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Andrew F. Lang,
In the Wake of War: Military Occupation, Emancipation, and Civil War America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 2017); Allen C. Guelzo, Reconstruction: A Concise History (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2018).
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Civil War.”3 They look to West’s “Greater Reconstruction” argument as proof that the
term is no longer viable. They argue that framing post-Civil War works around
Reconstruction precludes researchers “from considering postwar history from different
angles.” As such, they consider the period as “The World the War Made,” viewing it as
the growth and reaction to the impact of the massive Civil War the nation had endured.
This view of the postwar era, removing Reconstruction from the center of the framework,
helps to explain the seemingly dichotomous understanding of a stronger centralized
government operating, as they argue, as a “Stockade State,” run through a series of
territorial outposts. However, removing Reconstruction from the framework does a
disservice to the complexity of the time, in which the people of the United States
understood they were living through Reconstruction and saw, for themselves, the
connections between the policies that governed the Reconstruction of the South and those
that affected the lives of non-whites throughout the West.4
The centerpiece of Grant’s Reconstruction policy is what I term the “Grant
Doctrine,” articulated in a memorandum that Grant wrote in late 1869 while considering
whether to annex the Dominican Republic to the United States. Titled “Reasons why San
Domingo should be annexed to the United States,” this memorandum encapsulates
Grant’s policy of exporting Reconstruction’s republican ideology abroad, in this case to
the Caribbean. Grant hoped that the annexation of the Dominican Republic (or Santo
Domingo) would allow the United States finally to divest itself from the slave society of

3

Gregory P. Downs and Kate Masur, eds., The World the Civil War Made (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2015), 4-6.
4

Ibid., 6.

6

Cuba, which was the main supplier of tropical goods to the United States. The Grant
Doctrine differed from the Monroe Doctrine in that previous presidents had utilized
Monroe’s doctrine during a period when the United States was still a slave-holding
republic. Though Grant espoused the same belief as Monroe that the United States should
be the arbiter of disputes in the Western Hemisphere and that Old World imperialism was
unwanted in the region, Monroe’s vision was of an expanding slave-holding republic.
The Monroe Doctrine, then, was worthy of reexamination in the post-Civil War United
States. Grant’s Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, reasserted the Monroe Doctrine’s “no
transfer principle” which stated that Cuba was “no longer regarded as subject to transfer
from one European power to another.” As historian Jay Sexton notes, “There would be as
many Monroe Doctrines as foreign policy perspectives.” The Grant Doctrine, however,
represented a new philosophy toward the Western Hemisphere. The United States would
act not as the purveyor of slavery in the region but as the exemplar of how to emancipate
slaves. Grant intended to assert American influence in the region by acquiring bases in
the Caribbean that would put the United States in a position of naval dominance,
asserting control over important shipping lanes and exercising influence over the
remaining European colonies. However, the Grant Doctrine also sought to incorporate the
people of Santo Domingo into the body politic of the United States, and to welcome the
people of the neighboring slave-holding islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico to come of their
own accord, to the beacon of American freedom. Grant’s Doctrine took its cues from the
Reconstruction Amendments. His plan for Santo Domingo was to export citizenship

7

rights to the Dominican people, build up their economy with free labor, and, in doing so,
gradually strangle the slave economy of Cuba.5
Grant hoped that, through annexation, the Dominican Republic could become a
state, allowing American citizens the chance to make their fortunes in the fertile lands of
the island nation and providing the Dominican people the right to live and work
throughout the United States as equal citizens. But he took note to focus on African
Americans as the citizens best suited for the territory. Drawing on the race-based biology
of his day, Grant believed they would find the climate congenial, but he also believed
they would want to leave the South to escape the oppressive white supremacy of the
former Confederate states, which he believed were inevitable. “[Santo Domingo] is
capable of supporting the entire colored population of the United States, should it choose
to emigrate,” Grant wrote. “The present difficulty, though sensless [sic], to in bringing all
parts of the United States to a happy unity and love of country grows out of the prejudice
to color. The prejudice is a sensless [sic] one, but it exists.” Grant understood that the
hostility of former Confederates toward African Americans might last a while, but
economic realities could mitigate conditions. “The colored man cannot be spared until his
place is supplied,” he wrote, “but with a refuge like San Domingo his worth here would
soon be discovered, and he would soon receive such recognition as to induce him to stay:
or if Providence designed that the two races should not live to-gether [sic] he would find

5

“Reasons why San Domingo should be Annexed to the United States,” [1869-1870], Series 3: Speeches,
Reports, Messages, 1863-1876, Ulysses S. Grant Papers, Library of Congress; The no-transfer principle
was rarely enforced from the 1830s until Fish instituted it in 1870. Jay Sexton, “The United States, the
Cuban Rebellion, and the Multilateral Initiative of 1875,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 3 (June 2006): 335365; Jay Sexton, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America (New York:
Hill and Wang, 2011), 4.
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a home in the Antillas [sic].” Emigrating from the South seemed to be a logical move for
African Americans and Grant considered Santo Domingo to be an ideal location.6
This notion of individual freedom of movement was a key component to
citizenship in the nineteenth century. Prior to the Civil War, African Americans had been
limited in their movements, whether slave or free, unlike white Americans. Martha Jones
notes in her examination of free Blacks in Baltimore in the antebellum period, Birthright
Citizens, that the loss of locomotion, or the ability to move about the nation freely, was at
the heart of denying people the right of citizenship. This “right indispensable to
citizenship” was central to Grant’s Reconstruction policy. He understood that the nation
was expanding and he sought ways to incorporate African Americans into the body
politic. The acquisition of Santo Domingo potentially provided another venue for the
United States to extend republicanism to other benighted peoples.7
For past eighty years, the only comprehensive analysis of the Grant administration
was historian Allan Nevins’s examination of Secretary of State Hamilton Fish’s life and
career, Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration. Even most modern
Grant biographers utilized Nevins’s work as the foundation for their discussions of
American foreign policy during the Grant administration. While certainly an important

6

“Reasons why” memo, USG, LC; Though Grant’s internal memo mentions African Americans moving to
Santo Domingo he never mentions this in his Message to Congress related to annexation. However, he does
mention it in numerous newspaper interviews. Eric T. L. Love, Race Over Empire: Racism and U. S.
Imperialism, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 31-32.
7

A note on my choice to capitalize “Blacks” throughout this dissertation: I decided to follow the style
guidelines of the Brookings Institution which decided, in September 2019, to capitalize Black and Blacks,
“when used to reference census-defined black or African American people.”
https://www.brookings.edu/research/brookingscapitalizesblack/ [accessed 22 November 2019]; Martha
Jones, Birthright Citizens: A History of Race and Rights in Antebellum America (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2018), 28.
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contribution to the historiography of the Grant administration, its diplomacy, and the
Reconstruction era, the book suffers from several deficiencies. Primarily, Nevins echoes
the William Archibald Dunning interpretation of Reconstruction, which examined the era
from a white supremacist perspective. The Dunning School advanced the Lost Cause
narrative of Reconstruction, depicting it as a time of suffering in the South due to federal
oppression of white southerners and the limitations of African Americans thrust into roles
of authority. Modern historians denounce the Dunning interpretation of Reconstruction,
yet they continue to reference Nevins’s work as the definitive word on the Grant
administration’s foreign and domestic policies.8
Nearly eighty years later, historian Charles W. Calhoun published the first
comprehensive reexamination of the Grant presidency. Calhoun was able to utilize the
complete run of The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, and thus a more complex picture of the
Grant presidency emerges. Calhoun’s analysis is the latest in a wave of Grant revisionism
that depicts the president as more sympathetic to the plight of African Americans, as
suffrage and equal rights are central to the Reconstruction policies of the Grant
administration. Unlike the bumbling, ineffectual Grant depicted by Nevins, Calhoun’s
Grant “took more interest in foreign affairs than in most other business before his
administration.” Calhoun views Grant as a modernizer, a president who brings innovation
to the office much to the chagrin of his detractors. Calhoun gives equal weight to both
domestic and foreign policy issues in his study, yet he does not show them as a cohesive
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policy. As a work that seeks to examine the entire presidency, Calhoun has so much
ground to cover he cannot dive too deeply into diplomatic and political episodes that link
foreign policy and domestic Reconstruction together. As very few historians have done
so, it might be helpful to examine the historiographical trends of both United States
foreign policy and domestic Reconstruction to see how they have come together in recent
analyses.9
Historians of American foreign relations have often overlooked the
Reconstruction era, focusing more on the beginnings of American global reach at the end
of the nineteenth century. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Patterson’s condensed Major
Problems in American History series skipped over the Civil War and postwar era entirely,
jumping from the Mexican-American War directly to the Spanish-American War (the
two-volume edition has two chapters covering this era in Volume 1). That the editors
excised completely the pivotal era of the Civil War from the condensed edition is
problematic. Of the myriad methodological essays in the Cambridge University Press
collection edited by Paterson and Michael J. Hogan, none examined the Civil War and
immediate postwar era. This volume, which is an excellent primer for the different ways
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in which historians can examine American diplomacy, would be improved if the authors
utilized their analytical frameworks in the study of the Civil War era.10
The distinguished historian, Walter LaFeber, wrote several works focusing on the
development of the United States in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In The New
Empire, LaFeber utilized an economic analysis of American expansion by tying the
growth of the American empire to domestic economic developments. He continued his
analysis of the development of nineteenth-century America in his contribution to the
Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations subtitled The American Search for
Opportunity, 1865-1913. In this book, LaFeber examined the ways in which Americans
centralized power at home as they expanded abroad in search of economic opportunity.
This centralization of power helped the United States develop into a world power while
American business interests led the redevelopment of several foreign economies.
American hegemony caused the disorder, LaFeber argued, that led directly to
revolutionary outbreaks across the globe, which the United States either encouraged or
provoked. This analysis reflects the early growth of the Grant Doctrine, as the Grant
administration centralized American power in the hemisphere. Yet LaFeber fails to
recognize the revolutionary nature of the administration’s desire to export American
Reconstruction values to the people of the hemisphere.11
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Howard Jones’s and Don H. Doyle’s analyses of the diplomacy of the Civil War
era looked beyond traditional studies of decision-makers to examine the ways in which
President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of State William Seward sought to utilize
propaganda in order to sway European public opinion to the side of the Union. Jones
argued that “British intervention would almost certainly have led to a third war between
the Atlantic nations.” Jones showed that both the Union and Confederate governments
exerted well-thought out strategies that considered the intervention or non-intervention of
European states vital to their respective success. Doyle took a different approach,
eschewing an examination of the traditional diplomatic functions of the State Department
and focusing on the writings of European thinkers, such as Karl Marx, to demonstrate the
success of the department’s campaign to permeate American ideas of freedom throughout
Europe. Marx interpreted the meaning of the Civil War for European readers, arguing
that slavery was its cause and emancipation the United States’ goal “regardless of what
Lincoln declared to be the Union’s policy,” according to Doyle. Marx’s writings invoked
a struggle between oligarchy and free labor, one that the working classes of Europe were
duty-bound to support. This notion of free labor and liberty would continue into the Grant

status in the same period in his book Prelude to World Power. According to Dulles, American foreign
policy evolved from isolationism to active diplomacy defined by the “free security” of the United States, or
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proliferation of American writers and travelers around the world laid the groundwork for a conscious
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Administration as European immigrants who had fought in the Civil War embraced these
American ideals and returned to their homelands armed with similar rhetoric.12
Steven Hahn argued, in A Nation without Borders, that the United States
embarked on imperialism from the nation’s founding. According to Hahn, “the model of
governance inherited from the British was empire; that from the birth of the Republic the
United States was a union with significant imperial ambitions on the continent and in the
hemisphere.” Hahn noted that the United States based this imperialism on the expansion
of a slave economy, however, the Civil War forced the nation to rethink the idea behind
its empire. For Hahn, the central tension of the era was the “contradiction between nation
and empire,” that is, the contested ideology of a nation which held clearly defined borders
and an empire which was ever expanding. For the Grant administration, expanding during
Reconstruction meant expanding the new constitutional standard of equality to the people
of foreign lands and welcoming them into the body politic. However, it also meant
expanding a strong national government, a Union strengthened by the reunion of the
North and the South and a sense of nationalism taking root across the country.13
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Many Grant biographies mention his forays into foreign policy from the
perspective of individual events and crises. Jean Edward Smith’s Grant and Ronald C.
White’s American Ulysses presented Grant’s foreign policy as part of a larger analysis of
his presidency. Both authors devoted only a single chapter to foreign relations in their
eight-hundred-page biographies. Smith, particularly, cited Nevins’s Hamilton Fish as the
authority on Grant’s foreign policy. A more recent biography of Grant by acclaimed
author Ron Chernow also utilized the Nevins narrative of Grant’s foreign policy but he
broke with Nevins by focusing on the importance of Grant’s Reconstruction policy
toward African Americans and the centrality of the Reconstruction Amendments to the
era.14
Historians of the post-Civil War era have also focused on Reconstruction through
a variety of sub-genres that enhance our understanding of the complex time. These subfields reflect the variety of themes focused upon in this dissertation: slavery and
emancipation, the unfinished revolution, violence, labor, party politics, the Constitution
and citizenship, geography, and foreign policy. These themes reveal the ways that the
Grant administration’s Reconstruction policy affected African Americans, immigrants,
white southerners, and political elites in order to redefine the roles of citizens in the
changing republic. They show that Reconstruction was an era of competing policies,

Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1986), 21-22; Thomas J. Brown, ed., Reconstructions: New
Perspectives on the Postbellum United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 6-7.
14

Jean Edward Smith, Grant (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001); Ronald C. White, American Ulysses:
A Life of Ulysses S. Grant (New York: Random House, 2016), 517; Ron Chernow, Grant (New York:
Penguin Press, 2017); Other biographies of Grant worth examining are: William S. McFeely, Grant: A
Biography (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1982); Geoffrey Perret, Ulysses S. Grant: Soldier and
President (New York: Random House, 1997); Joan Waugh, U. S. Grant: American Hero, American Myth
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); H. W. Brands, The Man Who Saved the Union:
Ulysses Grant in War and Peace (New York: Anchor Book, 2012).

15

where white and Black Republicans viewed the goals of Reconstruction differently and
where the Grant Administration’s policies tried to fit these competing goals into a
singular domestic and foreign policy.
This dissertation contributes to the growing subfield of slavery and emancipation
studies in two important ways. It shows that the Grant Administration and the Republican
Party remained committed to emancipation after the Civil War, targeting the remaining
slaveholding societies in the Western Hemisphere. It also examines the ways in which the
Republican Party attempted to eradicate what it deemed the final vestiges of the slave
trade, the importation of contract laborers from China. Emancipation studies show the
complex ways in which former slaves integrated into the United States as freed people.
This dissertation adds to the dialogue by examining the Republican Party’s views of
emancipation on a global scale during Reconstruction. “Emancipation not only
eliminated an institution increasingly at odds with the moral sensibility of the age,” Eric
Foner wrote, “but raised intractable questions about the system of economic organization
and social relations that would replace slavery.” Emancipation in and of itself, historian
Chandra Manning noted, could not fix the hundreds of years of damage done by slavery
to the enslaved. For many African Americans, in the early days of emancipation,
citizenship meant an “alliance with the national government to help them attain their
visions of what freedom should be and mean.” Because African Americans lost many of
their hard-earned rights following Reconstruction, some historians have looked at
emancipation and freedom “as a process.” Through this analysis, “emancipation becomes
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a longer story, one that emphasizes the gulf between the federal government’s plans and
life on the ground in the postwar South.”15
Beyond analyses of slavery and emancipation, the field of Reconstruction studies,
which challenged the Dunning school, began with W. E. B. Du Bois’s revisionist Black
Reconstruction in America which centered the actions of African Americans. As a direct
reaction against the Dunning School, Du Bois argued that slavery was a profitable
economic system in which Black slaves were unpaid laborers and the loss of these
laborers destroyed one of the most profitable capitalist systems of the United States. The
destruction of Reconstruction, then, was an effort by white Americans to regain control
over Black labor that they had temporarily lost for the first time in American history. Du
Bois ushered in a new field of Reconstruction analyses that situated African Americans
as central figures in the story and acknowledged their slave labor as the central cause of
the Civil War. Historians Kenneth Stampp and John Hope Franklin continued in the same
vein, publishing their revisionist analyses The Era of Reconstruction and Reconstruction
after the Civil War, respectively. Whereas revisionists highlighted the positive aspects of
African American contributions in the Reconstruction period, historians in the 1970s,
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grown cynical following the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement, viewed
Reconstruction with a sense of skepticism. These works, historian Michael Fitzgerald
argued, took their cue from the New Left school of political history, developing postrevisionist analyses where “republican leadership during Reconstruction could only look
bleak.” Such analyses as William Gillette’s Retreat from Reconstruction, Fitzgerald
noted, argued that “the final withdrawal of military protection [of African Americans]
appeared as a ‘blind pursuit of peace at any price.’” To post-revisionists, the Grant
Administration failed African Americans. It was not until the publication of Eric Foner’s
seminal work, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution that Du Bois’s
revisionist argument was extended to situate the transformation of enslaved African
Americans into free laborers within the context of an ever-expanding nation state beyond
the post-revisionist argument of the failure of the Republican Party. Foner viewed
Reconstruction at a national level, centering freed people in his narrative and examining
the social, political, economic, and racial changes that developed as part of the
Reconstruction Amendments. According to Fitzgerald, “Foner’s emphasis on labor
struggle focuses attention on planters, casting them as the major adversaries of black
freedom.” Foner’s work is a synthesis of Reconstruction historiography, one that
examines the period through politics as well as social and cultural lenses. For Foner, the
failure of the United States to safeguard the rights of African Americans led him to
conclude that Reconstruction was an “unfinished revolution” which only bore fruit in the

18

Civil Rights era. As Fitzgerald observed, “if inclined toward optimism,” after reading
Foner, “one might view Reconstruction as an eventual triumph through disaster.”16
Foner’s notion of Reconstruction as an unfinished revolution has been taken up by
other scholars. This dissertation elaborates on the theme by examining the promise of
citizenship, not only for African Americans, but also for peoples in lands the Grant
Administration hoped to annex, for Native Americans, and for millions of immigrants
who were arriving in the United States during the 1870s. This dissertation highlights the
lost possibilities for African Americans, as white Southerners regained control of
southern legislatures and instituted Jim Crow laws that stripped Blacks of their hard-won
rights. This dissertation also discusses how the Grant Administration failed to implement
the initiatives of the Grant Doctrine throughout the Western Hemisphere while the
policies of equal rights during Reconstruction also failed. But it will do so by examining
Reconstruction through the lens of the administration’s foreign policy initiatives and their
effect on the domestic Reconstruction. While these failures are certainly evident, other
historians have taken a decidedly different view of Reconstruction’s success and failures.
As mentioned earlier, Mark W. Summers argued that for the vast majority of Americans
the sole purpose of Reconstruction was not equal rights, but reunion and a strong nationstate. In that regard, Reconstruction was a success. Historian Allen C. Guelzo agreed,
arguing that Reconstruction also had successes: preserving the Union, the lack of
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vengeance against the conquered foe, the economic gains for the freedmen, and the
Reconstruction Amendments enshrined in the Constitution. These analyses of the
successes and failures of Reconstruction have become the basis for the subfields of
Reconstruction studies that developed in the years following the publication of Foner’s
Reconstruction.17
This dissertation reflects one of the subfields of Reconstruction studies that
emerged in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, namely the study of
violence in the South. As a study of the effects of Reconstruction on African American
citizens, rebellion in Cuba, the Fenian invasion in Canada, Chinese immigrants, and the
attempted Native American “Peace Policy,” this dissertation examines moments of
history where violence and terror were prominent in the everyday lives of the
participants. The analysis of this subfield provides important context for the period under
examination as it relates to the administration’s attempts to incorporate non-whites into
the body politic of the United States. Recent studies have examined the ways in which
white southerners utilized terror and violence to intimidate African Americans to prevent
them from exercising their right to vote in local and federal elections. George C. Rable
noted that the acts of violence, riots, and terror, were increasingly local acts and political
in nature, incidents confined “to a smaller area [by the mid-1870s] but made…more
desperate and intense.” White southerners feared a Jacobin state, a government that
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would enact vengeance upon the former Confederates, while African Americans feared
the violence of the night riders, terrorists who slashed and burned in order to intimidate
the voting public. Historian Carole Emberton argued that the violence in the era was due
to a heightened masculinity that she traces to “a political culture that idealized military
valor and sacrifice as the ultimate expression of American citizenship.” The era, she
states, was a “struggle to overcome the ambivalence that had characterized antebellum
notions of masculinity and violence.”18
Another subfield of Reconstruction history is analyses of the Republican Party, its
rise to prominence during the Civil War, and how Black Republicans strengthened the
Republican Party in the South. This dissertation contributes to this subfield in at least two
important ways: it provides an analysis of intra-party conflict over foreign policy
initiatives and an analysis of Republican Party ideology and the tenets of republicanism.
The histories in the subfield offer a variety of analyses of the political issues of the
Reconstruction period, from political patronage to reform and free labor. The Republican
Party pursued an agenda during Reconstruction that was often at odds with that of the
Freedmen. Mark W. Summers’s The Era of Good Stealings examined the Reconstruction
era through the context of corruption reform and the use of claims of corruption as a
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political weapon. Republican factions charged the Grant administration with corruption
while southern Democrats charged African Americans with corruption in southern
legislatures, all in the name of reform. Prior to Reconstruction, Republicans supported
African Americans’ rights to be free, particularly to work as free laborers, enjoying the
fruits of their labor as members of the marketplace. Equality and citizenship, however,
were not significant planks of the Republican Party platform until the Congress enacted
the Reconstruction Amendments. Even then, many saw the amendments as merely tools
for sectional reconciliation and strengthening the Union. When the party began to focus
more on business interests and the national economy and less on the rights of African
Americans, the Reconstruction agenda receded, and Black Republicans lost control of
legislatures in the South.19
The subfield of labor studies has produced several works that examine the
expansion of African American agrarian work and the rise of the labor movement in the
South during Reconstruction. This dissertation reflects the subfield by examining the
reactions of elite African American leaders to the labor conflicts between African
Americans and Chinese immigrant labor both in the South and the West and provides an
19
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analysis of elite African American reactions to the great Exodus to Kansas following
Reconstruction. Works in this subfield provide historians with analyses of the ways in
which the federal government attempted to provide land for African Americans through
the Homestead Act. The Republican ideal of free labor for free men was borne out in
Reconstruction through the redistribution of public lands in the South. Unfortunately,
these lands proved to be unworkable as farmland and African Americans were unable to
make a living on the properties. Michael L. Lanza argued that the second Homestead Act
of 1866 “embodied the free land, free labor ideology of the Republican Party” by
explicitly extending property ownership rights to African Americans. White southerners
opposed it “because they were terrified that the legislation would drain their labor
supply.” Republicans utilized a similar program in their efforts to “civilize” Native
Americans during Reconstruction by forcing them onto homesteads on public lands,
requiring them to farm land that was untenable for agriculture. All these efforts were part
of a Republican plan that Heather Cox Richardson argued was a “happy vision of a
prosperous nation [that] could not be realized until the South converted to free labor.”20
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This dissertation, at its core, is an addition to the subfield of studies of citizenship
during Reconstruction. Reconstruction historiography focuses on the revolutionary
changes to the Constitution and the laws that brought equality and citizenship to African
Americans after the American Civil War. Historian Xi Wang argued that the Fifteenth
Amendment was the most important of these legal reforms “for it put into the hands of
millions of former slaves the right of suffrage, an essential right enabling a citizen to be
politically accountable in a democracy.” Susanna Michele Lee noted that Southerners
contested citizenship in the post-war South over the ground of loyalty. “Loyalty emerged
as a rival to white masculinity as the preeminent characteristic of good citizenship,” Lee
argued. For Republicans war-time loyalty to the Union was most important, for
Democrats, post-war loyalty as “re-devoted citizens” earned back former Confederates
their rights as citizens. White Southerners regained citizenship alongside African
Americans gaining citizenship for the first time, thus clashes were inevitable. Eric
Foner’s The Second Founding explored these revolutionary changes to the Constitution
by examining the birth of the Reconstruction Amendments and the Congressional
wrangling undertaken to make them a reality. Foner argued that the Reconstruction
Amendments represented a “seconding founding” of the United States, one that
fundamentally altered the Constitution and the meaning of citizenship. Though white
supremacists curtailed the rights of African Americans in the decades following
Reconstruction, the Amendments remained embedded in the Constitution making “it
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possible for movements of equality of all kinds to be articulated in constitutional terms.”
Such is the importance of the Reconstruction Amendments.21
Recently, historians of foreign policy have re-examined the Reconstruction era to
place the development of the United States in an international context. This dissertation
intervenes into both the historiography of diplomatic history and Reconstruction history.
It provides a diplomatic analysis that examines the foreign policy of the Grant
Administration as it attempted to export citizenship abroad. It also examines how the
administration tackled the complexity of naturalization in the immediate post-war years
and it views how the Republican Party utilized treaties and domestic laws to end what it
deemed to be the remaining legal slave trade, Chinese contract labor. Reconstruction is a
function of foreign policy in these analyses and they examine the ways that the economy,
imperialism, and diplomacy affected domestic Reconstruction pursuits. Jay Sexton noted
that the national debt and the debt of Southern states were both financed by foreign
capital, thus intermingling foreign relations and domestic Reconstruction. In 2009,
historian Mark M. Smith noted that, other than Sexton, no other historians had paid
attention to the intersection of foreign policy and Reconstruction. In the years since,
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historians have published essay collections examining the meaning of citizenship to
Native Americans and other essays of Reconstruction in the West, and notions of
Marxism in the Civil War. David Prior’s essay collection, Reconstruction in a
Globalizing World, examined the transatlantic connections between the United States and
Europe, anti-slavery movements in Latin America, European immigration to the
American southwest, and the rise of Irish-American nationalism. These essays represent
excellent forays into the intersection between foreign and domestic policy during the
Reconstruction era and are welcome additions to the ever-growing historiography of the
period. The collection “addresses how connections that stretched across the United
States’ borders intersected with and took shape from the pattern of events wrapped up
with and following from slavery’s demise and the Confederacy’s defeat.” Like the essays
in Prior’s collection, this dissertation is an answer to Mark M. Smith’s call for more
analyses of Reconstruction that examine the foreign and domestic together as unified
whole.22
The above works all offer a variety of historiographical approaches and
interpretations of foreign policy and the Reconstruction era. They range from economic
interpretations of expansion to political assessments of the decision-makers and the
motives behind their policies; from diplomatic histories to biographies; from social and
cultural examinations of Reconstruction to legal and political interpretations of slavery
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and citizenship. These analyses cover both short-term periods and over eighty years of
foreign affairs, state-level analyses and transatlantic interpretations. This dissertation will
show how the Grant administration developed a comprehensive Reconstruction policy
that encompassed both foreign and domestic affairs. It will add to the existing
historiography by placing the Reconstruction Amendments’ citizenship guarantees into
an international context as the Grant administration sought both to export citizenship
rights to peoples outside the United States and to bring them to those previously
considered ineligible for citizenship.
Chapter II, the first substantive chapter, examines Ulysses S. Grant’s attempts to
expand the equal rights of republicanism and citizenship beyond the structures of
domestic Reconstruction to the Western Hemisphere. Grant developed a policy, through
his efforts to annex the Dominican Republic as a territory to the United States which I
call the Grant Doctrine, which was behind his Reconstruction ideology. To Grant,
annexing Santo Domingo meant exporting Reconstruction’s Civil Rights gains to the
people of the Caribbean, creating a safe zone for former slaves, and developing an
economic and military foothold for the United States in the region. Grant’s political
strategy involved the extension of political and civil rights to freedmen and all African
Americans in the United States. With his proposed annexation of the Dominican
Republic, Grant sought both to extend these rights to additional people in the Caribbean
and secure them for African Americans at home.
This chapter examines two documents that articulated the basis of the Grant
Doctrine. The first is the memorandum entitled “Reasons why San Domingo should be
Annexed to the United States.” Penned by President Grant in late December 1869, he
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explained why Santo Domingo would benefit from entering the Union and why the
republican institutions of the United States would make the lives of the Dominicans
better. The memo also explains how the territory might become a haven for the freedmen
looking to escape the violence and oppression of Southern whites. Moreover, Grant
envisioned the Dominican Republic as a beacon of freedom throughout the Caribbean
whose free labor and tropical produce would out produce and ultimately depress slavebased economies on the neighboring islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Grant’s memo also
outlined where Grant saw the United States’ place in the world both economically and
militarily. Grant believed that this foothold in the Caribbean would contribute to the
United States’ growth as a world power.
The second document at the core of this chapter is Grant’s message to Congress
which echoed the memorandum in almost every point. While Grant only shared his
memorandum with his Cabinet and staff, the message to Congress helped to solidify the
president’s views on what I have termed the Grant Doctrine. Interestingly, in this public
statement, Grant omitted his idea of Santo Domingo as a haven for African Americans,
probably assuming that a focus on the rights of freedmen would undermine the prospects
for congressional approval. However, his message to Congress included the remaining
points of the memorandum, which asserted the emergence of the United States as the
arbiter of freedom in the Western Hemisphere and the champion of the eradication of
slavery in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Brazil. It also envisioned the United States as the
dominant military force in the Caribbean and established the Reconstruction republican
ideology as the cornerstone of Grant’s foreign policy. The Grant Doctrine, then,
encompassed both the domestic and foreign policies of Reconstruction as Grant
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attempted to implement significant Civil Rights transformations that helped define the
United States’ place in the post-Civil War world.
I argue that the Grant Doctrine provided the central focus of the administration, so
Chapter III examines the episode at the heart of the policy attempt, the failed annexation
of Santo Domingo in 1869-1870. Specifically, it delves into Orville E. Babcock’s mission
to the island nation and the methods Secretary of State Hamilton Fish and President Grant
utilized to accomplish a treaty. It centers on Babcock’s initial fact-finding mission,
drawing upon the never published diaries of Grant’s private secretary and former aide-decamp, which contain his observations about the island, the Dominicans, and their fitness
as republicans. His diaries present the perspective of a republican, military man who
viewed the Dominicans skeptically but optimistically predicted the beneficial and
modernizing force of the United States on the island nation. Babcock represented the
typical American point of view, paternalistic, culturally insensitive, and arrogant, while
also viewing the people and the nation through the lens of free labor and free institutions.
Yet his opinions of the Dominicans, their culture, their society, and their political acumen
are important for understanding how Grant viewed and interpreted the Dominicans as
possible future American citizens. Ultimately, Babcock recommended that Grant pursue
annexation. The chapter also examines the fraught diplomatic process in which Babcock
participated, the congressional hearings which examined the annexation scheme and
charged Babcock with fraud, and the political rift that developed between Grant and
Republican Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts. This chapter shows that, while the
Grant administration made numerous diplomatic mistakes, annexation was key to the
Grant Doctrine and was a central tenet of Grant’s Reconstruction policy.
29

Chapter IV examines how naturalized American citizens, particularly Cuban
Americans and Irish Americans, defined their rights as citizens in the Reconstruction era.
Many who had fought in the American Civil War embraced the republican ideals of
American democracy and championed them in their rhetoric calling for liberation of their
homeland. The Irish Fenian movement, which sought to overthrow British rule in Ireland
through political activism and armed rebellion, gained popularity in the United States in
the years immediately after the Civil War. Large rallies of Irish American Fenians
utilized their American citizenship rights to their advantage by engaging in political
speech in the United States against the British that was illegal back home in Ireland.
These speeches riled up Irish American sentiment against the British, fueling armed
conflict. Fenian incursions into Canada and Ireland, where the Canadian and British
governments arrested and charged many of these Irish Fenians with sedition, failed in
their goal but succeeded in creating political celebrities out of the imprisoned Fenian
leaders. Once arrested these men claimed American citizenship and sought the protection
of the United States government.
Cuban American groups similarly sought to support an independence movement
in Cuba that began in 1868. Some sailed from the United States to the island and, upon
arrest by Spanish officials, claimed American citizenship and protection. The question of
recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban rebels represented an important test for the
Grant Doctrine. The Cuban rebels’ struggle to overthrow the Spanish, end slavery and
establish a republican form of government were ideals which squared with those
espoused in the United States. Yet Grant failed to recognize or provide support to the
rebels and the naturalized Cuban Americans who sailed to Cuba to participate in the
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rebellion. This chapter examines the complicated questions that arose following the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and the end of the Civil War, as naturalized
citizens embraced republican ideals and exported them to the world to foment
revolutionary change in their homelands. It examines the ways in which Grant and
Secretary Fish dealt with the diplomatic intricacies of these cases, and the realpolitik
solutions that pulled Grant away from the ideals of the Grant Doctrine in order to
maintain peace and secure other pressing international objectives. The chapter also
investigates the methods that Fish deployed to establish Washington, DC, as the
metropole of the Western Hemisphere, and the two major diplomatic crises, the Alabama
claims and the Virginius affair, that Fish negotiated on behalf of the Grant
Administration. These episodes all revolved around questions of citizenship and the
United States’ place in the world which were central to the Grant Doctrine.
Chapter V delves into Grant’s attempt to provide Native Americans a pathway to
citizenship in the early days of his first term. For Grant, this path entailed embracing the
trappings of western civilization and republican institutions, whether Native Americans
wanted them or not. The chapter likens Grant’s policy toward Native Americans to his
policy toward the Dominicans and shows how Grant’s Indian policy was similarly an
extension of the Grant Doctrine. Much as Grant sought to bring Dominicans into the
republican experiment from outside of the United States, he sought to do the same for
Native Americans within the nation’s borders. Grant sought to treat them as natural born
citizens of the United States, who, once civilized, could be welcomed into the body
politic. To help Grant institute his Indian policy, he looked to his long-time colleague,
Ely S. Parker, a former Union General and Chief of the Seneca tribe of New York. Parker
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encouraged Grant to follow a plan that allowed Native Americans to establish republican
institutions on their reservations to manage their own affairs. Parker believed that Native
Americans would better accept the trappings of Western civilization and republicanism if
they oversaw their local governments in their territories. The administration had to fight a
Congress and an Indian agency loaded with representatives of religious organizations
who believed that Native Americans were inferior to whites and therefore were incapable
of being effective decision-makers in their own affairs as well as political appointees only
interested in their positions for self-interest. The fact that Parker, a Native American,
oversaw the Office of Indian Affairs, riled Grant’s enemies who set out to prove that
Parker was guilty of fraud and, by extension, end the president’s plans to make citizens of
the Native Americans. In the end, these groups succeeded in derailing Grant’s plans for
Native American citizenship.
This chapter also notes the dichotomy between Grant’s desire to accept Native
Americans as citizens and his attempts to block the path to statehood and citizenship for
the Mormons in Utah. To Grant, the Mormons were more uncivilized than the Native
Americans due to their embrace of polygamy. Beyond that, the Mormons flouted
republican institutions by packing juries and pledging their allegiance to their Church
before the authority of the federal government. Grant considered these acts unrepublican
and believed the problem so significant that he denounced the Mormons and polygamy in
nearly every Annual Message to Congress. If the Mormons acted with such impudence,
he posited, they did not belong in the United States. Since its founding in the 1850s, the
Republican Party had considered polygamy to be one of the twin pillars of barbarism
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alongside slavery. After the emancipation of over three million African Americans, Grant
and the Republicans looked to end other forms of slavery in the Western Hemisphere.
Grant considered the forced labor of Chinese “coolies” working on railroads and
in mines in the West as no more than slavery. These immigrant laborers were forced,
often tricked, into working for minimal wages for an undetermined amount of time for
business interests in China and the Unites States. Worse than coolie labor, though, were
the immoral prostitution rings that arose around Chinese labor camps. These women were
essentially sex slaves in Grant’s eyes, and their presence in the United States was a stain
on the face of republicanism. That many of the Chinese immigrant workers were willing
migrants and that a marked percentage of Chinese women in the United States were not
prostitutes made no difference to Grant or the Republican Party. Their core values of free
labor and anti-slavery, which drove Grant’s Reconstruction policies at home and abroad,
necessitated action in the American West as well. This chapter, then, examines the oftencontradictory ways in which President Grant sought to extend republican principles to the
as-yet unreconstructed West.
Chapter VI examines various aspects of Grant’s Reconstruction agenda from the
perspective of African American activists, politicians, newspaper editors, and former
abolitionists. These Black leaders remained loyal supporters of the Republican Party, of
Grant’s candidacy in both presidential elections, and of the national Reconstruction
policies in the Southern states. This chapter shows how Black leaders viewed Grant’s
attempts to export Reconstruction into the Caribbean through the annexation of Santo
Domingo and the proposed introduction of over one hundred thousand Dominicans as
citizens of the United States. Black leaders differed in their views as to whether Grant’s
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scheme was for the betterment of the Dominican people or was an attempt by his
administration to exploit the island nation for its natural resources and its strategic
location. African Americans, while solidly supportive of the Republican Party at the
ballot box, held nuanced views of Grant’s Reconstruction policies beyond the borders of
the South. African Americans joined many Republicans in their support for the rebellion
in Cuba and the emancipation of Cuban slaves, and they expressed consternation at
Grant’s refusal to recognize the rebels as belligerents in the conflict. As Grant had made
the eradication of slavery a core component of the Grant Doctrine it stood to reason that
he should support the rebels in Cuba. When he chose to remain neutral, it led African
Americans to question his motives.
This chapter also examines the ways in which African American leaders viewed
the Grant Administration’s immigration policies as they affected Black labor in the
South. Freedmen in the South finally enjoyed life as free laborers in the Reconstruction
era, but it was not easy to acquire work for good wages as millions of new workers joined
the market and they battled with the racist violence perpetrated by the former
Confederates. Black southerners competed with immigrant labor including Chinese for
jobs in the South and in the West. African American leaders held complicated views
regarding Chinese immigrants as they struggled to square their republican values of
equality with western prejudice against the Chinese as uncultured and uncivilized
heathens. Many African American leaders supported the immigration of Chinese
workers, while at the same time held racist views of these immigrants as uncivilized and
unworthy as American citizens. Others, like Frederick Douglass, supported not only
Chinese immigration but full Chinese citizenship as well. This chapter examines the
34

complicated views of African American leaders as they balanced their desire for racial
equality with their beliefs in Western Civilization and their hopes for free Black labor in
the Reconstruction South.
By the end of Grant’s presidency, the violence in the South had reached untenable
levels for many African Americans. As Grant left the White House for his famous World
Tour, Blacks began to leave the South by the hundreds in search of better jobs and a more
secure environment free of the racial animosity that came with the resurgent Democratic
victories in southern elections. Frederick Douglass worried that by moving, Blacks were
abandoning the South and that the government was abdicating its responsibilities,
enshrined in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, to enforce the citizenship and
voting rights of African Americans. If the federal government could not enforce the laws
in the South, he argued, it could not enforce them anywhere.
This chapter examines a few areas of Grant’s Reconstruction policy which
African Americans grappled with beyond the implementation of their own social and
political rights. While Black leaders wholeheartedly supported the Republican Party and
Ulysses S. Grant at the ballot box, they were not always of one voice when it came to the
president’s individual policies. Grant’s decision to export Reconstruction beyond the
borders of the American South and beyond the needs of African Americans alone raised
concerns among Black leaders who questioned exactly who should enjoy the equal rights
and the cause of liberty that they had fought so hard to attain. The republican values that
Grant espoused through the Grant Doctrine were born of the Reconstruction
Amendments and Black leaders supported the expansion of freedom to the enslaved in
the Western Hemisphere. In the end, even if they faltered in their support of Grant’s
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specific policies, African American leaders remained stalwart in their support of Grant
and the Republican Party throughout the Reconstruction era.
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CHAPTER II
A NEW DOCTRINE
Late in December of 1869, nearly ten months after his inauguration as President
of the United States, Ulysses S. Grant sat down and drafted a memorandum that would
come to define the grand strategy of his administration. He penned this document,
entitled “Reasons why San Domingo should be annexed to the United States,” as a set of
talking points for questions that he and his Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, would
inevitably field in their attempts to acquire Senate approval for the annexation of the
Caribbean nation. Grant, with edits and suggestions from Fish, outlined not only his
foreign policy objectives for the United States but also his intent to extend his domestic
policy of Reconstruction throughout the Western Hemisphere. This memo amounted to a
reiteration of Grant’s, and by extension, the nation’s position on republican values. Grant
and his administration hoped to promote freedom throughout the Caribbean through the
eradication of slavery, the support of free trade, and the expansion of the American
economic system. Doing so, Grant posited, was in keeping with the United States’ oftrepeated adherence to the Monroe Doctrine. What Grant was proposing, however, was
something quite different.
This chapter will analyze the Grant Administration’s attempt to export republican
ideals into the Caribbean through annexing the Dominican Republic and how this move
articulated his strategy for dealing with both domestic and foreign affairs. An internal
37

document, the annexation memorandum contained some ideas that Grant neither
presented to the public nor even discussed outside of his Cabinet meetings. This chapter
will compare the memorandum to his message to Congress months later, in 1870, in
which he officially presented the themes of his doctrine, particularly the idea of the
United States as the arbiter of freedom and emancipation in the Western Hemisphere. In
doing so, this chapter will show that Grant, with assistance from Secretary Fish, intended
to institute a new doctrine, born of the Monroe Doctrine but dedicated to upholding the
values of the U.S. Constitution, including the Reconstruction Amendments, as the United
States attempted to influence the political and economic development of its hemispheric
neighbors. Further discussion in subsequent chapters will delineate how numerous
foreign policy and domestic roadblocks in Congress hindered the administration’s
attempts to enact this new doctrine. This chapter will also note that while Grant was
willing to extend the blessings of liberty to African Americans and Blacks in the
Caribbean, his stance toward Native Americans was much more complicated.
The Grant Doctrine envisioned an American sphere of influence in the Western
Hemisphere that erased the economic and cultural influences of Europe, by which Grant
meant the continuation of slavery in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Brazil. Grant’s Doctrine
argued for an expansion of American economic and cultural influence to open up the
countries of the Caribbean, Central, and South America to American trade and
investment, but also to the republican ideals of freedom, free labor, and liberal
democracy. To Grant, the annexation of the Dominican Republic by the United States
would be an extension of the promise of the Civil War and the civil rights gains of
Reconstruction. Grant’s political strategy involved the extension of political and civil
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rights to former slaves and all African Americans in the United States. Through his
proposed annexation of the Dominican Republic, Grant sought to extend these same
rights to people of the Caribbean.23
Annexation meant the exchange of people and cultures along with American
ideology. Grant sought to reshape the Dominican Republic into a liberal democracy that
could achieve equal participation in the American political and economic system.
Citizenship and voting rights were two pillars of Grant’s Reconstruction policy at home,
alongside the traditional Republican Party ideology of free labor and free men. By
annexing the Dominican Republic and offering citizenship and equality to the
Dominicans, Grant attempted to create a sphere of influence in the Caribbean that would,
by its mere presence and successes, force neighboring slave-holding nations to abolish
the Old-World practice and adopt American republican ideals and culture. Grant
believed that the United States would throw off Old-World influences in the Western
Hemisphere by finally acting upon the liberal ideology of the nation’s founders, the
acceptance of men, both Black and white, as equal under the law. A recent study by
Stephen McCullough examining the Grant administration’s policy in the Caribbean posits
that Grant and Fish laid the groundwork for future economic expansion into the region
that would be borne out in the late nineteenth century. While McCullough focused on the
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economic impact of the Grant Administration’s policy in the Caribbean, Reconstruction
is not central to his analysis. McCullough’s examination echoed arguments by Walter F.
LaFeber that the immense expansion of American manufacturing and economic growth
drove imperial pursuits in the Caribbean and the Pacific. LaFeber also concluded that
race was a guiding factor in the eventual defeat of the Dominican annexation treaty, yet
he does not explicitly tie the attempt to Grant’s broader policy of Reconstruction.24
Grant’s Reconstruction policy represented a chance at stabilizing the nation in the
aftermath of the American Civil War. The Grant Doctrine represented his method to
stabilize the Union economically, politically, diplomatically, and militarily.
Reconstruction offered the Republican Party a chance to restore the nation back to what it
had been prior to the war, without the stain of slavery. African American rights were part
of this strengthened Union, yet, most Republicans envisioned the republic after
Reconstruction looking similar to the one prior to Reconstruction without the institution
of slavery, that is a white man’s republic. Grant’s Reconstruction policy, though,
envisioned something quite different. He envisioned a strengthened Union including new
citizens, non-whites and foreigners, previously excluded from the body politic, and he
saw the United States’ ever-increasing sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere
expanding even further afield.25
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Grant’s ideas and ideology were more than just a corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine. They were a new method of thinking about the United States’ place in the
world and the revolutionary nature of American ideals following the American Civil
War. Global analyses of the war in which Grant emerged as the nation’s hero argue that
the United States was but one battleground in an international revolution of ideas.
Following the defeat of the Confederacy and the establishment of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and Grant’s push for the Fifteenth
Amendment, the United States was finally able to complete “the greatest civil
change…since the nation came into life.” Republican government, Grant wrote in a
proclamation after the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, “must depend measurably
upon the intelligence, patriotism and industry of these people [African Americans].” For
Grant, annexing the Dominican Republic offered an initial step in healing the wounds of
the Civil War and the first attempt to fulfill the true promise of the American
Constitution. Citizenship and free labor finally provided African Americans the means to
enjoy the republican experiment. According to Grant, offering similar blessings of liberty
to the Dominican people would directly influence the surrounding nations to adopt
similar economic and political systems. Chief among these, he believed, would be the
idea that nations still practicing slavery would succumb to the logic that slavery was no
longer a profitable economic system, nor morally just, in a region defined by liberty and
freedom. Annexation, he argued, would be another major step toward finally making a
free and republican Western Hemisphere.26
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Much like the Monroe Doctrine, the Grant Doctrine was high-minded in concept
yet unsuccessful in immediate application. Not only was the primary pillar of the
doctrine unattainable because annexation never stood a chance of passing the Senate, but
political and diplomatic necessity forced Grant and Fish to appease European powers
rather than support revolutionary and republican movements in the Americas against the
Old World order. The Grant Doctrine distilled the president’s ideas of republicanism and
the promise of Reconstruction into an international setting, yet Grant was unable to
implement his core idea, despite numerous attempts, forcing him and Fish to straddle the
line between ideology and practical diplomacy. They chose political expediency over
support for republican movements because they understood that meant the difference
between war and peace with Europe. Although Grant toyed with the idea of supporting
the insurrection in Cuba against Spain and the Irish Fenian revolt against British Canada,
Fish persuaded the president that doing so would undermine significant negotiations with
the British and the Spanish over perceived wrongs committed against the United States
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during the Civil War and immediately after. Fish balanced his president’s hopes for a
Western Hemisphere free of both European influence and the sin of slavery with a
practical need to negotiate with the British and the Spanish in order to prevent war with
one or both nations. Historian Jay Sexton argued that Grant turned to the Monroe
Doctrine as a last resort in order to gain support for the annexation of Santo Domingo in
the Senate. However, an examination of Grant’s December 1869 memorandum shows
that Grant was considering the implications of annexation as an outgrowth of the Monroe
Doctrine well before the administration made the annexation treaty public.27
The Grant Doctrine, then, amounted to more than just a rationale for why the
United States should add the Dominican Republic as a territory, and it was more than just
an addendum to the Monroe Doctrine. For the first time in the history of the United
States, a president embraced an ideology of expansion to bring freedom and equality to
all inhabitants of the hemisphere, and to scuttle the influence of Europe that, according to
the president, undermined republican institutions and sustained the institution of slavery
economically. Eric T. L. Love examined the ways in which race was used to defeat the
annexation of the Dominican Republic in his book Race Over Empire. He argued that
Grant kept the racial motivation for annexation, possible African American immigration
to the territory, a secret because he understood that it would ruin the chances of Senate
approval of the treaty. Love noted that all of Grant’s messages to Congress on annexation
left out the emigration (or as Love calls it, colonization) of African Americans which
Grant mentioned in his memorandum and he faults Grant for failing to come up with a
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better solution to the racial strife of the Reconstruction South than the mass removal of
African Americans. In fact, the racial aspect of annexation was actually at the forefront of
Grant’s annexation scheme from the outset, as he sought to utilize the territory as a
springboard for emancipation throughout the Western Hemisphere and for the acceptance
of non-white “civilized” people into the body politic of the United States.28
Grant’s memorandum followed months of official and unofficial diplomacy
between the United States and Santo Domingo. The Dominican President, Buenaventura
Baez, utilized American land speculators Joseph Fabens and William Cazneau as
intermediaries with the Grant Administration to express his desire for annexation to the
United States. Fabens and Cazneau were notorious speculators who brought nefarious
reputations to their work and therefore their presence as central figures in the negotiations
led many in the United States Senate to assume that annexation was a corrupt scheme.
The prospect of annexation, however, intrigued Grant and despite reservations from
Secretary of State Fish, he moved forward with a fact-finding mission. After he was
satisfied with the economic potential of the island and the desire of the people to join the
United States, Grant next ordered Fish to begin the process of negotiating a treaty of
annexation. Foreseeing questions from members of his Cabinet and Congress, Grant
wrote out his memorandum to clarify his reasoning for annexing the island nation to the
United States.
Grant began his memo by commenting on the agricultural and economic benefits
of acquiring Caribbean territory. “It is an island of unequaled fertility,” he wrote:
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It contains an area (that part of it known as the republic of San Domingo) of
20.000 square miles, or 12,800.000 acres. One half of this is now covered with the
most valuable timbers known to commerce; at an elevation above the diseases
incident to a tropical climate, and is capable of producing, when cleared of the
native forest, 1500 lbs. of coffee pr. acre.
The fertile soil would help the United States to produce tropical crops that could not be
cultivated as successfully on the North American continent. Grant noted that “the valleys
and low lands are of great productiveness, the sugar cane requiring re-setting only once in
twenty years, and producing, [to the acre] with much less labor, nearly double [that] of
the best sugar lands of L[ouisian]a. to the acre.” Here Grant first hit upon the notion of
labor. The production of sugar cane had long been the purview of the slave-holding
class. Grant believed that United States citizens would flock to Santo Domingo to work
as free laborers to grow a variety of crops previously monopolized by the Slave Power
interests. “Tobacco, tropical fruits, dyes, and all the imports of the equatorial region, can
be produced on these lands,” Grant wrote, “San Domingo is the gate to the Caribean [sic]
Sea, and in the line of transit to the Isthmus of Darien, destined at no distant day to be the
line of transit of half the commerce of the world.” To Grant, the economic benefits of
annexing Santo Domingo grew beyond the merely agricultural: its location in the
Caribbean meant that it would soon be in the middle of a growing global transit of goods
across the isthmus. The construction of a Central American canal was a matter of when,
not if, and the Dominican Republic would therefore sit astride the world’s shipping lane.
An American presence in such a vital economic hub was important to Grant’s plans for
the future commercial growth of the United States. Labor and trade were key to
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stabilizing the Reconstruction economy and, therefore, the Union, and the annexation of
Santo Domingo would provide that stabilizing force the Union so needed.29
Beyond the island’s agricultural and trade potential, Grant considered the
introduction of the Dominican people into the American cultural and political sphere.
Grant noted that the population of Santo Domingo was “sparse,” yet the people were “in
entire sympathy with our institutions, anxious to join their fortunes to ours.” Like the
freedmen of the American South, the Dominicans were “industrious, if made to feel that
the products of their industry is to be protected; & tollrent [sic] as to the religious, or
political views of their neighbors.” Grant believed that their understanding of the concept
of free labor for free men would enable the Dominicans to assimilate into the American
system easily. “Caste has no foothold in San Domingo,” he argued, “It is capable of
supporting the entire colored population of the United States, should it choose to
emigrate.” As evidence from the diaries of Grant’s private secretary Orville E. Babcock
will show in the next chapter, Grant’s description of the Dominicans as being “in entire
sympathy with our institutions…” was not entirely accurate. Babcock’s diaries point to
division or, at the very least, indifference to annexation and American intervention in
Santo Domingo. There was a vocal majority in the Dominican government who were for
annexation, an indifferent populace in the hinterlands, and a rebellion underway, which
sought to use the prospect of foreign annexation to oust President Baez.30
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At this point in the memorandum, Grant began to detail how the annexation of
Santo Domingo fit into his overall goals for Reconstruction. African Americans, he
believed, would be more inclined to seek their fortunes in a place like Santo Domingo
than remain in the states where they had been held in bondage for so long. “The present
difficulty in bringing all parts of the United States to a happy unity and love of country
grows out of the prejudice of color,” Grant wrote, “the prejudice is a senseless one, but it
exists. The colored man cannot be spared until his place is supplied, but with a refuge like
San Domingo his worth here would soon be discovered, and he would soon receive such
recognition as to induce him to stay: or if Providence designated that the two races should
not live to-gether [sic] he would find a home in the Antillas [sic].” Grant was not blind to
the idea that racial prejudice was a real and present fact for African Americans. Grant’s
hope for Reconstruction was that this racial prejudice would subside once whites allowed
Black people to earn an honest wage for their labors and to invest in themselves and in
their country. The reunification of the southern states into the Union was on the horizon,
yet racial prejudice was a roadblock to Reconstruction. Grant figured that offering a
refuge in Santo Domingo for African Americans, away from the racial prejudice of
whites, would allow them to enjoy the blessings of liberty, the full force of the American
economy, and unobstructed participation in American political life. Yet Grant also noted
that the dream of domestic interracial harmony might just as easily remain unattainable.
In that case, Grant thought that African Americans would welcome the chance to leave
the discriminatory South behind and settle in Santo Domingo. Rather than colonization,
as Eric T. L. Love labeled it, annexation would create a unique Black-majority state
where African Americans would control their economic and political life while obtaining
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equal representation in the federal system, thus obtaining the goal of reunification while
also maintaining stability.31
Grant connected this plan for Reconstruction with his foreign policy. He
understood that an American foothold in the Caribbean would place the United States
into direct competition with European powers for control of the Western Hemisphere. “A
glance at the map will show that England has now a cordon of islands extending from
southern Florida to [the] East of the Island of Cuba,” Grant wrote, “with Jamaca, [sic]
and Grand Cayman south of that island, and a foothold upon the mainland in Central
America, thus commanding [on both sides of Cuba] the entrance to the Gulf of
Mexico…a gulf which borders upon so large a part of the territory of the United States.”
Annexation, then, was important to ensure an American economic, political, and military
presence in the region. American merchant ships and men-of war were necessary to
combat European economic dominance in the Caribbean. At the close of the Civil War,
the United States Navy had consisted of nearly 700 ships; however, the government
began scrapping the fleet soon after the war’s end, reducing the number to a mere three
dozen. Grant understood that a strong naval presence in the Caribbean was necessary in
the event of a war with a European power such as Great Britain, which had a fleet of
hundreds of ships.32 Great Britain, he argued, also “has a succession of islands runing
[sic] from [the] East of St. Thomas to South America, with another foothold upon the
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main land, British Guiana, thus nearly surrounding the Caribean [sic] Sea.” Grant wrote
his memorandum amidst serious diplomatic tensions with Great Britain. The United
States Senate had overwhelmingly defeated the Johnson-Clarendon Convention, an
attempt to settle outstanding disputes between the two nations arising from the Civil War.
Soon after, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner delivered a scathing speech that
claimed that the British owed the United States hundreds of millions of dollars for
damages incurred by British-built ships utilized by the Confederate Navy. Tensions
between the two nations were high at the end of 1869 and Grant understood war with
Britain was a realistic, albeit unwelcome, possibility. Therefore, he considered all this
when he wrote that: “The coasting trade of the United States, between the Atlantic
seaboard and all ports West, and South west of the Cape of Florida, has now to pass
through foreign waters. In case of war between England and the United States, New York
and New Orleans would be as much severed as would be New York and Calais, France.”
United States imports and exports were vulnerable in case of war with Britain; however,
Grant argued that an American presence in Santo Domingo would mitigate these worries.
A Reconstructed United States, then, was one that was strong and able to withstand an
international threat, and annexing Santo Domingo made this possible.33
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The United States imported all manner of goods from the Caribbean, but their
means of production and quantity worried Grant. In his memorandum, he addressed how
the United States might affect the future development of agricultural production in the
region, particularly regarding slave labor. “Our imports of tropical products, and
products of slave labor,” Grant wrote, “exceed our exports to the countries producing
them more than the balance of trade against the United States.” Tropical products, then,
made up a significant portion of American imports. Yet the fact that slave labor produced
these products made their importation unpalatable. “San Domingo can produce the sugar,
coffee, tobacco, chocolate and tropical fruits for a population of 50.000.000 of people,”
Grant argued, “Coffee and sugar there can be produced, with free labor, at but little more
cost pr. lb than wheat is now produced in our great North West.” Free labor in Santo
Domingo would improve the productivity of its export crops and drive down prices.
“With the acquisition of San Domingo,” Grant wrote, “the two great necessities in every
family, sugar and Coffee, would be cheapened by near one half.” Staple goods produced
by free labor would benefit the American people and undermine slave-based agriculture
elsewhere, and the best way to do that was through the acquisition of Santo Domingo.
One of Reconstruction’s goals was to “end slavery and give that freedom more than a
nominal meaning.” Supporting a slave economy in the Caribbean undermined that goal.34
Beyond the economic and military benefits of the annexation of the island nation,
Grant argued that acquisition was the moral duty of the United States as the leading
power in the Western Hemisphere. “San Domingo is weak and must go some where [sic]
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for protection,” Grant suggested, “Is the United States willing that she should go
elsewhere than to herself [seek protection from a foreign power]? Such a confession
would be to abandon our oft repeated ‘Monroe doctrine.’” Grant’s memorandum
represented a significant departure from the Monroe Doctrine, however, in that he
envisioned a hemisphere free of slave labor inspired by the example of the United States.
Whereas the Monroe Doctrine had sought to protect American interests in the early
nineteenth century from those of the old-world European powers, the institution of
slavery had still been intertwined with those American interests. With the dissolution of
the Slave Power, Grant’s Doctrine sought to protect American interests while eradicating
the institution of slavery for good in the Western world. “San Domingo in the hands of
the United States would make slave labor unprofitable,” Grant argued, “and would soon
extinguish that hated system of enforced labor.” The importation of goods from the
American tropics meant, “the United States is the largest supporter of that institution.
More than 70 pr ct. of the exports of Cuba, and a large percentage of the exports of
Brazil, are to the United States.” Annexation of Santo Domingo would allow the United
States to be free of the economic and moral burden of being attached to slave powers in
the Caribbean. “Upon every pound we receive from them an export duty is charged to
support slavery and Monarchy. A prohibitory duty, almost, is placed upon what we have
to sell. Get San Domingo,” Grant argued, “and this will all be changed.” It was Grant’s
contention that an American economic, military, and political presence in the region
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would force the slave holding countries to abandon the practice and adopt the American
system of free labor and liberty and open markets.35
Grant concluded: “San Domingo from its exposeure [sic] to the trade winds, and
its elevation is, in large part, free from the diseases of the tropics.’” Grant noted that “It is
nearer New York City, and all the North Atlantic Sea ports, than any American Sea port
in the Gulf of Mexico.” He reiterated the need for American commerce to have a
presence in the region, stating, “It can be reached without passing through the waters of a
foreign country. In case of a Maritime War it would give us a foothold in the West Indias
[sic] of inestimable value.” Grant likened annexation to the grand ideas behind
continental territorial expansion when he wrote, “Its acquisition is carrying out Manifest
destiny. It is a step towards claring [sic] …all European flags from this Continent. Can
any one [sic] favor rejecting so valuable a gift who voted $7.200.000 for the icebergs of
Alasca [sic].” Territorial expansion provided stability to the Union through land and
economic development, all for the benefit of the republic.36
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How, then, can this one memorandum be construed as a full-fledged presidential
doctrine, especially when it is unclear to most historians if Grant ever actually sent the
memorandum to anyone? Grant repeated the logic and arguments set out in his
memorandum in many conversations and interviews on the subject with associates and
congressional leaders throughout the annexation process as he sought to garner support.
In effect, Grant’s memorandum defined the essence of his administration’s foreign and
domestic policy. As Grant attempted to sway Congress, the memorandum provided the
source for arguments that both Grant and Secretary of State Hamilton Fish would espouse
to the American people.
Early in January 1870, President Grant left the White House and ventured across
Lafayette Square to the home of Senator Charles Sumner, chair of the powerful Foreign
Relations Committee. Grant arrived unannounced, where he found the Massachusetts
senator dining with friends, including two newspaper reporters. Sumner invited the
president into his home, whereupon Grant proceeded to share with him his desire to
annex the Dominican Republic as a territory to the United States. While no transcript of
the meeting exists, it would seem likely that Grant mentioned the benefits of annexation
as he saw them for African Americans, Sumner having been the champion of
abolitionism in the United States Senate. Grant left Sumner’s home under the impression
that he had acquired his support; however, Sumner later argued that he had not endorsed
the treaty of annexation, merely that he had agreed to consider it. From then on, a feud
developed between Grant and Sumner that would grow to jeopardize many of Grant’s
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foreign policy initiatives and his management of the Republican Party and its
Reconstruction agenda.37
Grant’s May 1870 message to the Senate on annexation reiterated his argument
that the United States should be a beacon for liberty in the Western Hemisphere. Grant
explained that he felt “an unusual anxiety for the ratification of this treaty because I
believe it will redound greatly to the glory of the two countries interested, to civilization,
and to the extirpation of the institution of slavery.” Grant invoked the United States’
tradition of claiming hemispheric supremacy when he argued that “the theory [doctrine]
promulgated by President Monroe has been adhered to by all political parties, and now
with apparent universal acquiescence, we have declared that [I now deem it proper to
assert the equally important principle that hereafter no] territory on this Continent shall
[be regarded as subject to transfer to a European power.]” Historians have often pointed
to this message as Grant’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, emphasizing his assertion of
the no-transfer principle. More important, however, was Grant’s call for the United
States to divest itself of all imports from slave holding nations and, more radically, for
the eradication of slavery throughout the hemisphere.38
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Grant sought to forestall hardline conservative anti-expansionists (that is, those
who sought to limit American acquisition of foreign soil), including his own secretary of
state, by acknowledging that the idea of annexing the Dominican Republic was the
brainchild of the Dominican leaders themselves. “The government of St. Doming [sic]
has voluntarily sought this alliance [annexation],” Grant wrote, “It is a weak power,
numbering probably less than 120.000 souls, [and yet] possessing one of the richest
territories under the Sun, capable of supporting a population of 10.000.000 of people in
luxury.” Grant again brought up the specter of European influence in the region by
claiming that he had “information, which I believe reliable that a first class European
power stands ready now to offer $2.000.000 for the possession of Samana Bay.” Here
Grant was referring to rumors in the diplomatic corps that either Great Britain or
Germany was interesting in acquiring Samaná Bay. In that case, Grant argued, what good
then was the Monroe Doctrine? “If refused by us what grace can we say to any [a]
foreign power who may come in for [from attempting to secure] the prize we refuse,
‘hands off’? The people of St. Domingo,” he claimed “are not capable of maintaining
themselves in their present condition and must look for outside support. [They] yearns
[sic] for the protection of our free institutions and laws, our progress and civilization. Let
us give them.” Unlike other imperial expansion attempts by the United States either
before or after, annexation of Santo Domingo would mean the expansion of the rights and
privileges of the U.S. Constitution as well as the cultural and economic benefits of
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American influence to non-whites in the new areas. Grant and the Dominican leaders
both envisioned a path to statehood, but Grant understood that would be a difficult sell to
both his Cabinet and the Senate. Secretary Fish informed the president that many
members of the Senate were unwilling to support a path to statehood as they did not want
to acquire new territories and many did not want more non-white citizens, but he offered
the idea of establishing a protectorate as an olive-branch to hesitant legislators. Grant
therefore offered the Senate another option by stating “if in good time providence should
make it clear that a Confederation of all the Islands of the Caribian [sic] Sea, and Gulf of
Mexico, under a protectorate or other supervision of the Unites States should be
desirable, there will be nothing in this treaty to prevent such an arrangement.” If not
statehood, then, at least the United States would provide protection for those who asked.
“Shall we refuse them?” he asked rhetorically.39
Through his message to the Senate, Grant sought to convince Senators of the
strategic value of an American presence in the Caribbean. “The acquisition of St. Doming
is desirable because of its geographical position,” he argued, “It commands the entrance
to the Caribian [sic] sea and [the] Isthmus transit of Commerce. It possesses the richest
soil, best and most capacious harbors, most salubrious climate and the greatest abundance
of [most valuable] products of the forrest [sic], mine and soil, of any of the [West India]
islands.” Grant continued to argue that this Caribbean acquisition would lead to the
growth of the American economy. “Its possession by us would [will in a few years] build
up a coastwise Commerce of immense magnitude in a few years, which will go far
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towards restoring to us our [lost] Merchant Marine. It will give to us those articles which
we consume so largely and do not produce, thus equalizing our exports with
our…imports.” Grant hoped that the members of the Senate saw the enhanced standing in
the world and the stability that annexing Santo Domingo would provide.40
The “lost Merchant Marine” was a clear statement to the Senate that he
understood the importance of the Alabama Claims and the disagreements that had led to
difficulties in the diplomatic relations with Great Britain. “[In case of foreign war],”
Grant argued, Santo Domingo “will give us a command of all the islands refered [sic] to,
in case of foreign war, instead of them becoming [and thus prevent an enemy from ever
again possessing himself of] rendezvous upon our very coast, for our enemy.” Santo
Domingo then would mitigate the problem of foreign control of vital waters in a time of
war. “[At present] Now our coast trade between the States bordering on the Atlantic and
those bordering on the Gulf of Mexico, is cut in two by the Bahamas and Cuba [the
Antilles],” Grant told the Senate, “Twice we must, as it were, pass through foreign
countries to get, by sea, from Georgia to the West Coast of Florida.” War with Britain
was a possibility on the minds of both the British and the American publics. Grant used
this to justify the annexation of Santo Domingo as an important contingency measure.41
Beyond added security in time of war, Grant reiterated that the acquisition of the
Dominican Republic would become a beacon for freedom in the Caribbean. “St.
Domingo, with a stable government,” Grant envisioned, “[under which her immense
resources can be developed] will give remunerative wages to tens of thousands of
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laborers not now upon the island.” Rather than drawing labor from the American South,
as he argued in his memorandum, however, he curiously suggested to the Senate that “the
labor will come in canoes, and in every conceivable way from [take advantage of every
available means of transportation to abandon] the adjacent islands both for [and seek] the
advantages [blessings] of freedom, and its sequence; each inhabitant receiving the reward
of his own labor.” Grant argued that an American presence in Santo Domingo would
lead to mass immigration to the island, either from free laborers on neighboring islands
and Haiti, or from runaway slaves. “Porto Rico and Cuba will have to abolish [slavery]
as a measure of self preservation [sic]; to retain its [their] laborers,” he told the Senate.
Strangely, Grant’s decision to leave out the passage about African American emigration
to the island undermined his own Reconstruction policy of equal rights while showing
political pragmatism in his attempt to get the treaty through the Senate.42
As an island of freedom in the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic offered the
United States a way to promote economic recovery from the Civil War. Not only would
Santo Domingo produce materials for the American market, it could also provide a new
outlet for the consumption of American goods. “St. Domingo will become a large
consumer of the products of Northern farms and Manufacturies [sic],” Grant argued,
“The cheap rate at which her citizens will [can] be furnished with food, tools and
machinery, will make it necessary that the other islands contiguous [islands] should have
the same advantages [in order] to compete in the production of Sugar, Coffee, tobacco,
tropical fruits etc. thus opening [This will open] to us a still wider market for our
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products.” Once Santo Domingo integrated into the American economy, then, the
neighboring island nations would ultimately follow suit.43
Producing American goods and shipping them to the Caribbean opened up new
markets, and the production of these goods by an American territory within the United
States would add to the nation’s treasury. “The production of our own supply of these
articles will cut off more than One Hundred Millions of our [annual] imports; besides
largely increasing our exports” Grant explained to the Senate, “With such a picture it is
easy to see how our large debt abroad is ultimately to be extinguished.” This debt had
reached over $2 billion in 1869, with over half of the debt in foreign loans. Again, Grant
tied the annexation of Santo Domingo to the domestic economy and the foreign interests
in the United States. “With a balance of trade against us (including interest on bonds held
by foreigners, and money spent by our citizens traveling in foreign lands) is greater than
[equal to] the entire yield of the precious metals in this country,” he wrote, “it is not so
easy to see how this result is to be [otherwise] accomplished.” Jay Sexton argues that the
Civil War had made both the Union and the Confederacy dependent on foreign loans, and
during the period of Reconstruction the Grant Administration attempted to transition the
federal Treasury away from government held foreign loans. However, the national
economy turned to privately held loans for businesses and industry. At the same time,
Sexton notes that the Republican governments of the Southern states sought foreign
investment in an attempt to stimulate their local economies. The investment of foreign
capital hindered political and diplomatic discussions of the annexation of Santo
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Domingo. Grant understood that foreign loans also burdened the Dominican economy
and that the repayment or cancellation of these loans was important to securing Senate
support for annexation. Economic stability was a key component of Reconstruction
policy and the ability of the southern states to reenter the Union and to strengthen the
republic. Grant hoped that acquiring Santo Domingo would alleviate the economic
burden of the national debt.44
Grant’s reluctance to procure foreign loans was an extension of his faithfulness to
the Monroe Doctrine. “The acquisition of St. Doming is an adherence to the ‘Monroe
Doctrine,’ he wrote, “it is a measure of national protection: it is assuming [asserting] our
just claim to a controlling influence over the great Commercial traffic soon to flow from
West to East by way of the Isthmus of Darien.” In advocating for annexation, Grant
argued that an American presence in Santo Domingo would “build up our Merchant
Marine; it is to build up [furnish] new markets for the products of our farms, shops and
maunfacturies [sic]; it is to make slavery insupportable in Cuba and Porto Rico, at once,
and ultimately so in Brazil; it is to settle the unhappy condition of Cuba, and end an
exterminating conflict.” Annexation, then, would “provide honest means of paying our
honest debts, without a long period of privation and want [without overtaxing the
people].” Grant ended his message by stating that annexation would “provide [furnish]
our citizens with [the] necessaries of every day [sic] life at cheaper rates than ever before;
and it is in fine a rapid stride towards that greatness which the intelligence, industry and
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enterprise of the Citizens of the United States entitle this country to assume among
nations.”45
Grant’s message to the Senate in May 1870, combined with his memorandum
from earlier in the same year, therefore amounted to a new Doctrine. Grant
revolutionized the application of the ideas of the Monroe Doctrine in the new world that
the Civil War created. Jay Sexton notes that “nineteenth-century doctrines…were not
accepted by all but competed with other doctrines.” The Grant Doctrine was both an
outgrowth of the Monroe Doctrine and something distinct. Prior to the Civil War,
enforcing the Monroe Doctrine meant doing so to aid a slaveholding American society.
President Polk had invoked the Monroe Doctrine when he justified the MexicanAmerican War and the United States’ demands for Mexican territory in the 1840s, which
Grant experienced as a young officer. Not only was expansion in the American southwest
during the antebellum period directly responsible for the coming conflict of the 1860s, it
was rooted entirely in the growth and replication of slave society in new territories.
Sexton argues that the intent of the Monroe Doctrine was to strengthen republican
governments in Latin America, but the republican government of the United States in the
1820s and 1840s sustained the system of slavery. The Monroe Doctrine, then, was a tool
with which the United States hoped to push out European influence in the hemisphere to
grow its slave-based economy. The Grant Doctrine was unrestrained by such
considerations. The blessings of liberty and freedom were central to Grant’s philosophy
of American hegemony in the hemisphere.46
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As a Doctrine, Grant’s ideas were offered up as an honest articulation of
American republican ideology and economic freedom. His doctrine represented a
realignment of purpose for the United States following its Civil War, a purpose which
Grant understood was the price to be paid for the bloody conflict. National reunification
required national stability, and Grant saw the Grant Doctrine as that stabilizing force.
Grant hoped to advance American ideals of freedom, free labor, and citizenship
throughout the hemisphere. He would do so by exporting an ideology which sought,
through economic and social change, to bring about an end to slavery in the region in
Cuba and Puerto Rico, and as a result, an end to European influence. Grant desired to see
the republican experiment replicated throughout the Caribbean and Central and South
America, and he understood that the process could begin on a small scale with the
acquisition of the Dominican Republic.
Grant quickly realized that conceiving a presidential doctrine was much easier
than implementing it. From the moment of his visit to Charles Sumner on Lafayette
Square, Grant encountered one roadblock after another to his hopes for Dominican
annexation. He was unable to convince enough senators to support his plan and he was
unwilling to limit his vision by embracing Secretary Fish’s suggestion of jettisoning
annexation in favor of a United States protectorate in the Caribbean. Grant’s singleminded desire to bring the Dominican Republic into the Union as a territory with a path
to statehood similarly attracted little support from the American public. The American
people had focused their efforts on building up the economy and rebuilding the former
Confederate states. Many Republicans believed Reconstruction would end when the last
southern state rejoined the Union, focusing their attentions on strengthening the republic
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and building up the national economy rather than on equal rights. Grant proved unable to
convince Congress and the American public that acquiring Santo Domingo would
enhance the nation’s economic and social well-being. Rather, Americans seemed to be
more interested in westward expansion, economic development, or the increasing
agitation over the Cuban rebellion against Spain, in which they urged Grant to intercede
on behalf of the Cubans. Grant, however, was unable or unwilling to do the latter, for fear
of upsetting other pressing diplomatic priorities.47
The main sticking point to implementing Grant’s doctrine of extending freedom
and republican ideology throughout the Western Hemisphere was the litany of diplomatic
disagreements that he inherited with Great Britain. These disagreements were rooted in
both conflicts over boundary lines and fishing rights in Canada and in the claims lodged
by northern merchant ship owners against the Civil War exploits of British-built
Confederate raiders, namely the CSS Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Shenandoah
(referred to collectively as the “Alabama Claims”). President Andrew Johnson and his
Secretary of State William Henry Seward had failed to conclude a successful deal when
the Senate voted down the proposed “Johnson-Clarendon Convention” almost
unanimously. Many Republicans, particularly Charles Sumner, wanted Britain to cede
Canada to the United States in lieu of payment for the Alabama Claims. Grant and Fish

47

See news clippings: “Cuba and the United States,” Evening Post; “Spain Bullying the United States,”
September 21, 1869; “Afraid of the People;” “Discouraging Accounts from the Cuban Patriots,” January 6,
1870; “The Republican Party and Cuba,” (Newspaper names not given), Hamilton Fish Papers, Library of
Congress.

63

both believed that American annexation of Canada was inevitable, but until that day, the
two nations would have to settle their differences diplomatically.48
These United States and British disagreements also enveloped the province of
Canada. The Canadians had petitioned the British government in 1866 for independence
and the establishment of a confederation. The cancellation of American-Canadian trade
reciprocity in 1866 by the United States, the continual problem of Irish-Fenian raids and
riots originating in the United States, the 1867 American annexation of Alaska from
Russia, and the clash of American and Canadian fishermen in both the Great Lakes and
northern Atlantic compounded American-Canadian-British animosity, as did the
unresolved Alabama Claims. Grant sought peaceful negotiations with the British, and
therefore ordered U.S. marshals to arrest all Fenians invading Canada and he thwarted the
attempts of American politicians who wanted to hasten the acquisition of Canada,
regardless of whether the Canadians wanted to join the United States. Grant prioritized
settling the numerous outstanding financial and political claims with Britain and
instructed Fish to negotiate an advantageous settlement.49
Grant compromised on his vision for a free and democratic Western Hemisphere,
in part, because of the pragmatism of his secretary of state and his own belief in the
ultimate inevitability of Canadian annexation. Fish and Grant understood that the
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difficulties between the United States and Great Britain represented the most urgent
diplomatic challenge facing the administration. While Grant spent the better part of 1870
focusing his attentions on the Santo Domingo treaty, Fish remained in constant
communication with the British Minister to the United States, Sir Edward Thornton.
While most of their conversations centered on the rights of Canadian fishermen and
traders, Fish continued to press the president on when he could begin negotiating the
settlement of the Alabama claims. Grant preferred to settle all of the difficulties between
Britain and the United States in a single treaty, but in December 1870, he relented and
authorized formal negotiations with the British. Canadian annexation was no longer an
objective of the negotiations because numerous correspondents and acquaintances had
convinced Grant and Fish that the Canadians would choose to join the United States of
their own free will sooner rather than later.50
A further test of the Grant Doctrine was the ongoing Ten Years’ War between
Spain and the independence movement in the Cuba. Many Cuban farmers and
abolitionists sought to overthrow Spanish control of the island and embrace
republicanism. The Ten Years’ War was a perfect opportunity for Grant to test the
viability of his doctrine, as many Americans were supportive of Cuban independence.
However, Grant, and more specifically Fish, decided against support and recognition of
the Cuban belligerency. Although Grant initially wanted to intercede on behalf of the
Cuban rebels, Fish understood that recognition of Cuban belligerency would undercut the
American legal argument against the British over the Alabama claims, which was based
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on the position that they had illegally intervened in a domestic conflict. The British
would view any American recognition and support of the Cuban rebels as interference in
a similar civil conflict between Spain and its subjects. Therefore, Fish convinced Grant,
it was better to act as an honest broker to resolve the differences between the Spanish and
the Cubans. Such an approach would allow the United States to maintain its stance
against the British while, at the same time, advancing Grant’s goal of a free and
independent Cuba. Grant and Fish therefore tried to forestall armed conflict with Spain
while the Cuban rebellion raged even as Americans inspired by abolitionism argued that
the United States should intercede on behalf of the rebels. In 1873, Americans called for
direct U.S. intervention as retribution for the killing of American citizens taken from the
American ship Virginius that had been supplying the rebels. The controversy that resulted
from the Virginius affair pushed the Grant administration closer to war with Spain.
Secretary Fish declared, “The capture on the high seas of a vessel bearing the American
flag presents a grave question…and the summary proceedings resulting in the
punishment of death, with such rapid haste, will attract attention as inhuman and in
violation of the civilization of the age.” Far from implementing Grant’s expansive
Doctrine, Fish personally handled the negotiations with Spain in order to make sure the
two nations did not go to war in the Caribbean. Grant and Fish understood that the
United States Navy was unprepared for war with Spain due, in large part, to the failure to
acquire Santo Domingo. Had the United States been able to obtain a coaling station, at
least, in Samaná Bay, the American naval presence there might have prevented the
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capture and seizure of the Virginius. As Grant had foreseen, however, the danger of war
between the United States and a major European power in the Caribbean was real.51
While all these diplomatic problems were happening in the Western Hemisphere,
revolutionary change erupted across the European continent. European states were
realigning and the long conflict between France and the German states culminated in the
Franco-Prussian War. As had been the case in the U.S. Civil War, the Atlantic Ocean did
not separate the United States and its Reconstruction travails from larger international
forces. In fact, the turmoil and upheaval throughout Europe directly affected American
foreign and domestic policy. During the Franco-Prussian War, shipments of Americanmade weapons to Europe tested the Grant administration’s policy on avoiding
involvement in foreign conflicts. The Administration had to answer for how American
rifles fell into the hands of French soldiers American citizens, some of German and
French birth, traveled across the Atlantic to participate in or observe the conflict,
including a number of American elites and diplomats who found themselves trapped in
Paris and Berlin in the early years of the 1870s. The development of the Paris Commune
in the spring of 1871 exacerbated former Confederate fears of African American
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leadership in the South and northern industrialists’ fears of rising organized labor as
Northern Republicans, newspaper editors, and Northern laborers employed the rhetoric of
the Commune as a fear tactic against African American laborers throughout the United
States. Black workers “relied on government jobs handed out by politicians who relied
on their support,” echoing the specter of the Paris Commune as madness in Europe. As a
revolutionary movement, the short-lived Paris Commune should have been ripe for
support from Grant, who professed liberty and equality. Yet, the Commune struck many
Americans as a crude and violent rebellion and not a true republican movement. Grant
instead supported the French Republic and the Paris Commune became an American
bogeyman, a metaphor for government gone awry.52
The decision not to assist revolutionary moments abroad was underscored by the
violent reaction to Grant’s Reconstruction idealism in the American South. African
Americans secured the rights of citizens through the Reconstruction amendments but
their white neighbors in the South were unwilling to recognize these rights. Much as
Grant had predicted in his memorandum, white southerners exhibited their animosity
against African Americans through violence and intimidation. Grant’s doctrine of
freedom, equality, and citizenship for all people in the Western Hemisphere proved to be
unobtainable in his own country. Despite numerous interventions with federal troops,
Grant could not stem the tide of violence and tumult in the South, and Secretary Fish was
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unwilling to support forcible attempts to create a society based on freedom and equality.
As Grant and Fish were implementing their foreign policy, they were also implementing
one of the greatest social changes in the nation’s young history. Grant’s exhortations on
the idealism of the republican experiment and the notion of African American
participation in American democratic processes were undercut by the unwillingness of a
majority of Republicans to support the rights of African Americans and the weariness of
white Americans who were, as Grant wrote, “tired out with these annual, autumnal
outbreaks in the South.” Reunion was their goal, not equal rights, and once the reentry of
the southern states had restored the Union, many whites moved on from Reconstruction.
Grant’s Doctrine, then, was untenable from the start, as he and the American people were
unwilling and unable to support freedom and democracy at home just as they were unable
to support those rights for people abroad. 53
Outside of the plight of African Americans, Native Americans held a tenuous
position in Grant’s dream of freedom and equality in the United States. Even among the
attempts and failures listed above, Grant’s doctrine of a hemisphere free from the sins of
slavery and from European influence was, much like the Monroe Doctrine, hampered by
its own time. Though Grant sought to include African Americans, Central Americans,
South Americans, and Caribbean people in his experiment, his doctrine had little room
for the Native Americans living within the United States. To Grant, all but Native
Americans had achieved the ideal of civilization. Native Americans did not farm, they
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did not worship a Western God, and they did not conform to civilized society in dress and
manner. Though African Americans and Caribbean peoples were new to republican
ideals they were capable of participating in the republican experiment because they had
proven their ability to perform labor, usually for the benefit of others. In short, they were
civilized and understood what it took to be a hard worker and a successful citizen. Native
Americans, Grant believed, were unwilling and unable to participate in the republican
experiment until they embraced western civilization. Grant envisioned an entirely
different policy for Native Americans, one that required they reform their social structure
and be educated in western cultural and economic norms, after which they might become
civilized citizens. Grant’s close aid, Ely S. Parker, a Seneca Indian who had risen
through the military ranks and was on Grant’s staff at Appomattox, embodied Grant’s
notion of a civilized Native American. However, he believed most were not yet there,
and his administration set about on a wholesale reorganization of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs to rein in graft and scandal and to utilize a combination of military and later
religious leadership to civilize Native Americans. This policy resembled the Grant
Doctrine in many ways, establishing a path to citizenship for Native Americans and even
working toward establishing a Native American state, yet its conception and
implementation were markedly different. That Native Americans were not interested in
Grant’s definition of civilization seems to have been of little concern to him.
Ulysses S. Grant’s inaugural address, on March 4, 1869, has never been viewed as
one of the great American speeches. In terms of foreign policy, the new president offered
little more than a desire for an equal exchange of the rights of all citizens between the
United States and the nations of the world, including African Americans. Regarding
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Native Americans, however, Grant advocated further analysis of their situation. “The
proper treatment of the original occupants of this land—the Indians is one deserving of
careful study,” Grant wrote. “I will favor any course toward them which tends to their
civilization and ultimate citizenship.”54 Grant hoped to end the violence that existed
between the United States and the Native Americans, particularly those in the West.
Prior to and during the Civil War, violence grew exponentially between the Federal
Army, white settlers, and Native Americans. As many western tribes began to side with
the Confederacy, Union reprisals against Native Americans led to bloody conflicts on
government sponsored reservations and in white settlements throughout the territories.
This, coupled with the reputation of the white Indian Agents as greedy and criminal, led
many to see Grant’s election as a hope for reforming relations between the government
and the tribes.
Interestingly, Grant referred to Native American issues immediately after his brief
discussion of foreign policy. To that time, Native American tribes had dealt with the
United States as independent and sovereign nations, making treaties with the federal
government and negotiating for land and water rights in territories occupied by white
settlers. Often, however, white settlers had violated these treaties, provoking reprisals
from Indian tribes. The United States Army sent troops to quell the Indian uprisings and
the cycle of violence would continue. Grant sought to end this violence, first by
reforming the Indian Agency by placing military officers in charge of securing the peace,
and then having religious groups nominate suitable local agents. He also sought to
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reform the way the federal government negotiated with Native American tribes. No
longer would tribes be treated as sovereign nations. Instead, they would become wards of
the government, neither foreigners nor citizens. However, Grant believed his prescribed
path to citizenship for Native Americans comported with his republican ideology. This
will be explored in depth in a subsequent chapter. For Grant, once Native Americans had
fully embraced the trappings of civilization their citizenship would be guaranteed.55
The Grant Doctrine, then, was revolutionary in its notion of expanding American
influence and republican values, not just for economic or political gain, but also as a
source of social good throughout the Western Hemisphere. However, it was also a naïve
concept that proved to be impossible to implement for fear of undercutting vital
diplomatic negotiations. Grant proved unwilling to act upon his stated beliefs in the
difficulties born of Santo Domingo, Cuba, Canada, or Native American policy. While
Grant was sentient, his doctrine was not. The Grant Doctrine was an exercise in which
the president laid out a strategy of combining the international, political, and economic
power of the United States with the domestic Reconstruction of its political institutions.
It was an effort to redefine the role of the nation in the Western Hemisphere and to
produce several democratic republics in the image of the United States. His failure to
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implement his ideas, however, should not detract from their revolutionary intent,
particularly the quest to dismantle slavery, bolster trade, and supersede European
influence in the region.
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CHAPTER III
BABCOCK, SANTO DOMINGO, AND CITIZENSHIP
In the 2006 essay collection Reconstructions: New Perspectives on the Postbellum
United States, Mark M. Smith argued, “Reconstruction as a domestic episode is best
understood by appreciating foreign developments and initiatives.” Smith noted the
relative dearth of foreign policy analysis of the Reconstruction period and argues that
integrating foreign policy into the Reconstruction narrative would help historians to
understand the ways in which Americans situated the United States in the world. A
transnational analysis of the changes brought on by the Civil War, he wrote, “broadens
and enriches our understanding of changing conceptions of class, democracy, and
nationhood.” Broadly speaking, placing American foreign policy into the framework of
Reconstruction enables historians to contextualize the rapidly changing political and
cultural landscape of the United States compared to the world. According to Smith,
historians should view the many revolutionary and nationalist movements that occurred
during the 1860s and 1870s as part of a transnational narrative of changing ideologies,
including those in the United States. “Diplomatic historians,” he argued, “might well take
the Reconstruction period more seriously than they have, not least because their full
understanding of the late-nineteenth-century developments will necessarily have to
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include earlier developments.”56 The post American Civil War period, then, can be
considered part of a global reconstruction of ideologies.
One episode that occurred early in Ulysses S. Grant’s presidency that benefits
from Smith’s analysis was the attempt by the Grant Administration to annex the
Dominican Republic to the United States. For Grant, annexation of San Domingo (as he
called the Caribbean nation) was the lynchpin in a foreign policy initiative that he
envisioned as a function of his Reconstruction policy.57 Beyond a simple act of American
imperialism, Grant saw the annexation of the Dominican Republic as an answer to
inevitable racial violence in the American South, and he hoped that it would become a
beacon of freedom in a Caribbean still scarred by the institution of slavery. He viewed the
annexation as a stabilizing force for American Reconstruction, as it would drive political,
economic, social, and military improvement during his presidency, strengthening the
Union and protecting equal rights. Annexation, then, was a method for Grant to extoll the
virtues of American republicanism throughout the Caribbean and to show that the United
States was indeed a champion of freedom and civil rights.
The attempted annexation of Santo Domingo exemplified the president’s embrace
of the Monroe Doctrine. Grant sought to establish the United States as the dominant
power in the Western Hemisphere and the sole arbiter over Latin America. “The time is
not probably far distant,” Grant wrote, “when in the natural course of events, the
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European political connections with this continent will cease.” Grant placed annexation
at the center of what he saw as the inexorable end of European influence, whether by
economic, diplomatic, or military means. In late November 1869, Grant and Secretary
Fish broached this topic when Fish handed the president a note that spelled out his ideas
on European transfers of territory in the Western Hemisphere. The first test for Grant and
Fish’s “no-transfer principle” of the Monroe Doctrine, which Grant first outlined in his
message to the Senate in May 1870, was Grant’s effort to annex the Dominican Republic
(Santo Domingo) as a territory of the United States. Grant envisioned a United States
presence in the Caribbean that would stretch across the Gulf of Mexico to Central and
South America. Annexation, he believed, would enable the United States to acquire
immeasurable commercial interests and become the arbiter of republican ideals. He
explicitly stated this exertion of American hegemony over the region in his Annual
Message to Congress in 1870, when he declared: “The acquisition of San Domingo is an
adherence to the ‘Monroe Doctrine;’ it is a measure of national protection; it is asserting
our just claim to a controlling influence over the great commercial traffic soon to flow
from west to east.” Grant’s attempt to annex Santo Domingo would ultimately fail, yet it
signaled a new moment for United States foreign policy that revitalized the previously
unenforced Monroe Doctrine and served notice to European powers that their influence in
the Western Hemisphere was under direct challenge. Grant hoped that Santo Domingo
would be the fulcrum for his plan to bring about the end of slavery in Latin America. The
expanding influence of the United States would “make slavery insupportable in Cuba,
Porto [sic] Rico, at once, and ultimately so in Brazil.” As one of the “twin relics of
barbarism,” slavery was key to the platform of the Republican Party (alongside
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polygamy). Santo Domingo would be the first step in placing the United States at the
forefront of the world. 58
This chapter examines the neglected story of Orville E. Babcock’s diplomatic
mission to Santo Domingo and the political wrangling that occurred in its aftermath. It
fills a gap in scholarship on the failed Santo Domingo annexation by providing the most
complete account to date of the 1869 episode and examining the nature of republicanism,
citizenship, and civilization as seen through the eyes of a young army officer, who was
both confidante and private secretary of the president. Utilizing correspondence,
congressional testimony, and Babcock’s diaries, which were maintained during his two
trips to Santo Domingo, this chapter demonstrates that Babcock performed his mission
faithfully based upon his instructions from both President Grant and Secretary of State
Hamilton Fish, that he struggled to manage diplomatic negotiations with the Dominicans,
and that his desire to bring about annexation for Grant led him to deny assistance to an
American citizen imprisoned in a foreign land. It also shows that Grant’s desire for
annexation grew out of the new doctrine which he hoped to implement; one that would
place the United States at the forefront of abolitionism in the Western Hemisphere.
Finally, the chapter charts the failure of the annexation treaty by focusing on Hamilton
Fish’s maneuverings with key senators and the ways in which European entanglements
obstructed Grant’s attempt to expand American influence in the Caribbean. This chapter,
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then, is a story of the varied ways in which Republicans viewed Reconstruction and the
United States’ place in the world.59
The attempted annexation of Santo Domingo was the next step in American
expansion that signaled a renewed effort of imperialism, in which the United States
sought to establish itself as an economic world power. At the close of the Civil War,
Abraham Lincoln’s Secretary of State, William Henry Seward, had envisioned an everexpanding United States that would rival European economic influence in the Western
Hemisphere through both the annexation of Alaska and other territories in the Caribbean.
Seward, though, did not intend to incorporate the non-white populations of such
territories into the American polity. Grant’s scheme for Santo Domingo, then, represented
a significant shift in the arc of American imperialism. Grant intended that the people of
Santo Domingo would enjoy citizenship rights and the protections guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. Annexation was, to Grant, the answer to numerous problems
affecting the United States during Reconstruction.60
For Grant, the annexation of the Dominican nation to the United States was the
first step toward the fulfillment of his hemispheric strategy. His Grant Doctrine placed
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the United States at the forefront of hemispheric abolitionism, economic development,
and military superiority. Acquiring Santo Domingo would lead to a strengthening of the
Union, the expansion of American influence over North America, South America, and
the Caribbean, and positive social and political gains in the United States including the
full political participation, economic opportunities, and social equality of African
Americans. The influx of over one hundred thousand new citizens of Hispanic, African,
and indigenous origin into the United States would, Grant hoped, encourage racial
reconciliation in the South or, failing that, provide an American territory where non-white
citizens could enjoy the fruits of their own labor and the blessings of republican liberty.
But the Grant Doctrine was about more than race, it was about the role of the government
in crafting policies both foreign and domestic and about stabilizing the Union through the
efforts of Reconstruction.
Grant’s ideas regarding citizenship were part of a long American tradition
regarding republicanism. Americans held fast to the idea that the people of the United
States were the sovereign voice, and that voice represented the best of American
idealism. To Grant, African Americans were citizens because they had worked hard,
accepted the cultural norms of civilized society, and, most importantly, had served and
fought for their freedoms. African Americans had proven their worth as citizen-soldiers
and, because of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments now had the constitutional
right to participate in the body politic. Andrew F. Lang argued that “the citizen-soldier
tradition grew from the ethos of American republicanism, a culture adopted during the
Revolution and consolidated in the early republic.” Prior to the Civil War this
“republicanism defined white Americans’ citizenship, individual liberty, and protection
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of natural rights by government, while limiting the coercive scope of governing
institutions.” Though this ideology would change drastically after the Civil War as many
Americans accepted the role of a strong coercive government, Grant continued to believe
that African Americans had proven to the nation, through their labor and their service,
their ability to make good American citizens. While many Republicans viewed the Civil
Rights Amendments as measures to bring about an end to Reconstruction and to restore
the Union, African Americans and their white allies understood the revolutionary nature
of their entrance into the body politic, possibly none more so than African American
veterans.61
It is important to note here that Grant based his offers of citizenship upon his
notions of what constituted a civilized citizen. Civilization, to Grant, was contingent upon
the acceptance of western social and religious norms, free labor, and modernity. African
Americans had fully assimilated into western civilization, in Grant’s eyes, as had the
Dominican people, therefore they were worthy of the rights of citizenship afforded by the
U.S. Constitution. Grant might not have understood the irony of his willingness to extend
citizenship rights to the Dominicans, many of whom were descended from indigenous
people and African slaves, whom many in even his own party saw as uncivilized, while at
the same time denying these same rights to Native Americans. In his first inaugural
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address, Grant noted that he hoped that the people of the United States would treat Native
Americans with respect, but he continued to question their fitness for citizenship. “The
proper treatment of the original occupants of this land--the Indians,” Grant told the
gathered crowd, “is one deserving of careful study. I will favor any course toward them
which tends to their civilization and ultimate citizenship.” Native Americans, then, were
not yet civilized and until such time they could not be considered for citizenship. African
Americans and, Grant hoped, Dominicans, were already fit for citizenship.62
The Grant Doctrine was not representative of the beliefs of the entire Republican
Party. Many strident abolitionist Republicans opposed legislation that provided equality
for African Americans. These liberal republicans, as historian Andrew L. Slap described,
were fearful of a strong federal government and they did not support “uses of federal
power that they admitted could be seen as tyrannical.” The liberal republicans were a
small group consisting primarily of Charles Francis Adams, Lyman Trumbull, and Carl
Schurz and a few dozen more politicians, writers, editors, and businessmen. All vocally
criticized President Grant’s annexation scheme, but they supported his plans for
Reconstruction in the American South. Yet, as Slap noted, “classical American
republicanism was one of the primary prisms through which they saw and interpreted the
world.” They feared the centralized power of the federal government, believing it akin to
the Slave Power that Grant’s army had overthrown in the war. They also feared
corruption, which they suspected of being behind the Santo Domingo scheme. This
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traditional republicanism did not allow for the federal government to craft legislation
protecting the rights of the freedmen and it certainly did not permit the president to annex
a nation which they saw as unassimilable.63
Grant’s attempt to annex the Dominican Republic was not the first overture by the
United States toward expansion in the Caribbean; in fact, many prior administrations had
argued that a strong presence there was vital for strengthening American commerce and
military security. Previous administrations had sought coaling stations on the island and
some had considered territorial acquisitions in the area. These earlier expansionist
schemes, however, ran counter to Grant’s logic regarding the annexation of Santo
Domingo. In the early days of the nineteenth century, Southern slave-owners had sought
to strengthen slavery by annexing Cuba. Indeed, United States interest in acquiring Cuba
was one of the reasons that President James Monroe had originally issued the Monroe
Doctrine. These early Cuban annexation schemes would have provided citizenship not to
the vast majority of those inhabiting the island, enslaved persons, but only to the select
white planters who maintained the profitable sugar plantations. This would specifically
have averted the Haitianiziation of the island by forestalling a slave insurrection against a
weakening colonial power. Grant, however, always intended for the entire Dominican
population to become full U.S. citizens. The end of the Civil War had brought freedom to
millions of enslaved African Americans. The freedoms and citizenship which Grant
intended for these Americans would also be available to the Dominicans, regardless of
their racial background. At no other time before, nor for many years after, would an
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American president offer full citizenship to people whom many white Americans viewed
as an “other.”64
Before penning the Grant Doctrine, the president dispatched a fact-finding
mission to ascertain the Dominicans’ desire for union and their ability to maintain
economic and political stability. Although Secretary of State Hamilton Fish did not
support annexation, he was a loyal member of the Cabinet, so he agreed to send one of
his staff members to Santo Domingo to report on the situation on the ground. The first
two men he selected were unable to complete their missions (one due to illness the other
due to shipwreck), therefore, at the last minute, Grant sent his personal assistant and
former aide-de-camp, Orville E. Babcock, in their stead. Fish was not keen on sending a
non-diplomat to perform such work, but with such little notice and Grant’s persistent
desire to obtain some information on the Caribbean nation quietl, Fish relented. He
provided the young officer with a passport and instructions, sending him on his way in
mid-July 1869.65 The president and the secretary of state instructed Babcock to report
on:
[the] population in principal towns, cities, and country. Total, North and South or
any other order of distribution; Revenue for last fiscal year and the half of present
year, How obtained; Expense for last fiscal year and the half of present year;
Tonnage and flag under which the business was done last fiscal year and half of
the present year; National debt, foreign and domestic, how issued, where held,
rate of interest, how to be paid, what guarantee; Has any foreign power grants
from the Republic?; List and character of grants and concessions to private
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individuals and to companies; List of public property, in general terms; Size of
Army and Navy; Copy of the Constitution.66
Fish also requested information on the “number of whites, pure Africans, of mulattoes,
and of other mixtures of the African and Caucasian races; of Indians, and of the crosses
between them and whites, and Africans, respectively.” Both Grant and Fish understood
that the racial makeup of the island would be just as important to Congress and other
political leaders as the economic and foreign entanglements of the Dominican
government. While racial equality was an aspect of Reconstruction it was mostly an
impediment to progress and national unity, as many Republicans and all Democrats
believed African Americans were not able to participate in the body politic. The racial
makeup of the Dominicans was a necessary factor for many members of Congress who
would eventually lead the charge against annexation. Grant believed that having all this
information would better enable him to make his argument to Congress on behalf of
annexation and would prepare him for any challenges to the acquisition of the nation by
European powers.67
As Grant’s private secretary, Babcock did not question the appropriateness of his
selection to visit Santo Domingo. As Charles W. Calhoun notes, the relatively last-minute
nature of Babcock’s selection undermined all the charges later levied against Grant and
his personal secretary that they had been in collusion with Dominican speculators for
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months prior to Babcock’s departure. In fact, the choice of two diplomats prior to
Babcock, made by annexation skeptic Hamilton Fish, further undermines such charges.
Babcock took his mission as a direct order from his commander-in-chief and he left with
the understanding that his was a fact-finding mission and that he had no other authority or
treaty making powers. Babcock returned bearing samples of natural resources, economic
data, and a report of his visit. However, he also provided Grant and Fish with a
memorandum, drawn up by the Dominican president Buenaventura Baez, expressing his
administration’s desire for annexation, which embarrassingly referred to Babcock as
President Grant’s “Aide-de-camp.”68
Some historians have maintained that Babcock went beyond his mandate to report
about the island’s economy, industry, and resources and instead assisted the Dominican
president in creating a protocol stipulating terms for annexation. While Babcock’s official
commission from Hamilton Fish limited him to inquiry only, it is clear from Babcock’s
own journal entries and from subsequent correspondence from Grant himself, that the
president intended Babcock to obtain written requests from the Dominican government.
Though researchers should read Babcock’s diaries with caution, as his credibility is
certainly in question, much of his diary matches up with the Senate testimony of his
colleagues and many of the central figures in the annexation discussion. In fact, his
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diaries reveal him as a naïve diplomat instead of the shrewd conspirator so often depicted
by his critics.69
Babcock’s diaries also provide insight into what the potential annexation of Santo
Domingo would mean to the educated elite class of Republican men. Babcock observed
a strange and foreign “other” through his own personal prism of republicanism and
civilization. That Grant and Fish had tasked Babcock to report on the economic,
political, and social conditions is evident throughout the journals, yet what also comes
across are Babcock’s distinct ideas about what republican political tradition and civilized
society meant to him. Babcock’s experiences in Santo Domingo ultimately informed
Grant’s opinion on the annexation scheme, and, as a result, lay the groundwork for the
Grant Doctrine. Grant developed a grand strategy not only for economic advancement
but also for the broader expansion of republicanism. Babcock’s mission, then, provided
the first analysis of the Dominican people as potential beneficiaries of Grant’s
hemispheric Reconstruction.
In 1869, the Dominican Republic was a nation attempting to emerge from decades
of turmoil and strife resulting from both internal clashes and external conflicts. Following

69

Nevins argued that Grant gave Babcock instructions to work out Baez’s desires on annexation “without
Fish’s knowledge.” This is highly unlikely. Nevins, Hamilton Fish, 265; Nevins pointed to Babcock’s
testimony in the Davis Hatch investigation as evidence of this yet in the testimony Babcock testified that
Grant’s “instructions were to go to the island and have a conversation with Baez myself.” Babcock testifies
that he hands Baez a memorandum containing his instructions that match those given to him by Fish. Eric
Foner made the same claim, but his source is Nevins’s book. Davis Hatch, 36; Eric Foner, Reconstruction:
America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: Perennial Classic, 1988), 495; Eric T. L. Love
used Eric Foner as his source to make the same claim. Love, Race over Empire, 38; Stephen McCullough
claimed that Babcock not only exceeded his instructions but “that Babcock conspired with Baez to secure
annexation is beyond question.” McCullough cited Babcock’s diaries and notes in reaching his conclusion.
Stephen McCullough, The Caribbean Policy of the Ulysses S. Grant Administration: Foreshadowing an
Informal Empire (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018), 56; Ron Chernow echoes the Nevins claim that
Fish was unaware of Babcock’s instructions to bring back the memorandum. Ron Chernow, Grant (New
York: Penguin Press, 2017), 664.

86

its separation from Haiti in 1844, Santo Domingo suffered civil rebellion and a constant
threat of Haitian domination. Regional leaders fought for position and influence in the
newly independent nation, hoping to exert their will over the populace. Buenaventura
Baez and Pedro Santana headed opposing factions, and each led the nation respectively
and attempted to consolidate power. This included courting the support of foreign
powers. While Baez turned to the United States in 1855, offering a lease of Samaná Bay,
Santana sought the assistance of the British and the Spanish. The Europeans and the
Haitians looked warily upon any U.S. military presence in the Caribbean.70
As Santana and Baez traded the presidency back and forth, fighting between their
two factions left the nation in ruins. Economic disruption, coupled with continued threats
from Haiti, led Santana to seek Spanish assistance again. In early 1860, he sought
protectorate status and Spain annexed the nation in 1861 but was immediately beset by
troubles. The renewed presence of the former colonial masters created an atmosphere of
resentment among many Dominicans and within a year, the Restoration War broke out.
The conflict united both Dominicans and Haitians, who were also unhappy with the
Spanish imperial presence next-door. The conflict finally ending when the Spanish
withdrew in 1865. This Spanish intervention in Santo Domingo came at a time when the
United States was in no position to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. President Abraham
Lincoln was not inclined to assist the Dominicans as long as he had a rebellion of his own
with which to contend.71
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United States influence in the Dominican Republic was nothing new to the
Dominican people, nor was African American expatriation. Christopher Wilkins notes
that African American colonists had fled the United States in the antebellum period and
populated the Bay of Samaná, which Grant coveted for its strategic location. In 1825,
this “colony’s founders resolved to escape the American racial caste system” by settling
in then-Haitian territory. By the time of Grant’s attempted annexation, the hundreds of
colonists living there “embraced annexation because they believed that the U. S.
government would extend its reconstructed institutions southward, [incorporating]
Dominicans as equal citizens in the American nation.” Grant’s professions of equality
and freedom throughout the Caribbean resonated more strongly with the African
American colony in Samaná than it did with the rest of the Dominicans.72
Wilkins noted that Republicans who opposed Dominican annexation also opposed
Grant’s efforts at Reconstruction, particularly his support of African American rights.
They cast the annexation project in the same light as attempts to move African Americans
into the American political sphere. Led by Carl Schurz and Charles Sumner, they argued
that African American freedom had been the only goal of the Civil War, not equality.
Schurz would later found the Liberal Republican Party as a direct challenge to Grant’s
quest for African American rights and as a pushback against what he saw as
governmental overreach. Heather Cox Richardson noted, in her book The Death of
Reconstruction, that Schurz saw the advancement of African American rights as tied to
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governmental corruption. Schurz and other Liberal Republicans questioned why
Dominicans should be granted citizenship when former slaves were not up to the task in
the American South? To Liberal Republicans, Reconstruction had ended once the
Southern states had all returned to the Union. There was no need to add additional
uneducated, urepublican people into the citizenry when the Southern states were
struggling to incorporate freedmen into the body politic. “Black-skinned additions to
America as slaves were one thing, as far as white southerners were concerned, but as
voters quite another,” Mark Wahlgren Summers has observed, “With so few white
inhabitants, Santo Domingo was surer to elect a solid delegation of nonwhite senators and
congressman than even South Carolina.”73
Grant dissented from such thinking. He believed that African Americans were
indeed up to the task of citizenship and, in order to prove it, he needed to annex Santo
Domingo. One of Baez’s first attempts at securing the Grant administration’s support for
annexation came within a month of Grant’s inauguration and the arrival of Hamilton Fish
in Washington. In his diary, Fish noted that he was visited by a man named Joseph
Fabens on April 5, 1869, who “brought a memorandum purporting to be from the Govt.
of the Dominican Republic.” It proposed the annexation of the Dominican Republic to
the United States, entering “as a free and sovereign state.” Fabens’s memorandum
looked to the precedent set by the annexation of Texas to the Union in 1844. Fish
questioned Fabens’s authority to bring such a proposal to the United States on behalf of a
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foreign nation, noting his own reluctance for annexation. Fabens explained that he was
acting as a commercial agent on behalf of the Dominican government and had previously
placed on file in the State Department a memorandum of statistics relating to the island
nation. Fish maintained that annexation held little chance of passing Congress and that
he was “not inclined to entertain it favorably” and that he “had not time or inclination to
take part in its consideration, or in urging it.”74 Even though he personally expressed his
disinterest in the scheme, Fish brought the approach up to President Grant the very next
day.
Fish’s prejudice toward the Dominicans was most certainly a significant reason
for his antipathy toward annexation. At a meeting of the Cabinet on April 6, 1869, Fish
“informally presented” Fabens’s proposal. According to Fish’s diary, “I explained it [the
proposition], but said that I was opposed to considering it at present,” arguing that such
an action must originate in Congress, and “there is no time for such action at the present
session.” Grant relied on Fish’s counsel regarding matters of the State Department, and
the Cabinet agreed that there was not enough time for the Congress to take up the
matter.75 His diaries show that he opposed annexation of any nation in the Caribbean. In
June 1869, Fish told the British Minister, Sir Edward Thornton, that the United States
wished to maintain its neutrality in the ongoing Cuban rebellion against Spain
announcing that he did “not want annexation, but the Independence of the Cubans.”76 In
a Cabinet meeting in late 1869, the subject of Dominican annexation was broached after
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Babcock returned from his first trip to the island. General William T. Sherman, acting
Secretary of War, argued that he doubted that Caribbean nations, and by extension the
people there, were ready to join the American Union. “Sherman doubts the influence of
the climate on free institutions,” Fish wrote in his diary, “thinks our acquisitions of
Texas, New Mexico and of the greater part of California have been a source of weakness,
and are a burden.”77 This was a typical view of General Sherman’s. In the immediate
aftermath of the Civil War, he stated the social order of whites and Blacks should revert
to what it had been prior to the conflict. He did not believe in citizenship rights for
freedmen, arguing that they only deserved the right not to be mistreated because of their
color. Sherman articulated what many Republicans believed to be the main goal of
Reconstruction: securing the South’s return to the Union and a return to the status quo
minus the stain of slavery. Grant’s desire to bring in an additional 100,000 or more Black
citizens went too far. Fish expressed a similar opinion upon the subject of annexing Cuba.
Speaking to German Minister Baron Gerolt, Fish noted that annexing Cuba to the United
States was not in the nation’s best interest. “We derived forty millions [sic] a year of
custom duties from Cuba, which would be lost by its annexation,” Fish recorded in his
diary, “beside the necessity of expenditures…the character of the population was not
homogenous with ours.” The Cubans, and by extension the Dominicans, were not capable
of assimilating into republican institutions because of their race and culture. The
overwhelming majority was Catholic, many were of Spanish or African heritage, and
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some had indigenous heritage. To many Americans, the creolization of the Dominicans
made them incapable of introduction into the body politic.78
On July 17, 1869, Babcock set sail to Santo Domingo onboard the steamship
Tybee, accompanied by Republican Senator Cornelius Cole of California, Colonel Joseph
Fabens, and Judge Peter J. O’Sullivan. The ship sailed for six days before initially
reaching the Turk Islands, where the party rested before continuing on to Santo Domingo.
During the voyage, Babcock quizzed Fabens about Santo Domingo. He also gauged the
interests of his shipmates regarding annexation speaking with two Dominican citizens,
Mr. Coen and Mr. Deetjen, who also offered their opinions on a variety of topics.79 The
men stressed the need for infrastructure growth: the people “want communication – good
roads and rail roads,” in other words, the benefits of modernity. Deetjen explained that
the livestock in Santo Domingo had been neglected for such a long time that the horses,
mules, oxen, and sheep were all very small. Regarding the racial makeup of the island,
they explained that the Spanish and Indians had intermarried and that the old tribes no
longer existed. However, very few of the Indians had intermarried with Blacks. They also
explained that there were valuable mines on the island known only to the old women of
the countryside, who refused to divulge their locations to outsiders. Regarding currency,
the men stated that paper money “had been repudiated by the people,” and that the
amount of government issued bonds was very small. They concluded by stating that
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Baez’s generals were all in favor of annexation and would fall in line with any decision
he made. 80
Babcock had an interest in the nation’s trade. He observed that the main crop
shipped from the Puerto Plata harbor was tobacco, and that most of the ships carrying it
flew the German flag. Although one American schooner was moored in the harbor, it did
not take on any tobacco. “The pack trains [were] arriving from the interior all the time
with tobacco packed in their careless manner,” Babcock complained in his notes, while
also noting the lack of dyed wool and mahogany in the town.81 Trade connected Santo
Domingo to the rest of the world, yet, as Babcock observed in his diary, the Dominican
people needed the United States to educate them in the development of tobacco
production. While trade with Germany was undoubtedly profitable, he expected that
American investment in these harbors would modernize production and transportation
methods.
Babcock soon met with Colonel Enrique Abreo, the commandant of the city of
Samaná, to analyze the military situation in the country. During this discussion, Babcock
observed that the soldiers were armed only with machetes, though a few soldiers had flint
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lock rifles, which they said they preferred because of easy access to flint. Abreo informed
Babcock that every able-bodied male citizen was required to serve as a soldier. For both
Babcock and Grant, the state of the Dominican military was an important standard by
which to judge their degree of civilization and readiness for American citizenship. Both
men were career soldiers who saw military service as a rite of passage for republican
citizenship, and though the technology of the Dominicans army was lacking, the notion
that all able-bodied males were required to serve in a standing army ran counter to the
idea of the citizen-soldier who was called upon by the Republic when needed. Babcock
learned that Baez was commanding 17,000 troops in the Azua area. The Army issued the
men many different weapons, few had uniforms, and all lacked discipline. Babcock noted
that the men were a mixture of Blacks, Spaniards, and Indians. The racial make-up of the
military, as well as the nation, was an important factor to Babcock in the ability of the
people to embrace American republican values. They also discussed the judicial makeup
of Santo Domingo, noting that juries were non-existent. The alcalde, or magistrate, of a
city judged lesser offenses, while the courts sent higher offenses to a judge at Samaná,
and anything for the Supreme Court was sent to Santo Domingo City. The judicial
institutions of San Domingo, then, would have to be completely altered to fit into the
American legal system.
While examining the countryside that afternoon, Babcock determined that the
land, if cultivated properly, could feed three to four million people. Grant hoped that the
United States would be able to break its dependency on other Caribbean nations for the
importation of tropical goods, particularly sugar, rice, and fruit. These goods were
cultivated under slavery, which made the United States, Grant argued, complicit in
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slavery even after it had ended the practice at home. Santo Domingo no longer practiced
slavery thus making the annexation of the island and the cultivation of goods there
morally and economically ethical. Babcock, however, considered the Dominicans
insufficiently advanced in their agricultural pursuits. Much like their deficiency in
tobacco production, Babcock feared that they lacked the technology and expertise to
cultivate the land. Farming one’s own land was one of the first steps toward civilization.
Babcock believed that the Dominicans would require American guidance to take that first
step. Later that evening, Babcock called on the U.S. Consul, Somers Smith, who resided
in Domingo City with his son. Babcock’s first impressions of the Consul were negative,
describing him as “an old man in bad odor here.”82
As for the common people of Santo Domingo, Babcock was less than impressed.
Labeling them as a poor “rabble” living in thatched huts, he echoed the many ways in
which imperial societies denigrated the peoples with whom they interacted as less
civilized “others.” For him, the lack of development on Azua Bay, the single access road
in and out, and the straw houses reflected an antiquated society. The civilizing force of
the United States, then, would be necessary to achieve modernity, as American economic
expertise would transform the backward area into a modern port. Baez invited the group
to stay the night for dinner, with Babcock at the seat of honor, but he declined for fear
that his presence “might be an embarrassment to [Baez].” Baez was impressed with
reports that President Grant had sent the U.S.S. Seminole to patrol the waters around
Santo Domingo to assist in the search for the rebel ship Telegrafo. Though anxious, Baez
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claimed he had no true political opposition; Cabral only had a few men who wanted to
steal cattle and cause problems before fleeing to Haiti. Baez also charged that many
foreign nations were assisting the rebels in order to block U.S. influence in Santo
Domingo. While this claim was most likely untrue, it worked to convince Grant to
accelerate his annexation efforts.83
Most of Babcock’s time was spent feeling out his role as an unofficial diplomat.
Following his interactions with Baez, Babcock initiated his official duties by presenting
Dominican Secretary of State Manuel Maria Gautier with his letter of introduction from
Secretary of State Fish. Babcock next met with the Consul Smith to discuss annexation.
A holdover from the Andrew Johnson administration, whom Babcock immediately
distrusted, Smith made it clear that he favored the opposition forces in rebellion over the
Baez government, arguing that Baez was corrupt as were his American advisers, though
he claimed to have been working diligently to obtain a treaty for a coaling station in
Samaná Bay. Senator Cole, on the other hand, continued to be a trusted confidante to
Babcock, visiting with the young officer and discussing the methods by which Santo
Domingo could be successfully annexed. Cole believed that Baez’s control over the
nation was tenuous and feared that he would soon be overthrown. According to Cole, the
United States should not let the chance to annex the nation pass, but when pressed on the
subject of statehood, Cole did not think that the Dominicans were ready.84
Babcock’s statehood question to Senator Cole represented the first attempt by the
Grant Administration to gauge the sense of the Senate about admitting Santo Domingo to
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the Union. Cole, a Republican from California, offered what would prove to be the
prevailing opinion in the chamber, that the Dominicans were not yet ready for statehood.
Most senators, as well as Grant’s own secretary of state, believed that the Dominicans
were unfit to participate in the republican institutions of the United States. Instead, they
suggested the establishment of a protectorate over the island nations of the Caribbean,
under which the United States would offer economic and political support without
committing to annexing the island nations. Babcock reported Senator Cole’s views to
Grant who, despite Fish’s similar inclinations, continued to explore a path to statehood
for the Dominican Republic.
Over the next few days Babcock met with several Dominican officials, all giving
different versions of the country’s state of affairs. Gautier attempted to hurry negotiations
along, raising suspicions in Babcock’s mind, though he did not specify about what. Early
in the day, Babcock was besieged by a “crazy meddlesome fellow” named Elliott who,
after initially seeking money, attempted to procure the release of an imprisoned
American. Though Babcock did not mention the man’s name, it most likely was an
American sailor who had been imprisoned for murder. Having no diplomatic standing,
Babcock referred Elliott to Senator Cole, but Cole was set to return to the United States
carrying letters from Babcock to President Grant. Babcock later met with the prisoner
and, with the influence of other Americans in Santo Domingo, was able to procure his
release. Babcock’s decision to intervene in the case of an American charged with murder
but not to intervene in the case of another prisoner, Davis Hatch, would later create
problems for him when he testified before the United States Senate. Hatch, an American
living in Santo Domingo, had been imprisoned for supporting the rebels opposing Baez’s
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regime. The Consul Smith supported Hatch and implored Babcock to intervene in his
meetings with Baez, but Babcock refused. Prior to leaving, Cole expressed his approval
for annexation as a territory but not a state, saying that Babcock should “hoist the flag [if]
I got a chance.” Grant welcomed this approach as the first step toward statehood.85
On August 7, 1869, Babcock noted that the town grew excited with word that
Baez was returning to Domingo City, arriving with a large group of men armed with
machetes. General Cazneau called on Babcock that morning, where the officer presented
his papers from Secretary Fish, asking him to be his interpreter. Cazneau confidently told
Babcock about the loan which the government of Santo Domingo had procured from a
German-born British financier named Edward H. Hartmont. Hartmont provided a loan of
£420,000, keeping £100,000 for himself as compensation, to the Dominican government
in exchange for interest, guano, phosphate, mine, and forestry concessions. Once
Hartmont’s company sold the loan at market via public shares, the Dominicans received
only £32,000. Hartmont claimed to have disbursed the loan in full but the Dominicans
argued that the loan was null and void because the firm had never tendered the full
balance to the government. Either way, the arrangement was dangerous for the United
States because if the firm forced the Dominicans to honor the loan, but they did not,
Hartmont’s company would obtain a great deal of land in Santo Domingo and the United
States assume responsibility for repayment upon annexation. This, Babcock assumed,
was the scheme.86 Grant had worried about European involvement in Santo Domingo
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from the start and the Hartmont Loan raised the possibility of Great Britain acquiring
access to substantial holdings in the country. The Dominicans assured Babcock that the
loan would expire due to non-payment at the beginning of January 1870, therefore Grant
and his Cabinet kept Babcock’s mission and its results secret, even from the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, in order not to arouse suspicion from the British that the
United States was preparing to encroach on their apparent enterprise.87
After breakfast the following morning, Babcock called on President Baez with
Cazneau and Fabens and, it being a Saturday, which Baez claimed was his lucky day, the
men agreed to begin talks that afternoon. Babcock arrived at the president’s house, joined
by Cazneau, Gautier and Fabens, and quickly realized that he would be unable to get a
private audience with the president, so he was forced to present his papers to Baez in the
presence of the entire party. Grant’s letter read, in part: “I have appointed…Orville E.
Babcock…in the character of a special agent. Having been one of my aides-de-camp
while I commanded the armies of the United States…I have entire confidence in his
integrity and intelligence and I commend him to your excellency accordingly.”88
Having been “placed in [Baez’s] full confidence” and after “many protestations of
his great respect and great pleasure that the President had done so,” Babcock began his
officially unofficial discussions with the Dominican president. He recounted how Fabens
had asked President Grant to send a warship after the Telegrafo and how Grant had done
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so promptly and then asked Babcock to go straight to Santo Domingo (conveniently
leaving out that he was the third choice for the job). Babcock thought the large party a
detriment to negotiations, so he decided to schedule a later meeting. Babcock’s second
audience with Baez proved more fruitful, as he had gained the president’s confidence and
continued to ingratiate himself into the Dominican hierarchy. Following this meeting,
Babcock went to see Cazneau and told him of his instructions to consider both annexation
and a lease of Samaná Bay. Cazneau agreed to use his influence with Baez and to
accelerate the process up so Babcock could be on his way.89
A few days later, Babcock, Cazneau and Gautier returned to the president’s palace
where they found Baez bed-ridden and “looking quite badly.” Baez quizzed Babcock on
his intentions, to which Babcock reasserted that the United States was not interested in
buying Santo Domingo. To make “such an offer would be an insult,” Babcock told him.
Rather, Babcock maintained that his only interest in the nation was due to the fact that
Baez had reached out to President Grant and he was there as Grant’s representative to
continue the dialogue. He assured Baez that it would be mutually beneficial to both the
United States and Santo Domingo to continue relations. “St. Domingo is a small republic
and U.S. large,” Babcock recalled in his notes, “and St. D. had internal and external
troubles” and that “the Union of the two republics would improve both.” Baez then
confided to Babcock that he worried that his government had not been providing
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adequately for his people even before the Spanish came. He believed that annexation was
the only chance for Santo Domingo to thrive.90
At this meeting, Babcock finally broached the subject of money. Babcock
inquired of any financial propositions from Baez, insisting that he would give Grant his
best judgment. Baez had been reluctant to provide any figures, assuming Babcock would
reject them outright. Babcock led the discussion by suggesting that Grant would
authorize a $100,000 down payment, although he refused to pledge it. In return, the
Dominican government should agree to cede Samaná to the Americans. Baez was
undoubtedly pleased that Babcock also suggested that the United States would pay off his
war debts. Annexation as a territory was in his nation’s best interest, Baez told Babcock,
as he knew that his people would quickly satisfy the requirements of statehood. Babcock
reminded Baez of the benefits of being a territory, including “capital, roads, telegraphs”
and other improvements. These trappings of modernity were necessary for incorporation
into the quickly growing United States. Babcock believed that infrastructure
improvements were a prerequisite to statehood and full incorporation into the Union.
Baez, growing weary, asked Babcock to draw up some notes to submit to him, after
which Babcock presented him with maps of the United States and lands it had purchased,
including Louisiana, Florida, and Colorado. That night, Babcock and Cazneau worked on
the first memorandum they would present to Baez.91
Days later, Baez received Babcock and, with Cazneau and Fabens in tow,
negotiations for annexation continued. Baez wanted annexation but needed specific and
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acceptable terms from President Grant first. Babcock reminded Baez that he had no
authority to make an offer or give specifics; he could only present a recommendation to
Grant. However, Babcock immediately provided Baez with notes “that were simply ideas
not an offer.” Most likely he was sharing ideas that Grant and Fish had provided. The
genesis of the memorandum which Babcock and Baez were constructing, then, was an
outgrowth of the Grant administration’s plans for the Caribbean. Babcock understood
that he had no authority to negotiate an offer of annexation; however, Grant and Fish
gave him enough information to push Baez in the direction that the administration was
willing to go. Both parties agreed to move matters along swiftly, for Grant wanted to put
the matter to rest before Congress convened, and Baez needed assistance to maintain his
control of the nation against the rebels.92
The question of Haiti was another topic of much discussion between Baez and
Babcock. Baez claimed that Haitian President Sylvain Salnave would oppose any
annexation attempts by the United States, therefore he wished to delay the negotiations so
he could visit Salnave and reassure him. Babcock worried that such a trip would take too
much time and stated that the United States government would not allow the Haitians to
interfere in any annexation. Baez’s concerns over Haiti were well founded, however, as
the plight of the Black republic was foremost on the mind of annexation opponent
Senator Charles Sumner, who later charged that the Grant administration was only
interested in Santo Domingo as part of a larger effort to acquire all Hispaniola. Sumner
argued that Grant desired to destroy the Haitian Republic, thus depriving the majority
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African nation of its sovereignty.93 Sumner’s fears were partially justified as the
Dominican’s American intermediaries certainly had designs on Haiti, but there is no
evidence that Grant was interested in annexing the Haitian Republic. In the early months
of 1870, Fabens paid a visit to Sumner to discuss the annexation treaty. Fabens informed
the senator that annexing the Dominican Republic was just the first step for U.S.
expansion in the Caribbean. Sumner asked Fabens if he meant for Haiti to be next, to
which Fabens replied, “you must have Hayti [sic] too!” Sumner believed that Fabens, as
the chief architect of the annexation scheme, was speaking on behalf of the Grant
Administration, but he was not. Sumner argued that the inclusion of the Dominicans and,
inevitably, the Haitians into the United States was at odds with the natural order of
politics and race. Sumner saw the United States as “an Anglo-Saxon Republic [that]
would ever remain so by the preponderance of that race.” The Caribbean nations, though,
were Black majority countries that the American political sphere could not absorb. “To
the African belongs the equatorial belt and he should enjoy it undisturbed,” Sumner
argued.94 Unlike Grant, Sumner did not see people of African descent as equal to whites.
Sumner, the great abolitionist, feared an influx of Afro-Caribbean people would dilute the
Anglo-Saxon control of the American republic. But, whereas Sumner worried that the
United States would destroy Haitian sovereignty, Grant and Babcock worried that the
Haitians would attack Santo Domingo if the United States did not protect Baez.
Babcock’s concern that the Haitians would assault Santo Domingo grew out of fears that
other nations in the Western Hemisphere would not support American expansion in the

93

Donald, Charles Sumner, 471.

94

Ibid., 441-443.

103

region and from the previous history of Haitian incursions into Dominican territory. Not
only were Grant, Fish, and Babcock leery of the attitude of other Caribbean nations
toward American annexation, they also had to contend with the continued presence of
European powers in the area.
Babcock next derided the interference of the British and the French for making
exuberant offers to Baez for Samaná Bay to “badger the United States.” While the
Spanish had their hands full with the insurrection in Cuba, Babcock understood that the
British and the French continued to maintain a prominent presence in the Caribbean, and
undoubtedly understood that it was Grant’s position that the United States should
exercise preponderant control over those shipping routes. Even as Babcock was in Santo
Domingo, the United States was negotiating with Britain over fishing rights in northern
waters, the boundary line in the Pacific Northwest, and the ever-present Alabama claims.
If these negotiations failed, Grant worried that a military conflict might arise that would
necessitate an expanded American naval presence in the waters around the Gulf of
Mexico. Annexation would alleviate this problem by placing the United States in a
prominent position in the Caribbean.
Baez then switched the subject to statehood, changing his original position and
objecting to Babcock’s notion that the Dominicans should initially enter the Union as a
territory. Babcock assured Baez that they would work it out in the treaty, but that the
Dominicans’ existing system of government would not meet the requirements of the
United States Constitution for statehood. Babcock confided to his notes that Baez was
overly determined to bring about statehood in order to “save his head, or his government,
to better speak.” He believed that Baez was torn between “European and American
104

institutions,” struggling with which direction to take his country. These European
institutions were well entrenched in Dominican society. The young republic had just
recently thrown off Spanish occupation and both Baez and Grant feared that, without
American support, other European nations might move on Santo Domingo. To Babcock,
the republican institutions that the Dominicans had attempted to institute, such as voting
and a national congress, were not up to the standards set by the United States, also the
Dominicans were not ready to enter into the Union, despite Baez’s insistence.95
Babcock and Fabens returned to Santo Domingo City after a week-long trip to the
countryside and learned that the Baez government had again changed its position on
annexation. Cazneau informed Babcock that the Dominicans were now working under
the impression that the United States was only interested in Samaná Bay. Discouraged by
this information, Babcock visited Cazneau the next morning to ensure that Baez would
accept the terms outlined in Babcock’s memorandum. Babcock also received a copy of
the Hartmont loan that the Dominicans had negotiated with the English. The next day, at
a meeting with Baez, Babcock produced the Hartmont loan materials to put Baez on the
defensive. He succeeded, as Baez “attempted all sorts of excuses and explanation,” about
his need to acquire money for his country. He explained how the mineral rights attached
to the loan were for the rental of property and not outright ownership. Baez protested that
he had only received £37,000 of the loan, for which he had to pay £50,000 at a rate of six
percent. Sensing that Baez intended to ask for financial assistance, Babcock reiterated
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that he had no authority to make any financial offers to the Dominicans as his role was
merely to facilitate discussion.96
Over the next few days, the negotiations faced one roadblock after another.
Babcock discovered that Baez was vacillating in his private Cabinet meetings, prompting
him to inform Gautier that the time had come to either act on annexation or drop the
matter entirely. At the same time, Babcock’s meetings with the American Consul were
just as frustrating. While never giving credence to the charges levied against Smith,
Babcock sensed that the Dominicans would never enter into full diplomatic negotiations
with the United States as long as Smith was in charge. “He seems quite gloomy,”
Babcock wrote of Smith, “and sees this country through sad eyes…he is not friendly.”
Upon his return to the United States, Babcock recommended to President Grant and
Secretary Fish that the State Department recall and replace Smith. When questioned
about this before the Senate, Babcock answered that the administration made the decision

96

August 21-22, 1869, Babcock Diary, USGPL; For a detailed discussion of the Hartmont Loan see:
Welles, Naboth’s Vineyard, 360-361; During this meeting, the subject turned to Baez’s animosity towards
an American businessman living in Santo Domingo by the name of Davis Hatch, who had been living in
Santo Domingo for many years managing railroad and salt mine projects for Augustus Schell, the powerful
New York Democrat and financier. Baez accused Hatch of bias against him during the Cabral
administration and of secretly supporting Cabral’s rebellion against the Dominican president. American
Consul Smith demanded that Baez present Hatch’s case to him, because as an American citizen he was to
receive the full assistance of the United States government. Baez believed that Hatch would use his
influence as a correspondent for the New York Times against annexation; therefore, he refused to turn Hatch
over to him. Privately, Baez explained to Babcock that Hatch had been hiding in the woods when his troops
arrested him and that they had evidence that Hatch’s home had been used as an arsenal for Cabral’s rebels.
Babcock, satisfied with Baez’s version of the events regarding Hatch (though not the accusations against
the American Consuls), refused to assist Smith in procuring Hatch’s release. This decision would end up
being one of Babcock’s biggest errors in the negotiations. As Assistant Secretary of State J. C. Bancroft
Davis wrote during the Senate hearings on the Santo Domingo treaty in 1870, “I fear there is no hope that
the treaty will make its way through the Senate. If there ever was a ghost of a chance the Davis Hatch case
will kill it.” By denying assistance to Hatch, an American citizen opposed to annexation, Grant’s
opponents were able to paint Babcock’s negotiations as a cabal of nefarious schemes meant to suppress all
opposition. August 22-23, 1869, Babcock Diary, USGPL; Simon, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume
20, 166n-167n.

106

in the best interests of annexation because the United States could not place the treaty
talks into the hands of a man universally distrusted by the Baez government.97
Babcock and Gautier spent the next three days hurriedly finishing the
memorandum for President Grant. Baez again seemed to change his mind about
annexation, focus on leasing Samaná, and consider annexation later. “I told Cazneau to
tell him that it was too late,” Babcock wrote. After arranging to place for his belongings
onboard the Tybee, Babcock paid a final visit to President Baez, presenting him with a
drinking cup and accepting in return a map of the island for himself and for President
Grant. Babcock received the final documents prior to setting sail, having signed the
memorandum with terms for annexation earlier that day. On September 14, Babcock
returned to the United States, and reported his findings to President Grant a week later.98
Babcock’s mission pleased Grant and he excitedly presented his report before his
Cabinet. The hurried nature in which Babcock and the Dominicans wrote the
memorandum led to the awkward description of Babcock as “aide-de-camp” of his
Excellency General Ulysses S. Grant. Members of the Cabinet, many unsure as to the
necessity of annexation, admired the specimens of wood, stone, and minerals that
Babcock laid out for their perusal. In a letter to Cazneau shortly after his return, Babcock
shared Grant’s impressions of the memorandum. “I have conversed with him and find he
takes much interest in my report and in the Republic of Santo Domingo,” Babcock wrote,
however, “the question of ‘State’ as used in the confidential communication caused some
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consideration. I assured the President that…[Baez] understood that Sto Domingo could
not be admitted as a state, but she would have to be treated as a territory.”99 Satisfied with
the Dominicans’ desire for annexation as a territory, Grant and Fish set about producing a
treaty. Prior to doing so, Fish had to find a consul who could reliably assist in the duties
of negotiating it.
Upon Babcock’s advice, Grant removed Somers Smith and replaced him with a
young Union veteran, Raymond H. Perry. Fish instructed him to sign a treaty of
annexation, but the negotiations were to continue to go through Babcock. In November
1869, Babcock returned to Santo Domingo, accompanied by Generals Rufus Ingalls and
D. B. Sackett, the latter acting as official translator. Perry’s job was to act as minister
plenipotentiary for only as long as it took to negotiate the treaty, after which he would
revert to the status of commercial agent and consul. Perry was unhappy with his new
position and Fish’s decision to send him to Santo Domingo. He remarked that “I cannot
be content with a position where nerve, activity, and energy is not required…Lt. general
Sheridan can tell you this for I have been on some dangerous errands for him, I am ready
to take my life in hand and serve the Government anywhere you wish me.”
Unfortunately, for Perry, his role in Santo Domingo would prove to be less than
exciting.100
On his return trip, Babcock and company took their quarters aboard the steamship
Albany, making daily excursions ashore to meet with Baez and Gautier. Two treaties
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resulted from the negotiations. The first was a treaty of annexation to admit Santo
Domingo to the Union as a territory, with the United States providing $1.5 million toward
the liquidation of the Dominican debt. The second was a treaty providing for the leasing
of Samaná Bay for 99 years for $2 million in the event that the Senate did not ratify the
first treaty. As a show of good faith, Babcock presented President Baez with $100,000 in
cash and $50,000 of guns and ammunition.101
The translation of the treaties became a sticking point as the Dominicans insisted
on changing the language in a number of articles. Babcock maintained that the American
version be written in “plain English” so it would be easier for Gautier to translate into
Spanish. The revisions continued for what Babcock referred to as a long “tedious day.”
After a short pleasure trip around the coast, accompanied by Baez and several Dominican
dignitaries, Fabens reported to Babcock that the Dominican Senate had not voted to
approve the treaty. The Senate had to approve the treaty before Baez could sign it (unlike
in the United States, the Dominican Senate had to ratify the treaty before the president
could sign it). At issue was Gautier’s desire to add an article pertaining to the United
States paying off the Dominican national debt. Babcock protested that the Dominicans
could not add additional articles and that the time for Dominican ratification of the treaty
was soon approaching. Over the next few days, the Dominican Senate continued to delay,
causing Babcock to become concerned that Gautier and Baez were misleading him. In
one instance, Cazneau even suggested creating a “secret treaty” to fool the Dominican
Senate into voting for annexation. Babcock, Sackett, and Perry immediately balked at the
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suggestion, with Sackett stating: “anything that we got up would have to be on the square
and aboveboard.” On November 29, Babcock and Sackett called on President Baez to set
a date for signing the annexation treaty. In Spanish, Baez explained to Sackett the reason
for the delay in passing the treaty: Baez desired to confer upon Babcock a tract of land in
Samaná, as a gesture of goodwill for his work on securing the treaty. There was no delay
in the Senate save for a debate over how to lavish a gift on Babcock! When Sackett
translated Baez’s wishes to Babcock, they took the young officer aback. He implored the
president to understand that such a gift would be against the law and would certainly ruin
any chance of the treaty’s passage in the United States Senate. Babcock recalled, “I told
him…that as a citizen of the United States I should like to go into business with him but
could not accept a gift now.” Baez relented and agreed to sign the treaties that afternoon.
After securing Baez’s signature, Babcock arranged for the transfer of the money and
munitions to the Dominican authorities and the raising of the American flag at Samaná
Bay. Satisfied with his work, Babcock returned to the United States in December and
presented the treaties to President Grant who then called a Cabinet meeting to discuss
them.102
Grant's annexation proposal received a lukewarm reception in the Cabinet as Fish
did not think it would garner enough Senate votes for ratification. Grant asked that the
Cabinet members keep the annexation treaty secret until after the New Year; however,
they could discuss the treaty for Samaná Bay. Grant then composed a memorandum that
encompassed his doctrine of Reconstruction entitled “Reasons why San Domingo should
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be annexed to the United States.” Aside from the benefits of the soil, the crops, the
minerals, and other products that could be imported and exported to the island, Grant
stated that Santo Domingo was a weak nation, and rejecting annexation “would be to
abandon our oft repeated ‘Monroe Doctrine.’” He reiterated that Santo Domingo would
become a beacon for the anti-slavery movement in the Caribbean. He also hoped that
Santo Domingo would become a home for former slaves who desire to leave the South,
however, he hoped that racial prejudice would abate and African Americans “would soon
receive such recognition as to induce him to stay” in the former Confederate states. If
they chose not to stay, though, Santo Domingo was a welcome refuge. The Grant
Doctrine would come to define the president’s goals for American expansion,
Reconstruction, and the abolition of slavery within a global context. Grant saw the
annexation of Santo Domingo as the first step in the expansion of American republican
ideals throughout the Western Hemisphere and a pillar for stabilizing the recently
reunified Union. The abolition of slavery would proceed from the blessings of American
citizenship bestowed upon the Dominicans and create a domino theory of republicanism
and economic development throughout the Caribbean. The Grant Doctrine, then, would
strengthen the ties of the Western Hemisphere in the face of an ever-expanding European
influence around the globe.103
The Senate received the annexation treaty in early January 1870, and it became an
immediate sensation in Congress and in the press. Little did Grant know that it was dead
on arrival in the Senate. His primary mistake was his failure to include the powerful chair
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of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Massachusetts Senator and famed
abolitionist Charles Sumner, in the early treaty deliberations. Fearing that the Hartmont
Loan could derail the annexation attempt, Grant and Fish had decided to maintain secrecy
not only of Babcock’s mission but also of the entire annexation plan. With the Hartmont
Loan set to expire on New Year’s Eve 1869, Grant did not allow anyone outside of the
Cabinet to view the treaty until after the New Year. Therefore, just days into January
1870, Grant walked across Lafayette Square from the White House to the home of
Senator Sumner, where he hoped to discuss the annexation treaty with him. Grant found
Sumner entertaining guests, including reporters, and set about explaining to the powerful
senator why the annexation of Santo Domingo would be of importance not only to the
United States, but also to the Republican Party. Grant returned to the White House
believing that Sumner supported the treaty, yet Sumner later argued that he had made no
such promise. This meeting at Sumner’s home was the beginning of a long, drawn-out
feud between Sumner and Grant that revolved around Santo Domingo, Anglo-American
relations, and the fates of junior officers and diplomats who swore allegiance to either
man. Eventually, due to this feud, Sumner lost his committee chairmanship.104
Sumner and Grant’s animosity toward one another stemmed from a variety of
sources, the least of which was a cultural clash between the Harvard educated Senator
and the hardscrabble former soldier. Fish argued, though, that the genesis of Sumner’s
hostility to the treaty was his belief that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
should be the source of United States foreign policymaking. He believed that Sumner was
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angry at the way the administration had negotiated the treaty, specifically through
Babcock. “The Senate has been for two or three years accustomed to originate measures
and to resist what the Executive originated,” Fish noted, “The habit of criticism, if not of
opposition became somewhat fixed, and on the accession of a friend to the Executive
Chair, the habit could not entirely and at once subside—it is difficult to voluntarily
relinquish power.” Sumner had battled the Andrew Johnson Administration over the
direction of foreign policy, yet Grant was a Republican, and thus, nominally a friend.
Rather than attacking the president outright, Sumner originally took aim at Babcock as
the object of his ire, specifically noting that the young officer had exceeded his authority
in his mission to Santo Domingo. Sumner charged that Babcock’s September
memorandum represented a treaty engineered by a military officer, not a diplomat, who
styled himself as the “aide-de-camp” of the president. The senator also sensed corruption
in Babcock’s claim to Baez that the American president would use his influence to assure
annexation’s approval in Congress. Sumner, an acquaintance wrote, “became the enemy
of the whole scheme [because he] did not believe that the President of the United States
should be made a lobbyist to bring about annexation.”105
The case of Davis Hatch continued to vex the new American Consul, Raymond
Perry. In the interceding time between Babcock’s missions, a Dominican court found
Hatch guilty of insurrection and sentenced him to death. Baez commuted his sentence to
banishment and, as far as anyone in the State Department was concerned, the Dominicans
had exiled Hatch from Santo Domingo. In fact, Hatch remained in prison at Azua,
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eventually reaching out to the new consul. Hatch’s continued imprisonment, he claimed,
was because he opposed annexation, and Perry requested guidance from Secretary Fish
about how he should assist him. Fish instructed Perry to demand that the Dominicans
release Hatch immediately, however Perry found that the Dominicans were stonewalling
him in the hopes that Hatch would remain in custody until after Senate approval of
annexation. When Perry approached Babcock about Hatch’s situation, just as he had with
Somers Smith, Babcock declined to get involved. Eventually, Hatch brought a lawsuit
against the United States and the Dominican Republic, which resulted in congressional
hearings on Babcock’s conduct during the annexation process. Though the committee
cleared Babcock of any wrongdoing, the minority opinion (written by annexation
opponent Carl Schurz, R-MO) leveled the charge that Babcock’s relationship and
correspondence with William Cazneau was “most suspicious.” President Grant was
furious at these accusations of corruption and told Ohio Governor Rutherford B. Hayes,
“‘I can defend myself, but he is merely a major of engineers with no opportunity to meet
a Senator,’” and that he felt “‘much embitterment’ against Sumner for unjust attacks on
Major Babcock.”106
Though Fish personally did not fully support Grant’s annexation scheme, he did
not share his reservations with members of the Senate. He did, however, try to convince
the president that there were other ways to garner their support if he was willing to make
a few changes. Notably, Fish underscored that bringing the Dominicans into the Union
as a territory with a path to statehood would certainly sink the treaty. Fish understood that
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the issue had split Republicans. One faction, including Sumner and Schurz, led the charge
against annexation by utilizing racist science when arguing that the Dominicans were not
up to the task of citizenship and civilization. Therefore, Fish told Grant that any promise
of statehood would undercut support for annexation. Fish learned from numerous
senators that the establishment of a Caribbean protectorate would certainly gain support
for the Samaná Bay lease, but not outright annexation. Fish agreed with these senators
that the economic influence of the United States in the Caribbean was beneficial to the
United States and the island nations, but physical acquisition of these territories would
only hinder the development of both. In order to maintain national and international
stability, Fish contended, a base in Samaná Bay was preferable to annexation. In his
diary, Fish noted that “Senator Morril [sic] of Maine this morning urged the President
should not press the treaty—says it has no ‘earnest’ friends in the Senate—that the weight
of Argument & fact is against it.” Grant flatly rejected Fish’s suggestion of a
protectorate, arguing “it was Schurz suggestion…and he [Grant] regards it as the
suggestion of an opponent.” Fish countered that it was his idea only, stating “I express
the conviction that the Treaty will be rejected unless some of its opponents are gained
over by some new feature, or principle & that this [a protectorate] had occurred to me as
possibly capable of gaining some.” With Grant appeased that the idea had originated
with Fish, he authorized the secretary to mention it to Sumner.107
The constant disagreements between the administration and the Senate caused
Fish and Sumner’s personal relationship to strain. The two had been close friends prior to
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the American Civil War and observers assumed that they would have a good working
relationship as the heads of foreign relations in their respective branches of government.
However, Sumner’s hatred of Grant fractured his relationship with Fish, which played out
in public on the Senate floor and in private correspondence between the men and mutual
acquaintances. Sumner died in the middle of Grant’s second term but not before these
severe clashes with the president led to the fracturing of the Republican Party. This
animosity forced Fish, long an admirer of Sumner, to admit that the Massachusetts
senator had possibly lost his mind. Fish noted in his diary: “I express the opinion that
Sumner is ‘crazy—a monomaniac upon all matters relating to his own importance—& his
relations toward the President.’” The Secretary continued that Sumner, “more than once
in speaking of the Presidents [sic] interviews with him last Winter at Sumner’s house,
about San Domingo had said that Grant was drunk.” Fish concluded, “[Secretary]
Boutwell, who was present at the interview says ‘he was no more drunk, or excited than
he was when we left him upstairs five minutes since—no more than Sumner himself.’”108
On March 15, 1870, Sumner’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted against
recommending ratification of the Santo Domingo annexation treaty to the Senate. The
senator delayed the committee vote for months, leading Grant to charge that Sumner had
lied to him in their meeting at Sumner’s home. As Fish recounted, Sumner charged the
president with the all-too-common accusation of drunkenness and the vitriol between the
two men severed any relationship that Fish had with Sumner. Grant wrote to Fish
warning him against sharing information with Sumner, stating: “[Sumner] is an enemy of
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the treaty; will kill it to-morrow if he can, and only favors delay probably to better secure
its defeat. I do not think it good policy to trust the enemies of a measure to manage it for,
(and to speak in behalf of), its friends.” This personal animus ended Grant’s chances of
getting the treaty through by the Senate. However, he was not yet willing to let go of the
possibility of acquiring the island territory and promoting his vision of American
democracy abroad. In response to the committee’s decision, Grant went to the Capitol to
lobby for a full vote. Sumner balked at the idea that Grant would enter into his territory
and the turf war prompted the secretary of state to join the president in order to temper
rumors that he was against the treaty, rumors which historian Eric T. L. Love contended
were due to Fish himself uncharacteristically confessing to a friend his lack of support.109
Grant’s position on the equality of the races and the advancement of civil rights
for African Americans should have found allies among the Republicans in the Senate.
Many of the senate leaders had been strident abolitionists before the Civil War and Grant
expected them to remain loyal party men who upheld the Republican platform of civil
rights. Abolitionists like Senator Sumner and his colleague, Missouri Senator Carl
Schurz, however, possessed views on race that were not as enlightened as their support
for abolition had made them seem. Both men argued against the inclusion of African
Americans into the body politic, with Schurz going so far as to found the Liberal
Republican Party in 1872 in an effort to defeat Grant and his support for the rights of the
freedmen. Both Sumner and Schurz believed that non-whites were intellectually inferior
to whites and that they were unable to shoulder the burden of citizenship. Both also
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subscribed to the biological racism of the era, which held that whites could not physically
function in the tropics, therefore the annexation of Santo Domingo would be of no benefit
to the white citizens of the United States. Grant, however, possessed a more enlightened
view of the equality of whites and African Americans. Grant was hopeful, as the full
Senate met to debate the treaty that more Republicans believed as he did rather than
subscribed to the views of Sumner and Schurz.110
For many of these former abolitionist Senate leaders, equality and equal rights for
non-whites were never the goals of Reconstruction, national reunification was their
objective. The annexation of Santo Domingo, by which Grant proposed to increase the
non-white citizenry by hundreds of thousands, and the manner in which he had pursued
annexation, ran counter to their vision of republicanism. Republicans and Democrats saw
corruption and scheming at work in the Santo Domingo annexation effort. They blamed
Grant and opposed his attempted racial Reconstruction. To them the inclusion of
thousands of Black and non-white citizens from Santo Domingo would prove as
disastrous as it had in the South. They reasoned, “in its own sleazy way, Santo Domingo
was exotic, and exotic meant a foreignness in culture and habit that went with the climate
and stood very little chance of being eradicated.” With that foreignness was the
assumption of graft and nefariousness as well, “from very early critics knew that behind
the Santo Domingo proposal schemes, seedy or shady, must lie.” Many members of the
Republican Party intended Reconstruction as a return to normalcy, but annexation ran
counter to normalcy, as it challenged the status quo of American political norms. By
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negotiating the treaty without the consent of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Grant’s administration had further expanded executive power at a time when members of
his party feared an expansive presidency and federal government in general. Republican
senators, then, chose to challenge the president on annexation as a means to check his
executive overreach in the Reconstruction era.111
Heated debates ensued in the Senate in the three months following the decision of
Sumner’s committee. During that time, the original deadline set in the treaty for
ratification expired, but Grant directed Fish to work out an extension with the
Dominicans while he continued to lobby senators to his cause. Sumner and Schurz
continued their assaults against the treaty and the Dominicans. They also levied charges
of corruption against Babcock. Grant fumed as the Senate Investigative Committee took
the word of Raymond Perry, the American agent in Santo Domingo, over that of the
president’s aide. In a letter to fellow Grant confidante, Adam Badeau, Babcock
expressed his frustrations with the entire process. “We are in the midst of a terrible
struggle in the Senate, Sumner, Schurz, etc. ‘versus the President,’” he wrote. “He made
a most cowardly attack upon me in the Senate…as he is a coward, I simply intend to
denounce him as a liar and coward, and let the poor sexless fool go.” The Senate
investigation of Babcock centered on his poor handling of Davis Hatch’s case in Santo
Domingo. This mistake proved to be just what the anti-treaty group needed to sow doubt
surrounding Babcock’s involvement of the treaty. Assistant Secretary of State J. C. B.
Davis summed up the investigation’s importance when he wrote to Babcock: “If there
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was ever a ghost of a chance [for the treaty] the Davis Hatch case will kill it.” In the end,
the treaty failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority, falling by a vote of 28-28.112
The treaty’s defeat did not dampen Grant’s desire to annex Santo Domingo.
Grant signed a lease with the Dominicans for the port at Samaná Bay and he continued to
insist that annexation was the key to the future of race relations in the United States. In
order to convince the Senate that he was correct, Grant asked the Congress to establish a
commission of experts to travel to Santo Domingo to report on the nation’s willingness to
join the United States, and to see the economic and republican possibilities of bringing
the nation and its people into the Union. Congress agreed. The commissioners were:
Andrew White, the President of Cornell University; Samuel Howe, a reformer and
advocate of the Freedmen’s Bureau; Benjamin Wade, a former Ohio Senator; Allan
Burton, former Minister to Colombia, who was selected as commission secretary, and
Frederick Douglass, noted African-American speaker, abolitionist, and friend of Charles
Sumner, who was named assistant secretary. As Babcock had done before them, the
commissioners set sail for Santo Domingo in January 1871 for a two-month fact-finding
mission.113
During their investigation, the commissioners traveled throughout Santo Domingo
to ascertain the situation on the ground and to determine what form of relationship with
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the United States the Dominicans themselves desired. The commission concluded that the
Dominicans had never truly known independence, being either under the thumb of
European powers or under assault from their Haitian neighbors. The commission
witnessed the Dominicans’ poverty and concluded that the United States could help. As
they recorded in their report: “There is but one chance for that republic ever to recover its
independence — to become, after a proper period of probation, one of a union of states,
the freedom and substantial independence of each being guaranteed by the strength of
all.” While Congress barred the commission from overtly expressing that the United
States should annex Santo Domingo, the commissioners and secretaries believed that
annexation would be to the benefit of the Dominicans.114
What he witnessed particularly moved Douglass. He concluded that his old friend,
Charles Sumner, was on the wrong side of the debate. Like Grant, Douglass viewed the
incorporation of Santo Domingo into the body politic of the United States as a positive
good not only for the Dominicans but also for fellow African Americans. He agreed with
Grant that the people of Santo Domingo were offering annexation willingly and
acceptance of their offer would mean the expansion of citizenship rights for non-whites
and the strengthening of the Republican Party. As for his disagreement with Sumner,
Douglass wrote:
To Mr. Sumner, annexation was a measure of extinguishing a colored nation and
to do so by means of selfish motives. To me it meant the alliance of a weak and
defenseless people having none of the attributes of a nation, torn by internal feuds
and unable to maintain order at home or command respect abroad, to a
government which could give it peace, stability and civilization, and make it
helpful to both countries.
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Like Grant, Douglass envisioned the United States as a stabilizing and civilizing force for
a nation ready to accept the ideals of liberty and the blessings of the American political
system.115
Fish considered the commission’s report a vindication of the position he had
maintained throughout the process while Grant saw it as confirmation that his doctrine
was correct. According to Fish, Grant was excited by early reports from the commission,
stating, “he proposes with the report of the San Domingo Commrs [sic] to send it to
Congress with a short Message, referring to the confirmation it furnishes of his views of
the facts alleged in favor of Annexation.” Grant also believed that the report vindicated
Babcock “against the charges & insinuations against [him].” Fish agreed that sending the
report to Congress was wise, because “In the main it is right—it submits the whole
question to Congress & the Peoples [sic]—asks no action.”
In the end, Congress took no action on the report and, despite the public
insistences of both Grant and Douglass, the idea of annexation faded from the minds of
the public and the Senate. As the lease for Samaná Bay expired in October 1871, neither
the Congress nor the Cabinet were interested in pursuing the matter further. According to
Fish, Grant, after having read a message from the Dominican diplomat Gautier regarding
the Samaná lease, “very promptly says 'We will then drop the whole matter—and leave
the whole question for Congress & the People.’” In October 1871, Fish confided to his
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journal, “thus, a troublesome, vexatious & unnecessary question, is, as I trust, finally got
out of.”116
The demise of the Santo Domingo treaty did not end the drama between Grant
and Sumner. Sumner’s decision to defy Grant and block the treaty in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee led Grant to vow vengeance against him and anyone else who
opposed him in the Senate. According to Fish, Grant stated, “he will not consider those
who oppose his policy as entitled to influence in obtaining positions under him—that he
will not let those who oppose him ‘name Ministers to London.’” This was a reference to
Sumner, who had used his position as Committee Chairman to request the nomination of
his friend, John L. Motley, as Minister to Great Britain. Grant initially acquiesced to
Sumner’s request but, after their relationship soured, looked for any reason to recall
Motley from his position. The position of Minister to Great Britain was particularly
important as the United States was in the midst of negotiating numerous claims and
disagreements with Britain in what would eventually become the Treaty of Washington.
As will be examined below, the conduct of the American Minister to Britain obstructed
early negotiations and Grant allowed his feelings toward Sumner to color his dealings
with Motley. Fish recorded in his diary that Grant “intended to remove Motley, who he
said represented Sumner more than he did the Administration, & spoke with much
warmth of feeling, about Sumner.” Fish replied that he “thought [Grant] was mistaken as
to the extent of Sumner’s present exercise of influence over Motley…[that] there had
been a tendency to follow Sumner when he first went out.” However, Fish believed that
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Motley had not done so in recent months and he hoped “to induce the [President] to
withhold action as to the removal of Motley—at least for the present.”117
Grant worried that Sumner’s power in the Senate would undermine his entire
Reconstruction agenda. Though a fellow Republican, Sumner had no desire to support
any of Grant’s foreign or domestic proposals and Grant feared the senator’s
obstructionism would disrupt his policies. Sumner objected to all of the Reconstruction
amendments, arguing that they were redundant to what the Constitution already provided
to the freedmen. His speech against the British position on the Alabama claims
exacerbated an already fraught relationship between the two nations, and his personal
animosity toward the president began to encompass his relationship with Fish. Grant
remarked to the Cabinet that he understood “that Sumner has said to several persons that
he intends to oppose everything the Administration proposes.” None of the other Cabinet
members could corroborate Grant’s fears, though Secretary of the Treasury George S.
Boutwell could only say about Sumner, “‘no he did not say that, to me.’” Even so,
Secretary Fish spent the first three months of 1871 working to have Sumner replaced as
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. For Fish, the troubled relationship
between Sumner and Grant threatened the upcoming negotiations with the British. By
March 1871, Grant believed Sumner’s removal from his chairmanship was essential to
the passage of the administration’s agenda through the Senate.118
Fish initially contacted Timothy Howe, chairman of the Senate Committee on
Committees, to make the case that the Republican Party no longer wanted Sumner as
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chairman of Foreign Relations. Fish argued that Sumner was blocking important
administration foreign affairs initiatives, such as the Alabama Claims and the Dominican
Treaty, purely out of spite toward Grant. Fish repeatedly noted in his diary his suspicion
that Sumner was suffering from a physical and mental breakdown. “He exhibits what I
believe is a very common incident to insanity,” Fish wrote. Sumner had charged publicly
that Grant and Babcock were threatening him with physical harm, and he used that
charge to arouse sympathy from colleagues who recalled the vicious attack Sumner had
suffered from Representative Preston S. Brooks prior to the Civil War. Such arguments
were enough for Howe, who believed that the chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee should, at a minimum, be on speaking terms with the president and the
secretary of state. As such, Howe removed Sumner from his position as chair. Sumner’s
allies were furious and directly blamed Grant and Fish. Schurz alleged that Grant had
removed Sumner solely because of his opposition to the Dominican treaty rather than
because of any personal animosity on Sumner’s part. Senator James Nye’s argument,
though, swayed the Senate, when he noted that the legislative body could not remove
Grant or Fish but could remove Sumner for the betterment of American foreign relations.
Sumner subsequently lost his chairmanship by a vote of 33 to 9. Grant denied any direct
involvement in the event, but it was clear that Fish, on behalf of Grant, had worked to rid
the administration’s toughest critic of his power base. This, historian Charles W. Calhoun
noted, “marked an extraordinary exercise of executive power and demonstrated the
strength of Grant’s influence in Congress.”119
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Sumner’s ouster from the committee meant that Grant and Fish could successfully
prosecute their foreign policy, but it did not mean the annexation of Santo Domingo.
Grant continued to refer to it throughout his presidency, including his second inaugural
address and his final message to Congress. In subsequent interviews published around the
world, he discussed the lost opportunity with reporter John Russell Young during his
post-presidential World Tour. Even in his final days, while working on his memoirs,
Grant focused on Santo Domingo in one of the very few references he made to his
presidency and its legacy. Grant reiterated his position that he had hoped that Santo
Domingo would aid in the settlement of the question of the freedmen. “He was brought
to our shores by compulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right
to remain here as any other class of our citizens,” Grant wrote, “it was looking to a
settlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of Santo Domingo during
the time I was President of the United States.” Until the end, Grant maintained that
annexing Santo Domingo would have meant a better life for African Americans and the
republic at large.120
Though Grant’s desire to annex Santo Domingo did not come to fruition, his
attempt reaffirmed the principles of American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere as
expressed in the Grant Doctrine. Grant signaled to the world his vision of a united North
and South America, free from European influence and free from the sin of slavery. His
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decision to send a novice diplomat, Orville Babcock, to negotiate the terms for
annexation illustrated his belief in executive supremacy in matters of foreign policy. The
fact that he even bypassed his own secretary of state when presenting the treaty to
Congress shows that Grant believed that the power to treat was his alone. Babcock’s
missions to Santo Domingo illuminated Grant’s foreign policy objective to strengthen
United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. It also revealed Grant’s desire to
push Reconstruction beyond the borders of the American South, exerting American
influence over the remaining slave-holding nations in an attempt to bring about the
abolition of the practice of slavery throughout the Americas. Babcock’s missions also
reveal Grant to be a naïve politician who failed to grasp the nuances of diplomatic
protocols. Internal strife within Santo Domingo should have signaled to Grant that the
Dominicans were undecided upon annexation. Having just defeated a rebellion in the
United States, Grant should have realized that Baez’s control over Santo Domingo was
tenuous at best. While the annexation scheme served its purpose as a method for exerting
U.S. influence in the region, it was a venture that politically was ultimately doomed to
fail.
As for Babcock, he approached his missions as he would any orders given by
General Grant during the Civil War, by obtaining the objects set forth by Grant and Fish
and reporting the information accurately and quickly. Unfortunately, Cazneau, Fabens,
and Baez drew Babcock easily into their machinations, and as such, members of
Congress argued that he failed in his duty as a representative of the U.S. government to
protect the rights of an American citizen in a foreign land. Ultimately, Babcock’s mission
was the first major foreign policy failure of the Grant Administration. Even so, the
127

proposed annexation of Santo Domingo struck a new note for the United States’
ambitions in the Western Hemisphere, one that Presidents William McKinley and
Theodore Roosevelt carried forward in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
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CHAPTER IV
CUBAN REBELS, IRISH FENIANS, AND QUESTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP,
NATURALIZATION, AND NEUTRALITY IN THE ALABAMA AND
THE VIRGINIUS AFFAIRS
“In regard to foreign policy,” President Ulysses S. Grant stated in his inaugural
address on March 4, 1869, “I would deal with nations as equitable law requires
individuals to deal with each other, and I would protect the law abiding citizen, whether
native or of foreign birth, where ever his rights are jeopardised [sic] or the flag of our
country floats.” Grant continued, “I would respect the rights of all nations demanding
equal respect for our own; but if others depart from this rule, in their dealings with us, we
may be compelled to follow their precedet [sic].” These two sentences, the only two in
his entire address dealing with matters of foreign policy, encapsulated significant issues
that required the full attention of the president and Secretary of State Hamilton Fish. As
he spoke, American citizens, both native-born and naturalized, risked arrest for their
political activities in the Caribbean, Canada, and Ireland, leading the new administration
to pursue international agreements that would define citizenship and its attendant rights.
Foreign powers, Grant argued, were required to respect the sovereignty of the United
States and respect its citizens no matter where they roamed. Yet many American citizens
were aiding rebellions against sovereign nations, violating not only the laws of those
nations but also the laws of the United States. The actions of certain naturalized citizens,
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in particular, forced the Grant Administration to redefine exactly how the United States
would respond to its citizens inciting rebellion in the name of liberty in foreign lands.121
Grant inherited several foreign policy problems that had perplexed the previous
administration, particularly those involving Great Britain and Spain. These two nations
represented a challenge to his quest for eventual United States supremacy in the Western
Hemisphere. Moreover, they represented old world colonialism, the antithesis of Grant’s
design for hemispheric republicanism under the aegis of the United States. The Grant
Doctrine envisioned displacing European monarchy and imperialism with American-led
republicanism and abolishing Spanish (and Brazilian) slavery in favor of multiracial
citizenship and free labor. No territory in the Western Hemisphere offered a better
staging ground for the Grant Doctrine than did Cuba. Yet, President Grant and Secretary
Fish resisted Republican Party calls to support revolutionary independence efforts there.
Their hesitancy derived from concerns about how United States intervention might affect
other high-level negotiations with Great Britain over the Alabama claims. Primarily, Fish
convinced Grant, against significant pressure from within the Cabinet and the Congress
to support Cuba, that aiding and abetting the Cuban rebellion would significantly
undermine the United States’ argument against Great Britain in the Alabama claims. As
such, the United States officially remained neutral in the Cuban rebellion, though the
plight of numerous American citizens who traveled to Cuba to support the rebels forced
the administration to intervene. Eventually, Spanish authorities captured and executed
American and British insurgents on board the ship the Virginius, threatening Grant’s
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policy of non-intervention in Cuba, and an enraged American public demanded action
against Spain and continued to assist the Cuban insurgents.
One of the principal bones of contention between the United States and European
states was the rights of naturalized citizens. The enormous influx of immigrants into the
United States in the previous two decades had raised questions about the rights of
naturalized citizens when they travelled and worked abroad. Early on, disputes over the
rights of naturalized citizens arrested in other nations caused headaches for the Grant
administration. European authorities arrested Cuban rebels and Irish Fenians who all
claimed American citizenship and thus the protection of their adopted nation. Secretary
Fish and his diplomatic corps had to work through these claims and assess who among
those arrested were actually naturalized citizens and what the responsibility of the
government should be toward them. The convoluted nature of the naturalization process
did not help matters. While the government issued official naturalization certificates to
naturalized citizens, many others had no official papers to prove their citizenship. As
such, when arrested in foreign countries these naturalized citizens sought refuge in the
offices of the American legation and the charge of proving their citizenship often fell on
the clerks in these offices.122
Citizenship and to whom it should be conferred was a key component of the Grant
Doctrine and a basis of Reconstruction republican ideology, as manifested in the
Fourteenth Amendment which defined citizenship to encompass African Americans and
naturalized immigrants as well as native-born whites. Grant based his foreign policy on
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redefining the boundaries of citizenship rights for naturalized citizens and expatriates, as
modern technology made transportation around the world and immigration from one
nation to another easier. His administration negotiated several naturalization treaties
defining the rights of foreign-born American citizens when they traveled and worked
abroad. These treaties specified how long naturalized citizens could remain abroad and
what their status as Americans meant when returning to their former homeland. More
commonly known as the Bancroft Treaties, named for George Bancroft the American
Minister to Prussia during both Andrew Johnson’s and Grant’s administrations, these
treaties set international standards for naturalization laws between the United States and
other nations. Bancroft began with a naturalization treaty with the North German
Federation that agreed to the terms that “five years’ residence and naturalization in the
other country would be sufficient to change one’s nationality…any naturalized German
American who ‘renewed his residence in North Germany, without intent to return to
America…shall be held to have renounced his American citizenship.’” If a person
remained in Germany for two years, they lost their American citizenship and were again
subject to the North German Confederation. With the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian
War, the Prussian government pressed German American citizens into military service
under the guise that they had violated the Bancroft treaty. Naturalized citizens flooded
into the legations in London and Paris begging the United States government for help,
signaling to the Grant Administration the weakness of the initial Bancroft treaty. The
Johnson administration had entered into negotiations with Great Britain over a
naturalization agreement in late 1868, yet it was not until May 1870 that the United States
and Great Britain concluded the final treaty. According to historian Lucy Salyer, this
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treaty “appeared a striking victory for the republican theory that individuals should
choose their citizenship.”123
The development of the Grant Doctrine and the attempted annexation of Santo
Domingo occurred while the Grant administration was simultaneously dealing with the
fallout of the Cuban insurrection. Grant and Fish worked to keep the United States out of
the conflict while offering to arbitrate the dispute between the Cuban rebels and Spain. In
the process, the administration pressed for the abolition of slavery and the establishment
of self-government in Cuba. Political upheaval in Spain complicated matters, as did the
clamor of American citizens who lobbied for the recognition of Cuban belligerency and a
more active American role to secure Cuban freedom. Thus, the Grant Doctrine, with its
call to abolish slavery, maintain military readiness in the Caribbean while promoting
peace, and champion republican institutions across the Western Hemisphere, grew out of
Grant’s simultaneous handling of both the Dominican and the Cuban situations.124
Political leaders in the United States hesitated at the thought of annexing
territories with populations of non-whites citizens. The growing numbers of European
immigrants as naturalized citizens added to the labor force on the East Coast and the
influx of Chinese immigrants in the West strained labor relations amongst white workers
threatened by Chinese labor. Many Republicans supported Cuban liberation from Spain,
but did not support Cuban annexation, preferring to let the Cubans work out freedom for
themselves. Historian Mark Wahlgren Summers notes that many political leaders resisted
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expansion through annexation while embracing commercial expansion. Commercial trade
treaties opened up foreign markets to American goods and vice versa, and through that
trade new peoples entered into the United States. As Summers notes, though, “Americans
came for their goods, not their good.”125
While Grant and Fish privately pursued the arbitration of the Cuban insurrection,
their Minister to Spain, General Daniel Sickles, broached acquiring Cuba with the
Spanish. Unlike the proposed annexation of Santo Domingo, however, Grant and Fish
kept the Cuban proposal under wraps. Grant believed that he had the necessary
constitutional authority to handle all diplomatic negotiations. In both cases, Grant acted
in accordance with his desire to eliminate European influence in the Caribbean and
eradicate slavery.126
Cuba was home to one of the largest populations of slaves following
emancipation in the United States in 1865. The slave population in Cuba grew from
approximately 40,000 in the 1770s to nearly 440,000 by the 1840s. Slaves in Cuba
accounted for over three-quarters of the laborers on the island increasing as slave
importation was allowed by law, yet by 1860, with the abolition of the African slave
trade, the slave population declined to approximately 368,000 and plantation owners
hired Chinese laborers to augment the labor force. Rebecca Scott notes that Cuba planters
“had long recognized that Cuban slavery did not fully reproduce itself, and would
inevitably decline once the slave trade ended,” so Chinese labor was a short-term stop-
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gap solutionto the labor shortage. That the decline occurred prior to the Ten Years’ War
(1868-1878) meant that it was one of numerous contributing factors to the ultimate
abolition of slavery in the 1880s. This economic downturn, in conjunction with the
tenuous political situation in Spain, led to a growing discontent among Cuban-born
planters, Cuban laborers, and slaves that resulted in armed conflict. From the 1840s to the
1860s, Spain underwent complex political and religious changes. These civil wars and
military coups left the country weakened in both Europe and its overseas colonies.
Grant’s doctrine envisioned a peaceful, republican western hemisphere, but the presence
of slavery in Cuba conflicted with the Grant Doctrine. The Spanish Revolution of 1868,
which deposed Queen Isabella II and installed a military man, General Juan Prim, as
Prime Minister of Spain, further weakened Spain’s control over Cuba, allowing the
discontent among the Cuban laborers and slaves to boil over against the Cuban planters.
This conflict would engulf the United States in a decade-long diplomatic crisis.127
The perpetuation of slavery in Cuba was contingent on support from the
metropole in Madrid, where Spain, as well as the United States, profited from the
peculiar institution’s productivity and the massive amount of wealth produced in both
Cuba and Puerto Rico. As Grant recognized, the United States sustained slavery
indirectly through the importation of slave-produced sugar and coffee from both colonies.
As noted above, Grant believed that an American presence in Santo Domingo would
choke slavery in Cuba and Puerto Rico because the United States investment of capital
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would cut into the profitability of these colonies; however, he and Fish were unwilling to
wait for slavery to die a gradual death. The Cuban insurrection provided an opportunity
for Grant and Fish to pursue the end of slavery in the Caribbean immediately, which they
saw as the next step toward the emancipation of the entire Western Hemisphere.128
The viability of any new Cuban republic was important to Grant’s and Fish’s
decision-making regarding the granting of belligerent rights. Fish doubted the Cubans’
ability to maintain a strong independent government, noting, “the Cubans are inefficient,
& have done little for themselves.”129 Fish constantly questioned whether the Cuban
insurgents had secured control over certain provinces on the island, and whether they
were capable of sustaining themselves as a republic. Historian Aaron Sheehan-Dean
examines nineteenth century attitudes on warfare in his book The Calculus of Violence.
He notes that people in this era saw war as inevitable, yet they believed that only nationstates could conduct war. “The question of who comprised a nation contains much of the
core problem of the American Civil War, but regardless of whether participants
recognized the Confederacy as an independent state, they all regarded nation-states as the
sole actors of war.” This explains Fish’s insistence about ascertaining whether the Cuban
rebels held significant ports, portions of land, seats of government, or had established an
elected body.130

128

“Reasons why San Domingo should be Annexed to the United States,” [1869-1870], Series 3: Speeches,
Reports, Messages, 1863-1876, Ulysses S. Grant Papers, Library of Congress.
129

Hamilton Fish Diary, December 13, 1869. Hamilton Fish papers, Library of Congress.

130

Aaron Sheehan-Dean, The Calculus of Violence: How Americans Fought the Civil War (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 27.

136

Many American political leaders and newspaper editors argued that it was a moral
imperative for the United States to intercede on behalf of the Cuban rebels. In March
1869, Senator John Sherman of Ohio, brother of Grant’s comrade, General William T.
Sherman, introduced a joint resolution “authorizing the recognition of the independence
of Cuba.”131 Cuban exiles and Republican politicians adopted resolutions at a large
meeting in Steinway Hall in New York City later that month, expressing their support.
Charles A. Dana, Grant’s friend and editor of The Sun, read the resolutions to the
gathering crowd, to loud applause. The group resolved, “the present struggle of the
Cubans for independence and self-government, belongs in the same category as the
Americans in 1776.” They affirmed their support for the struggle against Spain and urged
the United States government to recognize the Cubans as belligerents. Notably, “In
proclaiming the abolition of slavery, the patriots of Cuba have given conclusive evidence
that they share the most substantial ideas of modern democracy.” The group included
noted abolitionist Henry Ward Beecher, who argued that Cuba “ought to be free because
her people desire it. Every people have the inherent right to self-government.”132 Such
vocal support from Republican political leaders influenced Grant’s consideration of
Cuban belligerency. He struggled over the decision to recognize Cuban belligerency,
holding numerous conversations with his Cabinet and asking Fish to write memoranda
for both recognition and non-recognition. He now faced an early test of will between his
desire to see a republican Caribbean free of European influence and Fish’s advocacy of a
more prudent diplomatic course in order to address multiple difficulties with several
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European nations simultaneously. Ultimately, Grant decided not to support the Cuban
insurgents, largely because of the ongoing controversy with Britain over Alabama claims
and the position the administration had taken on the question of belligerent rights during
the American Civil War.133
The Cuban rebels enjoyed overwhelming support from many American political
leaders and Cuban expatriates. But the ongoing Alabama negotiations forced the
president and his secretary of state to confront Cuban supporters early on. In July 1869,
Grant issued an executive order proclaiming United States neutrality in the Cuban
insurrection. This order authorized the arrest and prosecution of any American citizen for
supporting the rebellion in Cuba. It also authorized the utilization of the United States
Navy for “the purpose of preventing the carrying on of any such expedition or enterprise
from the territories or jurisdiction of the United States against the territories or dominions
of Spain with whom the United States are at peace.” Within two weeks, District Attorney
Edwards Pierrepont informed Fish that authorities arrested over one hundred-sixty people
in New York for aiding the Cuban rebels.134
Grant spent his first term avoiding entanglement in the Cuban insurrection. He
and Fish understood that the best method to do this would be to offer mediation and
restore peace. In late July 1869, Fish instructed Sickles in Madrid that he should offer
“the good offices of the United States” to negotiate an armistice.135 He sought an
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immediate cessation of hostilities because American citizens in Cuba were caught in the
crossfire or were even participating in the rebellion. “Spanish authorities in Cuba are
impotent,” Fish wrote to Sickles, “for protection of the lives of our citizens. Cuba and
Porto Rico [sic] should not be connected in the submission or negotiation.”136 Fish gave
no explanation why he wanted to sever Puerto Rico from negotiations over Cuba,
however Sickles obeyed his directive. Spanish authorities subdued a small one-day
revolutionary effort similarly made up of planters, laborers, and slaves in the Puerto
Rican town of Lares, known as “El Grito de Lares,” in 1868, but other than that incident
Fish had no reason to believe that insurrection would spread to the rest of Puerto Rico.
Spanish Prime Minister Juan Prim followed up with an offer to sell both Cuba and Puerto
Rico to the United States, perhaps wanting to rid himself of both vexing populations. Fish
had not authorized Sickles to purchase the two island territories, yet Fish suggested a sum
of $125 million. Prim noted that “Spain might arrange preliminaries with the United
States and concede autonomy of Cuba and Porto Rico [sic] for satisfactory equivalent as
soon as hostilities ceased,” Sickles informed Fish.137
The Spanish agreed to accept the “good offices” of the United States but only
under a set of conditions that Grant and Fish were unwilling to concede. The Spanish
wanted the insurgents to lay down their arms and accept a plebiscite for independence.
Fish did not believe that the conditions on the ground in Cuba warranted concessions by
the rebels. They would not voluntarily lay down their arms, although they were willing to
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agree to a cease-fire, but Fish did not believe that a free and fair vote for independence
would be possible.138 While the Spanish agreed to accept American arbitration, they were
also sending 20,000 additional troops to Cuba to subdue the rebellion. Grant was
displeased with this action, arguing that, while he was prepared to issue a neutrality
proclamation regarding the insurrection, the actions of the Spanish violated fundamental
republican rights. Not only was it anti-republican for the Spanish to deny the Cubans the
right to self-government, but to do so with a standing army was the epitome of antirepublicanism. “I am not clearly satisfied that we would not be justified in intimating to
Spain that we look with some alarm upon her position to send 20,000 more troops to
Cuba,” he wrote to Fish, “to put down as Americans believe the right of self-government
on this Continent.”139 Grant drafted a neutrality proclamation that threatened to prosecute
Americans for any involvement in the Cuban insurrection and recognized the insurgents
as belligerents, but he delayed issuing it because Fish argued that recognizing Cuban
belligerency would undermine the administration’s legal position in the Alabama claims.
Grant intended his neutrality proclamation to counter the rising support for the
Cuban rebels among the American public, especially Cuban-Americans. Many of these
citizens were actively collecting weapons and materials to send to the Cubans, and
hundreds were willing to enlist as rebel soldiers. The Cuban Junta, an organization of
exiled Cubans, rallied support by lobbying American financial and political leaders to
back the rebellion. Even Grant’s trusted friend, Secretary of War John Rawlins,
expressed pro-Cuban views. He saw the Cuban Junta as freedom fighters who deserved
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recognition by the United States. His friendship with the president potentially allowed
him more influence on the matter than Fish and swayed Grant toward recognition.
However, his declining health provided Fish the chance to unite the rest of the cabinet
against recognition. Instead of a neutrality proclamation, Grant extended an offer to
mediate between the parties, subject to an armistice and a Spanish promise to emancipate
remaining slaves. Rawlins died less than a week after Grant’s proposal and Fish and the
rest of the cabinet united behind a policy of non-recognition, mediation, and
emancipation. Nevertheless, the Cuban Junta continued to push American public opinion
in favor of Cuban recognition.140
Within a week of Grant’s mediation offer, Junta leaders lobbied the State
Department. Junta president José Morales Lemus called upon Assistant Secretary of State
J. C. B. Davis to ascertain the American position toward Cuba. Davis explained that the
Spanish had “declared that an armistice was impossible—but that if the insurgents would
lay down their arms, Spain would simultaneously grant a full amnesty.” Lemus balked,
stating, “We cannot trust the Spaniards. We will not lay down our arms.” Lemus argued
that the rebels had made several gains in Cuba and the Spanish were afraid of losing more
territory. The rebels would only accept the American terms, he argued, noting that they
were planning a great uprising in Havana as well as in the western agricultural region of
Cuba. “To all this I said nothing,” Davis wrote to Fish, “viewing the communication as
an attempt to hasten the proclamation of belligerency which now seems inevitable.”
Davis’s statement on the inevitability of recognition reflected a common belief among
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Americans that the United States would support the plight of freedom seeking peoples
throughout the Western Hemisphere. The Cuban Junta’s popularity was emblematic of
this view and privately even Grant considered the rebels worthy of recognition. However,
Fish ultimately convinced the president to change his mind.141 The crux of Fish’s
argument drew upon the ongoing negotiations between the United States and Great
Britain over the Alabama claims and the American positions on the questions of
neutrality and belligerency.
Republican and nationalist insurrections elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere
caused headaches for Fish and his negotiating stance. In addition to the Cuban revolt,
Grant and Fish had to contend with the constant political rumblings and occasional
violence of the Irish Fenian movement. The Fenians, like many Cuban Americans,
attempted to capitalize on their status as American citizens to promote their cause of
independence for Ireland. After the American Civil War, a group of Irish immigrants who
served in the Union Army worked alongside Irish Americans who supported Irish
independence from Britain, utilizing their military and familial connections to establish a
network of pro-independence organizations across the United States. Hundreds of
thousands of Irish men and women attended political rallies and picnics where they
espoused anti-British rhetoric. These pro-independence organizations rallied for armed
conflict, and eventually hundreds of Fenians led raids into Canada and even financed an
expedition to Ireland to foment revolution there.142
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At the heart of the Fenian crisis for the Grant administration was the question of
Irish American citizenship and how Irishmen living in the United States interpreted the
republican ideology of a post-Civil War America. One of the great legacies of the
American Civil War was the redefinition of American citizenship. The Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution allowed African Americans to claim their citizenship by
birthright and enter the body politic. With birthright now enshrined in the Constitution,
foreign-born Americans also clamored for their rights as naturalized American citizens.
They “developed ideas about citizenship and claims to the rights that citizens enjoyed.”
For African Americans this meant full political participation, for naturalized citizens it
meant embracing a freedom many could not have in their homeland. The naturalized
citizens who returned to Ireland and Cuba believed that the republican values of the
United States were theirs to export back to their home countries. In doing so, these
Americans hoped to bring about revolutionary change to old world European systems.143
The State Department negotiated a number of naturalization treaties in the years
following the American Civil War, the first, negotiated with Prussia by George Bancroft,
in 1868. Subsequent treaties, often referred to as Bancroft treaties, delimited the rights of
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foreign-born American citizens in the United States and abroad. The influx of Germans
into the United States in the 1850s had precipitated the original Bancroft treaty of 1868,
and the rising numbers of Irish and Cuban immigrants in the United States meant that the
State Department similarly had to work with Britain and Spain on just what their status
was as citizens. Many Irish Americans embraced republican notions of freedom in the
United States and sought to instill them in their fellow compatriots back home. Lucy E.
Salyer notes that chief among these rights was the right of expatriation, or the “right of an
individual to choose his home, and with it the right to change his country.” Fenians, she
writes, “demanded to be recognized as American citizens” when they returned to Ireland,
and they sought the protections that came with their citizenship. The United States
Congress enacted the Expatriation Act in 1868, which stated that, “individuals had the
inherent right to change their political allegiance and the government had the obligation
to protect its adopted as well as native citizens when they traveled outside the United
States.” Since Grant had made it clear in his first presidential address that he intended to
honor the spirit of the Expatriation Act by supporting naturalized citizens around the
world, Fenians arrested in Canada and in Ireland clamored for assistance from the United
States government, citing the Expatriation Act as their legal basis for help.144
In the years immediately following the American Civil War, these agitators
returned to British soil claiming American citizenship, yet the British government failed
to recognize their change in status, arguing that they had been and remained subjects of
the Crown. As such, they were subject to prosecution for stoking rebellion against the
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Crown. When an expedition of Fenians sailed from New York in 1867 with the hope of
starting rebellion in Ireland, the British authorities imprisoned thirty-two of the men,
many of whom claimed American citizenship. The British charged the Irish Americans
with fomenting rebellion, though the Fenian prisoners argued that “their only offense was
‘being an American,’” that is “they were arrested for things they had said or done in the
United States.” Fenians, like their counterparts in Cuba, believed that the Expatriation
Act of 1868 meant that they were, “armed with American citizenship as a shield against
further demands of their national sovereign.”145
Like the Fenians, hundreds of Cuban Americans sought aid and protection
through the American legation in Havana and the State Department offices in
Washington. The State Department records of these claims tell a story of the loss of
property and life among both native-born and naturalized American citizens caught up in
the conflict in Cuba. One such man was José García Angarcía, a Cuban educated in
Massachusetts and naturalized as an American citizen in 1854. He informed the State
Department that the Spanish government had seized his property in Cuba “without
accusation, trial, or order of embargo,” and they were now renting his house out without
his authority. García claimed the same had happened to his late brother, Joaquin, and that
both were American citizens. “He affirms that he has never taken part in the political
trouble or insurrection now prevailing in Cuba. He asks the interposition of the United
States government.”146 Fish’s department found no evidence that his property was under
embargo. As for his late brother, Joaquin had been in league with the Cuban Junta and his
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political activities were well known to the Spanish authorities. García’s was a case of
guilt by association. As Joaquin was a member of the Cuban Junta, José faced the
indignities of the Spanish government. Joaquin’s guilt was not in doubt as there was also
evidence that he held two passports, in violation of his oath of United States citizenship.
José’s case illustrates the turmoil encompassing the lives of Cuban Americans living and
working in Cuba during the rebellion, and how the slightest hint or association with the
rebellion could bring misery. His requests for assistance from the U.S. government were
unsuccessful as the State Department found no evidence to support his claim.147
Many of the claims emanated from Cuban Americans who were living under
Spanish passports and working Spanish government jobs. These expatriates had left Cuba
for the United States, often prior to the American Civil War, where they obtained
American citizenship. They then returned to Cuba and, under false pretenses, claimed
Spanish citizenship and accepted jobs with the Spanish colonial government as clerks,
jobs unavailable to them as naturalized American citizens. When arrested, they claimed
American citizenship and thus the protection of the United States against Spanish
authority. Such cases vexed American consuls in Cuba. The State Department explained:
“Naturalized and native-born citizens are entitled to the same protections from the
government when in a foreign country . . . and both in such case are ordinarily subject to
the laws of such country, and are bound to observe such laws to the same extent to which
its own citizens or subjects are bound.” If those American citizens decided to live abroad,
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they were subject to that nation’s laws just like other citizens of that land. However, the
dispatch concluded:
It is also possible for a naturalized citizen, by returning to his native
country and residing there with an evident intent to remain, or by
accepting offices there inconsistent with his adopted citizenship, or by
concealing for a length of time the fact of his naturalization and passing
himself as a citizen of his native country, until occasion may make it his
interest to ask the intervention of the country of his adoption, or in other
ways which may show an intent to abandon his acquired rights, to so far
resume his original allegiance as to absolve the government of his adopted
country from the obligation to protect him as a citizen while he remains in
his native land.148
This dispatch could just as easily have been addressing the situation of Fenians in Britain.
The State Department regarded numerous Cuban and Fenian claims of citizenship as
claims of convenience, yet, at the same time, the Grant administration embraced a
republican ideology of self-determination and republican thought. If not for the
realpolitik necessity of foreign policy, the administration would have embraced the
defense of these American citizens abroad. Yet Secretary Fish understood, and convinced
President Grant, that supporting the republican movements of the Fenians and the Junta,
either by recognizing their plight or providing material support, would undermine the
outstanding Alabama claims which remained unsettled.
The task of defending American citizens abroad fell to the various American
legations. In Great Britain, where American ministers changed at the whim of the
president, that task primarily fell to Legation secretary, Benjamin Moran. A lifelong
diplomat, Moran had arrived in England in the 1850s under the James Buchanan
administration. He maintained a diary over the two decades he spent in London,
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commenting on American foreign policy and the many American citizens who passed
through his door. His journals reveal the fluidity of citizenship claims, as Americans,
Irish, and Germans flooded his office in the 1860s and 1870s with claims of naturalized
citizenship and requests for help from the American government. Moran grew weary of
the constant requests and often questioned the character of those tasked with defending
the rights of naturalized citizens. “Paul Bagley came begging and took a shilling from
[American Minister] Mr. [Reverdy] Johnson!” Moran wrote, “And yet [Secretary of
State] Mr. Seward encourages such a knave to come here to petition the British Gov’t on
behalf of Fenians.”149 Moran found the Fenians bothersome and indiscreet in their
methods. One such Fenian, Stephen J. Meany, a journalist who claimed naturalized
citizenship in the United States and was arrested in Ireland in 1867, continued to stop by
the legation following his release from prison in 1868. Moran’s boss, Reverdy Johnson,
secured Meany’s release yet the Irishman compelled Moran to let him meet with Johnson.
Moran advised him to leave London at once, as his presence in England violated the
pledge he had made upon his release. Meany claimed both that he desired to remain since
his daughter was in a convent there and, at the same time, that he was now the London
correspondent for the New York Herald. Moran worried that his insistence on staying
would cause a rift between the two governments, calling Meany “an untruthful and
dangerous man.” Johnson succeeded in obtaining permission for Meany to reside in the
United Kingdom, which Moran called “a feather in Mr. Johnson’s cap which he will not
fail to display to his Irish fellow citizens to his own advantage.” Moran’s encounters with
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Fenians such as Meany colored his impression of their republican ideology and their
legitimacy as American citizens. “This everlasting sympathy for these rascals,” he wrote,
“is offensive to me and will come back on our heads some day [sic].” Of another Fenian,
arrested in Cuba and charged as a spy, who pressed the American legation for assistance
when in London, Moran wrote: “It is a pity [the Spaniards] did not hang him.”150
While Moran saw them as rascals, Fish understood that the Fenians and the Cuban
rebels were hoping to bring about revolution in their respective countries and, in case of
failure, professed their rights as American citizens in order to avoid prosecution by their
former government. However, both Grant and Fish considered these revolutionaries to be
potential roadblocks to settling the Alabama claims and other diplomatic difficulties. In
August 1870, Grant wrote to Fish that he was considering issuing pardons for the Fenians
imprisoned in Vermont for their raids into Canada. Fish urged caution and asked the
president to hold off on issuing the pardons writing, “political prisoners are the worst
kind of birds to keep caged…I would however suggest whether it may not be well to
postpone the action…the pardon will produce some irritation among the Canadians, who
may in their excitement annoy some of our fishermen.”151 Fish suggested postponing
until after the fishing season, since the complicated fishery situation was one of the main
sticking points between the United States, Great Britain, and Canada that he had folded
into the Alabama claims negotiations. Grant duly postponed the pardons until October,
waiting until the end of fishing season, but electing to issue a proclamation of neutrality
that would admonish not only the Fenians, but also the Cuban Junta (and for good
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measure the German Americans who felt the need to get involved in the Franco-Prussian
War). Fish recalled the Cabinet meeting in his diary:
Submitted the draft of a proclamation of warning against violation of
international duties, by such means as the assumed Governmental
organizations which claim to exercise Legislative Military Powers within
the US (for example the Fenian Congress & the Cuban Junta) to be issued
simultaneously with the granting of the Pardons (which the President has
decided to issue to the Fenians convicted in connection with the late raid
upon Canada).152
Grant issued the proclamation the same day as the pardon so that there could be no
denying its meaning toward the Fenians and the Cubans: American citizens, natural-born
or naturalized, were not to involve themselves in the military expeditions or upheavals of
other nations.
In June 1870, Fish prepared a message to Congress in which he laid out the
administration’s policy on neutrality in Cuba. President Grant then drafted a strong
statement condemning Spanish policies in Cuba, which he intended to append to Fish’s
message. His draft memorandum “referred…to the cruelties practiced in Cuba” and was
intended to demonstrate his administration’s objections to Spain’s actions toward
American citizens in Cuba. Fish had been supplying the House of Representatives with
official correspondence on Cuban affairs since February 1870, as requested, but Fish
decided that the neutrality proclamation should come directly from the president as a
formal message to Congress. Secretaries Hoar and Robeson concurred with Grant’s
characterization of Spanish actions, but Fish balked. “I contend that my draft presents a
just & impartial summary of the case,” Fish wrote in his diary, “condemns each party—
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that by adding what the [President] has written, its [sic] logical effect will be destroyed.”
Fish counselled that Grant’s detailing of American grievances against Spain was more
akin to a declaration of war. Moreover, he argued that the president’s claims were
inaccurate and that to include them in an official message would lead the nation down a
dangerous path. Fish succeeded in convincing Grant to soften his wording, despite Hoar
and Robeson pushing for the condemnatory statement. The president conceded the error
of his ways weeks later when he pulled Fish aside and remarked: “you led me against my
judgment at the time, you almost forced me, in the matter of signing the late Cuban
message, and I now see how right it was, and I desire most sincerely to thank you. The
measure was right & the whole country acquiesces in it.”153
The message to Congress reflected a larger issue that vexed Fish in the latter years
of the first term, charges of discontent between he and the president published
anonymously in the press. Leading up to the Cuban neutrality proclamation the New
York and Washington press assailed Fish for being out of favor with Grant and for the
administration having no clear foreign policy. Grant’s refusal to refute these reports
angered Fish causing some strain on their relationship. As such, when Grant presented his
memorandum which seemingly offered a harsher policy toward Spain over Cuba, one
which Fish believed verged on a declaration of war, the secretary of state balked at its
inclusion in the message to Congress. Eventually, Fish convinced Grant to soften his
language, even though it still accused the Spanish of barbarous treatment of American
citizens. This was a testament to the endurance of their relationship, hence, Grant’s
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remark thanking Fish on behalf of himself and the whole country for talking him out of
his original draft.154
Grant’s message arrived in Congress just as the House was set to vote on the joint
resolution on whether or not to recognize the belligerency of the Cuban rebels instigated
by Congressman Nathaniel Banks of Massachusetts and Senator Sherman of Ohio. Banks
was an ardent support of the Cubans, yet his resolution authorized the president to remain
neutral in the Cuban insurrection. Members of Grant’s Cabinet urged the sending of the
message in order to sway the vote in favor of recognition, hence the fight with Fish
earlier, but the message’s arrival still had its desired effect. While some members of
Congress cheered Grant’s decision to condemn the “failure of Spain to protect American
citizens, or to give them time to prove their innocence of complicity in conspiracy against
Spanish authority,” others bristled at his lack of support for the Cuban Junta. Banks
criticized the president’s message in a well-received speech (he received accolades from
Grant’s own brother-in-law) which championed the cause of liberty in Cuba and
proclaimed that the Cubans were indeed belligerents. But Banks’s resolution was
pragmatic, noting that “should we proclaim neutrality we would only be following in a
juster [sic] and more discreet manner [than] the example of Spain herself and all the
nations of Europe.” For Fish, the message succeeded because the House Republicans
voted against recognition of Cuban belligerency. It was the first time in the fifteen
months of the Grant presidency that Fish felt like the administration and the Republican
Party had coalesced around his foreign policy. Following a Cabinet meeting, Fish and
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other members congratulated one another on the defeat of the belligerency resolution.
“All concur in the opinion that the movement was wise and beneficial in its results,” Fish
wrote in his diary, “that it has served to concentrate and consolidate the party, and to
exhibit a policy, and the capacity of rallying the party.” Fish conceded that the
Republican Party had lacked “the presentation off some issue on which they should be
required as party men, to say ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ distinctly upon some issue presented by the
Administration.” Fish knew Grant was hesitant to support his course of action with Cuba,
yet Grant trusted him, and they “consolidated the party.” Fish understood that the
Administration was setting a precedent for a foreign policy that was more important than
any “momentary excitement of popular sympathy.” From this point forward, the Grant
administration became of one voice on foreign policy.155
Grant’s harsh language toward Spain seemed out of character with the Grant
Doctrine which, while acknowledging that a war with Europe was possible, if not
inevitable, sought to embrace republican ideas in the Western Hemisphere peacefully.
“Let Us Have Peace” was both Grant’s campaign slogan and his policy, both
domestically and internationally. He wanted the United States to maintain a peaceful
coexistence with the larger world. However, hawkish Cabinet members, such as Robeson
and Hoar attempted to push the president toward intervention in Cuba. The bellicose
statement Grant submitted to Fish was thus a move away from the Grant Doctrine in that
it threatened to rush into military intervention against a European power without regard
to the diplomatic or political needs of the Cubans or the American people. Fish’s final

155

Calhoun, 194-195; June 17, 1870, HF Diary, HF papers, LC; New York Herald, June 15, 1870; Lewis
Dent to Nathaniel Banks, June 14, 1870, Nathaniel Banks papers, LC.

153

version of the president’s message softened the expression of Grant’s ire toward Spain,
bringing his message back to a clear argument for neutrality while managing to argue still
that Spain was guilty of abuses against American citizens. With the problem of Cuban
belligerency and neutrality seemingly out of the way, though with the constant headache
of citizenship claims clogging up the legation in Havana, Fish and the State Department
could turn their attention to the more pressing matter of the Alabama claims and the
troubled relations between the United States and Great Britain.
The diplomatic dispute over the Alabama derived from the fact that a British firm
had built the ship in Liverpool, England, and sold it surreptitiously to the Confederate
government. The British origins of the Alabama, and the belligerent status that the act of
selling the ship conveyed to the Confederacy, led American politicians to charge the
British with violating their neutrality during the American Civil War. American
merchants and businessmen who had lost millions of dollars during the war to the actions
of Confederate cruisers filed claims against the government to recoup these losses. At the
same time the Alabama claims encompassed more than just the cost of Civil War
maritime losses; it included other issues like the naturalization of British citizens in the
United States, notably Irish Fenians, and fishing rights in Nova Scotia and the Great
Lakes.156
Efforts toward a settlement of the grievances between the United States and Great
Britain began immediately after the Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln’s Secretary of
State, William H. Seward, had actively sought redress from the British for injuries to the
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United States. Seward also had grander motives behind his tough stand toward the
British. He wanted to annex Canada to the United States and eliminate British influence
throughout North America. President Johnson’s appointment of Reverdy Johnson, a
Maryland Senator, as Minister to Great Britain led to the negotiation of a treaty that the
United States Senate failed to ratify, thus prolonging the diplomatic conflict between the
two nations.157
Johnson’s main task was the settlement of the Alabama claims, which he
attempted through negotiations with the British Foreign Secretary, George Villiers, Earl
of Clarendon. The resulting treaty, known as the Johnson-Clarendon Convention,
contained several provisions that angered political leaders in both nations. For the United
States, the lack of an apology by the British for their interference in the Civil War was
unforgivable. Conceding that they had violated their own Neutrality Proclamation was
equally as galling for the British. In the early months of 1869, outgoing Secretary Seward
presented to the United States Senate a significantly flawed treaty.158 Reaction to the
treaty in the United States was swift and negative. The Senate overwhelmingly rejected it
by a vote of 54 to 1, to widespread public approval. Soon after, in April 1869, Charles
Sumner gave a lengthy speech, charging the British with aiding the Confederacy and the
cause of slavery through their economic and diplomatic support of the South. The cost for
their treachery, Sumner surmised, was around $400 million in direct and indirect claims.
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These indirect claims became the most contentious point in the ongoing Alabama
negotiations, and Fish would eventually seek to adjudicate them in an international
court.159
Grant and Fish studiously avoided recognition of Cuban belligerency in order to
maintain the United States’ position in the Alabama claims even though Cuban
Americans and many Republican Party politicians believed it was the duty of the United
States to support an independent, republican Cuba. Such support, however, would
undermine the American position that Great Britain had acted inappropriately during the
Civil War by recognizing the belligerency of the Confederacy. It might also lead to
armed conflict with the British. The Fenian raids into Canada and the attempted
expedition into Ireland had heightened tensions between Great Britain and Irish
Americans. Sumner’s incendiary speech, delivered just as Grant took office, hindered any
immediate improvement in U.S.-British relations. Sumner’s charges that the British were
responsible not only for the depredations of the Alabama and her sister ships, but also for
the entire cost of the war from the Battle of Gettysburg forward, riled the British public.
When Sumner suggested that the United States would gladly forgive such a debt if the
British would part with Canada, the British balked at such a suggestion.160
The demise of the Johnson-Clarendon Convention required the United States and
Great Britain to return to the drawing board regarding the Alabama claims. Fish initially

159

Cook, 73-102; “The Alabama Claims” Speech by the Honorable Charles Sumner, Delivered in
Executive Session of the United States Senate, Delivered on Tuesday, April 13, 1869, Against the
Ratification of the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty for the Settlement of the Alabama and other Claims (London:
Stevens Brothers, 1869). See also: Nevins, Hamilton Fish.
160

Calhoun, 159-171; In early January 1870, a group of residents of British Columbia sent a petition to
Grant asking to be annexed to the United States as a territory. The President and the Secretary of State
thought it best to turn down the offer. January 4, 1870, HF diary, HF papers, LC.

156

relied on the new American Minister to Britain, Sumner’s friend John L. Motley, to
negotiate with the British. However, Grant soon came to believe that Motley’s loyalties
lay more with Sumner than the administration. He seemed to be a Sumner surrogate
rather than the president’s representative. Grant’s paranoia came from his hatred for
Sumner over the failed annexation of Santo Domingo and the senator’s campaign to
thwart Grant’s foreign policy aims. Fish blocked Motley’s recall from London on
numerous occasions, arguing that it was in the best interest of the Administration to leave
him in place.161 Grant, however, became adamant that Motley was undermining his
policies, and toyed with dispatching Fish to take Motley’s place because Motley
“represented Mr. Sumner more than he did the Administration, & spoke with much
warmth of feeling, about Sumner.” Fish argued that Sumner did not have as much
influence over Motley as Grant believed and hoped to postpone any precipitous action.162
In early July, Grant prevailed, and Fish telegraphed Motley to demand his resignation.163
Grant argued that Motley’s removal was in the best interest of the
administration’s policy as it moved forward with the Alabama claims negotiations. Upon
his forced resignation, Motley published a memoir about the troubles between the United
States and Great Britain, placing the blame squarely on the shoulders of the British. The
memoir was a carbon copy of Sumner’s argument, stating that the ill feeling toward
Britain in the United States “cannot be soothed or suppressed by negotiation, however
skillful, by phraseology, however friendly until the wound is thoroughly probed.”
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Whereas Fish had instructed Motley to tread lightly with the British and to avoid any
official discussions that might anger them, Motley’s memoir was overtly hostile, arguing
that “until [a settlement has been reached] there is danger that the wound will continue to
fester.” Angered by the release of the memoir, Fish began the task of moving the
negotiations from London to Washington. According to Fish, however, this had been his
plan all along.164
Fish had entered office knowing that the Johnson-Clarendon convention would
fail. He laid out his plan to famed political scientist and international lawmaker Francis
Lieber, writing, “The idea & the determination were mine before even the rejection of the
Johnson Clarendon treaty. Soon after I entered upon the office of Secy of State, I saw that
that Treaty was foredoomed to be rejected.” He continued, “I then decided, & expressed
to the President, the opinion, that we must take pause in the discussion with G. B. & that
when the excitement & irritation had subsided (which would ensue on the rejection of the
Treaty) we should insist that any renewed negotiations be had here.” Fish hoped for a
lull in the discussions between the two nations, using the time to settle the issues with the
Fenians, handle the neutrality proclamation, and manage Grant’s Santo Domingo
annexation. He explained to Lieber that his instructions to Motley were not to press the
question, and “on 28 June 69, I instructed him that when the negotiations should be
resumed, we desired them to be Conducted in this Country.” Though new to diplomacy,
Fish thought he could handle the negotiations better himself. “Although this was the first
Official declaration on the subject of the transfer of the negotiations (a change of venue,
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the lawyers would call it),” he wrote, “it was what I had expressed in conversation in
private, & in semi official [sic] Correspondence, & in deliberations in the Cabinet, & in
consultations with the President, from my entrance on office, in March [18]69.” Fish then
spent the next year prompting the British Minister to the United States, Edward Thornton,
by planting suggestions in their various conversations, as well as in conversations with
British banker John Rose. “The sending a Special Mission, & some person of high
official rank, was suggested by me in May [18]69,” he continued, “and was the subject of
close confidential conversation, and of correspondence with influential persons in
England, as early as the 1st June 1869 and the Correspondence was continued, in this
mode, until the fruit ripened.” This plan came to fruition when:
the official letters between [Sir] Edward Thornton & me, (which of course
were written & revised, & exchanged & had passed through the Cable,
word for word) before they were signed) finally took date & signature in
the latter part of January last—Those four letters were the official
parturition of twenty months secret Diplomacy.
Changing the venue for the negotiations of the Alabama claims was an important step in
the history of relations between the United States and Great Britain. It allowed Fish and
Thornton to work with their respective commissions to create a treaty that settled the
points of contention on the northern border all while never having to leave Washington.
Fish was able to maintain direct control over the treaty negotiations while also handling
the day-to-day business operations of the Department of State. Fish and Thornton agreed
to arbitrate the fisheries disagreements, and they sent the Alabama claims to an
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international arbitration that the Grant administration hoped would become the standard
for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.165
The Treaty of Washington boiled down to two important points: the Alabama
claims and the fisheries conflict in Canadian waters. The presence of commissioners from
Canada, led by Canadian Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald, meant that the fisheries
question received equal time with the Alabama claims. The fisheries question had
lingered for decades, as New England and Canadian fishermen constantly clashed over
inshore waters in Canada. The issue was so problematic that Fish felt the need to
convince Grant to postpone the pardon of the Fenian raiders in the hopes of curtailing
violence among Canadian and American fishermen first. Fish hoped that the British
commissioners assembling in Washington could convince their Canadian counterparts to
settle the fisheries issue alongside the Alabama claims to put an end to all the
disagreements between the United States, Great Britain, and Canada at once.166
Both the Grant administration and the British government agreed that independent
arbitration of the Alabama claims was the most important aspect of the Treaty of
Washington. Neither nation was willing to yield its position on the claims and both
recognized that a final settlement could not be reached in Washington. The
commissioners therefore agreed to argue their case in Geneva, Switzerland, before a
tribunal of judges from Spain, Italy, and Brazil. The attendance of a commissioner from
Canada leant legitimacy to the notion of Canadian autonomy. The treaty also established

165

HF to Francis Lieber, May 30, 1871, Francis Lieber papers, Huntington Library. See Frank J. Merli, The
Alabama, British Neutrality, and the American Civil War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004);
Myers, Dissolving Tensions, 87-90.
166

Myers, 90, 184-192.

160

a separate arbitration for the fisheries question. Before finalizing the treaty, Senator
Sumner attempted to derail it by adding articles that would declare private property free
from capture during times of war. Fish and Thornton both decried the last-minute attempt
by Sumner as “wicked,” but they were successful in fending it off.167 The two parties
ratified the Treaty of Washington on June 17, 1871. Historian Philip Myers argued that
the Treaty of Washington “was the most comprehensive treaty in the history of BritishAmerican-Canadian diplomacy. It attested that there was no tension that could not be
dissolved. National interests were suborned to peaceful settlement.”168 The Treaty of
Washington represented the best of Grant’s and Fish’s foreign policy and the hopes of the
Grant Doctrine, the peaceful settlement of disagreements and the crafting of international
commissions to adjudicate disputes. The United States and Great Britain agreed to take
their case to a tribunal in Geneva, Switzerland to settle the Alabama issue peacefully,
once and for all.
In the ensuing months, both commissions assembled their respective cases for
presentation to the tribunal. The United States focused on legal definitions of the terms
“intervention,” “abstinence,” and “neutrality.” According to the American
commissioners, the Confederacy had been a rebellious movement, not a sovereign nation.
“It would shock the moral sense of civilization,” the Americans argued, “to speak of the
United States as standing neutral between Great Britain and the Sepoy rebellion in
India.”169 As to the Confederate naval warfare, the Americans argued that such
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engagements represented “piratical violence and robbery,” and Great Britain should have
treated Confederate ships as such following its proclamation of neutrality. Under
international law, pirate vessels were “the enemies of every country.”170 Therefore, the
United States argued, it should have been Great Britain’s responsibility to apprehend all
Confederate cruisers at port in all their colonial territories. For this failure, and for the
equally unforgivable failure of the British to prevent the sale of ships to the Confederates,
the United States deemed Great Britain responsible for both the direct claims of
destroyed commerce inflicted by Confederate cruisers and indirect claims which the
Union incurred due to the Confederate naval destruction. For these indirect claims, the
United States asked the British to reimburse all military expenses following the Battle of
Gettysburg in July 1863. American diplomats contended that after Gettysburg, the
Confederate army fought only a defensive war in every engagement except on the sea,
and that the British were “guilty of want of due diligence, that is, of culpable negligence,
in permitting, or in not preventing, the construction, equipment, manning, or arming of
Confederate men-of-war.”171
Great Britain scoffed at the American demand for indirect claims and fought to
have them thrown out, claiming that they did not agree to the indirect claims at the Treaty
of Washington. After a few days, the tribunal agreed and determined that only the direct
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losses incurred by the United States at the hands of British-built Confederate ships would
be subject to arbitration. The British commissioners were happy with their early victory
and Secretary Fish was happy to have the matter settled into international law. Fish had
surreptitiously brought the indirect claims before the tribunal, angering the British
commissioners, but argued that he had done so in order to have them ruled upon in an
international court. “Fish reasoned that an important tenet would be established that a
neutral power could not be held liable for indirect damages resulting from neutrality
breaches,” historian Philip Myers notes, “such a ruling would be a defining idea for
maritime law.”172 The tribunal confined itself solely to the claims over damages inflicted
by four Confederate ships: the Alabama, the Florida, the Georgia, and the
Shenandoah.173 With the indirect claims off the table, the arbitration of the remaining
Alabama claims continued and, in early September 1872, the tribunal issued its judgment.
The tribunal held that Great Britain was responsible for $15.5 million in damages.
The year that followed the settlement of the Alabama claims remained relatively
peaceful in terms of foreign relations between the United States and Great Britain. The
Treaty of Washington allowed for an arbitration of the fisheries agreement and the
northern border, and the British made the payment for the damages awarded at Geneva to
Secretary Fish in a single cheque. By the autumn of 1873, the Grant administration was
more concerned with domestic problems surrounding the economic panic of September
and the rising violence in the American South. Amidst this domestic turmoil entered
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another American ship, the Virginius, and additional questions about neutrality and
citizenship.
No situation encapsulated the questions of citizenship, statecraft, and the Grant
Doctrine more than the tragic saga of the Virginius. The Spanish navy captured the
American-flagged ship off Jamaica in October 1873 while carrying volunteers and
weapons bound for the Cuban rebels. However, the Spanish claimed that the captain of
the ship had falsified his logbook and was illegally flying the American flag, thus making
the ship and its crew pirates. If the ship had been falsely flying an American flag, then the
United States government was not obligated to intervene, yet the question over the ship’s
legitimacy was unclear in the early reports of the affair. The Spanish imprisoned and later
executed the crew and many of the passengers, several of whom were native-born and
naturalized Americans. The incident therefore sparked an international furor and
embroiled the United States, Spain, and Great Britain in a diplomatic crisis that verged on
war. Hamilton Fish wrested control of the situation from his troublesome Minister to
Spain, Daniel Sickles, and ably handled an outraged American public while negotiating a
peaceful settlement with Spanish diplomats in order to end a tense situation, but not
before newspapers whipped the American public into a war frenzy.174
Grant worried that the situation in Cuba created an atmosphere where the “people
are scarsely [sic] longer capable of judging impartially in matters between Spain and
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American citizens.”175 In 1872, Spain dispatched a new Minister, Admiral José Polo de
Bernabé, and Fish initially hoped that they might make progress on American claims
against the Spanish government, but he was quickly disappointed. When Fish mentioned
“a large number of Cases, of embargoed Estates, & of complaint of violation of personal
rights, which have frequently been brought to the notice of his predecessor, but remain
unsatisfied,” Polo “disclaimed knowledge as to them saying that his recent arrival, &
being away from the Legation, he had not had time to familiarize himself with the details
of the past negotiations.” In fact, the problems between the United States and Spain
would grow exponentially in the autumn of 1873.176
Fish’s recent experiences had caused him to have little confidence in the Spanish
government. “I have been so often disappointed by assurances given by the Spanish
Gov’t,” he wrote the day before the Spanish executed the crew, “that I cease to count
upon their realization. The present Government at Madrid…is not strong in Spain &
when we get to Cuba its power of performance is infinitely small.”177 He lamented to the
Spanish Minister that the constant encroachments on the property and rights of American
citizens in Cuba and the rising tensions in the Caribbean were “exciting and disturbing
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our quiet.”178 Meanwhile, Fish was also at his wit’s end with his Minister, Sickles, who
had made a bad reputation for himself by 1873, by not only alienating himself from the
Spanish political elite in Madrid but also through his many illicit affairs which he carried
out in public. However, once the Spanish Volunteers in Cuba executed American citizens
the administration had to act quickly. “Would it not be well to telegraph Sickles that the
summary infliction of the death penalty upon the prisoners taken from the Virginius,”
President Grant wrote to Fish in a short note, “will necessarily attract much attention in
this country, and will be regarded as an inhuman act, not in accordance with the spirit of
the Civilization of the Nineteenth Century.”179
In early November, Admiral Polo called on Secretary Fish to discuss the matter of
the Virginius. He asked Fish if he knew whether the Virginius had been in British waters
at the time of its seizure. Fish understood that Spain had captured the vessel six miles off
the coast of Jamaica en route to Cuba, in international waters, to which Polo retorted that
the pursuit must have begun in Spanish waters. If the British captured the ship in their
waters then the Spanish would have had no legal right to board the ship. Polo’s retort that
the pursuit must have begun in Spanish waters was an attempt to justify that the initial
contact between the Spanish Navy and the Virginius happened in Spanish territory,
therefore the pursuit, boarding, and capture of the ship and crew was entirely legal. The
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Admiral concluded the conversation speculating that “he thought the Virginius was not
properly carrying the American flag.” Fish asked for evidence of this. If the secretary of
state could prove that the ship had been sailing under the American flag falsely, he could
forestall the war mongering of the press and the Cuban Junta. The Virginius would be
shown as nothing more than a pirate ship, falsely flying the American flag and using that
flag as a pretense to support and arm the rebellion against Spain and to elude capture.180
While the Cuban Junta, the press, and many members of Congress were openly
discussing war, Grant’s cabinet agreed “that war was not desirable.” Nevertheless, the
possibility of an unwanted war with Spain in Cuba required discussion and preparations.
The cabinet discussed reexamining the recognition of Cuban belligerency but agreed that
“there was not sufficient evidence of Government and Authority in the Insurgents to
justify a recognition.” Fish recommended an economic embargo of the island, followed
by an expression of kindness toward the Spanish government, as an appropriate response
to the Virginius falling victim to the outrages of the insurrection. Fish favored measures
that would hurt the Spanish economically but would stop short of taking the side of the
Cuban insurgents. He understood this would anger Cuban Americans who supported the
rebels, but he wanted to avoid any further escalation of the affair while safeguarding the
rights of Americans abroad. Unfortunately, the pace of events threatened to undermine
his measured diplomacy.181
The American public demanded action from the Grant administration in response
to the murder of American citizens. Others, however, worried that the call for war at a
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time of great financial panic would be disastrous for the nation. The economic panic that
began the previous month had rocked the international economy and the United States
was reeling from economic depression. American railroad companies had borrowed
significant debt from European firms and instability in European stock exchanges in the
spring of 1873 made these American investments volatile. This came to a head in
September 1873 when railroad investments in the United States began to fail. On
September 17, 1873, the New York Stock Exchange crashed and the following day the
respected investment firm of Jay Cooke and Company collapsed. A domino effect
occurred as banks and investment firms collapsed, people withdrew their deposits, and
stock prices plummeted. The federal government could only do so much, President Grant
informed the bankers in New York, but the Treasury Department was able to purchase
bonds to relieve some of the pressure on the floundering banks. In this instance, Fish
disagreed with Grant, cautioning a conservative approach, urging the Secretary of the
Treasury to “adhere to the policy of non-expansion [of currency into the market]. It may
be a severe remedy, but severe cases require severe remedies.” While Fish believed the
government should let the economic situation play out, Grant, believed “the government
should try to ameliorate the nation’s troubles.” This economic panic coincided with the
fears that the next year’s 1874 midterm congressional elections, which the Republican
Party were now swinging in the direction of the Democrats. As all of this played out, the
Virginius crisis sailed into the picture, threatening to upend an already unstable situation.
“You must have a lively time about Cuba,” Edwards Pierrepont wrote to Fish in the days
following the executions, “I feel much security that while the President and you will
maintain the honor of the country, you will not be hurried into any measures which will
168

add to the financial embarrassments which, in my judgment, are by no means ended.” As
the situation became more precarious, Grant and Fish looked for any solution that would
help maintain peace.182
While Fish wanted to avoid war, he saw the Virginius affair as an illegal attack
upon Americans. “The savage and vengeful butchery at Santiago,” he wrote to
Pierrepont, “is an outrage upon the civilization of the age, and unless signally repudiated
by Spain, must place her under the heaviest responsibilities which an outraged people
may visit upon her. The insult to our flag must be atoned for.” As far as Fish was
concerned, the questions regarding the legitimacy of the ship’s American origin, or of the
citizenship of the naturalized Cuban Americans on board, were moot. The attack on the
Virginius represented an attack on the United States. Yet, Grant and Fish also sought
assistance from other powers to achieve a peaceful resolution with Spain. Fish outlined a
plan to create an international coalition to force Spain to the negotiating table. “The
horrible butchery at Santiago de Cuba is occupying the attention of the Administration,”
he wrote, “I think that it marks the end of Spanish rule in Cuba...it is evident that Spain
cannot govern it, in fact that Spain has not for some time past been able to control it.”
The idea of international cooperation was another outgrowth of the Grant Doctrine,
leveraging one European power against another while ensuring that the island of Cuba
would have a path toward republican self-government. Here, yet again, Fish looked to
international law for a settlement.183
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Fish met with Attorney General Pierrepont and Secretary of the Navy Robeson in
late November to discuss common and international law as it related to the Virginius
affair. Pierrepont argued that the capture of the Virginius was an act of war if the ship
was American. However, if the ship was engaged in piracy or was really a Cuban ship
fomenting rebellion, its capture could not be considered an act of war against the United
States or a violation of international law. The pliability of international law was at the
heart of the attorney general’s argument. “The Common Law, of whose flexibility and
general wisdom we are accustomed to boast, grew up, as you know,” he wrote to Fish,
“from decisions upon emergencies as they arose, applying the principles of justice and
right reason to each case with its new and varied circumstances.” International law,
though, had no such basis and was less defined. “The flexibility of Common Law surely
needs to be applied to International Law, which is yet extremely crude and in many of its
precedents conflicting,” he continued, “To speak of a Law of Nations as even
approaching an exact science is to talk nonsense; hence each case as it arises must be
determined by the application of just principles and right reason to the particular
circumstances both moral and physical which the case presents.” Prior to going to war,
the secretary of state wanted to examine all existing laws and options for a peaceful
resolution to the situation.184
One avenue that Fish explored was to persuade Spain to extricate itself from the
island altogether on the grounds that it had lost control of the situation as evidenced by
the fate of the Virginius detainees. Fish broached this topic directly with Admiral Polo,
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pointing to the embarrassment that Spain had become on the world stage. “I thought she
might with dignity appeal to the fact that she had two revolutions at home and practically
two in Cuba,” Fish told the Admiral, “and was therefore temporarily unable to assert her
authority and to vindicate her Government against the usurped resistance of the Casino
Espagnol and volunteers.” In that case, he argued, Spain might allow the United States to
provide justice for American citizens in Cuba. Polo was nonplussed by the proposal,
arguing that the vessel had been fitted out in American ports and that “the Government of
the United States has not used ‘due diligence’ in preventing the departure of the
expedition.” The Admiral argued that the case of the Virginius was “parallel with the
case of the Alabama.” Fish balked at the comparison, arguing that there was no evidence
that the Virginius was fitted out and let out of port for the express purpose of rebellion
whereas there was ample evidence in the case of the Alabama. In truth, “the express
purpose” of the Virginius was rebellion, though the charge that American ports let her
depart without doing their due diligence was thin. Either way, Polo struck a nerve with
Fish by comparing the Virginius to the Alabama and charging the United States
government with the type of malfeasance they had levied against the British just years
before.185
Much like the Alabama had been a rallying cry for war but had resulted in
reconciliation, Fish sought the same for the Virginius, if only the Spanish would do their
part. News continued to reach Washington of more executions and the public grew irate.
Sir Edward Thornton, the British Minister to Washington, informed Fish that among the

185

November 13, 1873, HF diary, HF papers, LC.

171

executed were sixteen British subjects, with seven more British subjects still in captivity.
The two diplomats pondered what the international response to the situation should be,
with Thornton arguing that the Virginius was “on an unlawful voyage” to participate in
the Cuban rebellion. As Grant and Fish had specifically avoided recognizing the Cubans
as belligerents in order to maintain their legal argument during the Alabama claims, Fish
objected. “I contend that she could be accused of nothing more than an intent to violate
the municipal laws of Spain,” Fish argued, “there being no recognized state of war, and
consequently no blockade, her charges could not be regarded as contraband or illegal, and
there was no allegation of enlistment of the persons on board who were therefore simply
passengers.” With his last statement, Fish was stretching the truth. He understood that
the Cuban Americans on board the ship were, though naturalized citizens of the United
States, intent on fomenting rebellion against Spain.186
Four days later, the Spanish government announced its willingness to negotiate
over the Virginius affair. During a Cabinet meeting with President Grant, Fish learned
that: “The Spanish Cabinet are unanimously in favor of a satisfactory and honorable
settlement of the Virginius difficulty, but regard the maintenance of the integrity of the
Spanish territory essential.” Fish recognized this as a positive sign and counseled Grant
to have Sickles postpone closing the legation. Grant was more skeptical and worried that
the statement was just another in a long line of prevarications. “Admitting the fact I
observe,” Fish recalled, “that this Government cannot afford to go to the extreme of war
in view of an official representation that Spain is prepared to make honorable satisfaction
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by means of which damaged interests will be reestablished and national susceptibility
appeased.” Fish understood that he was posing an important argument. “We owe it to
ourselves and the World to be right,” he implored, “before resorting to the extreme
measures of war.” He cautioned that closing the legation in Madrid and suspending
diplomatic negotiations, as many in the Cabinet now urged Grant to do, before Spain
could obtain a full report from Cuba, would exacerbate a problem that he could settle
peacefully.187
Eventually Fish determined to take direct control of the negotiations and bypass
the unreliable Sickles. Immediately following the arrest and execution of the crew of the
Virginius, Sickles had alienated not only the Spanish government but also several of his
fellow diplomats across Europe. Fish therefore met more frequently with Admiral Polo to
seek a way forward. Polo informed Fish that he had a “very great interest in [the
incident’s] peaceful solution.” Fish explained to Polo that the American consul in
Jamaica had informed him that the port had released the ship under incorrect papers. The
log listed the owner as a Mr. Quesada, rather than the Mr. Patterson that the United States
had on file. “I suggest to him that that impression may afford an easy solution,” Fish
recalled, “inasmuch as the vessel was cleared at Kingston with American papers, his
Government might very well say that the capture had been under a misapprehension, and
could thereupon restore the vessel and salute the flag.” As for the Spanish commander
who had captured the ship, Fish wanted him punished, but he allowed that the Spanish
government could do so. He offered these ideas to Polo, unofficially, but hoped that Polo
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would consider them. There was still the matter, though, of the lives of American
citizens.188
Fish soon received word that the Spanish were willing to enter into an
international arbitration but regardless of how often President Grant had proclaimed
arbitration as his preferred method for settling international disagreements, such a process
for the Virginius was going to be a hard sell to the agitated American public. Thornton
brought first word of arbitration when he called upon the Secretary of State with news
that the British Foreign Minister, Lord Granville, had turned down an offer from Spain to
act as arbiter of the dispute between the United States and Spain. The British Government
“were co-complainants with the United States” Granville argued, and arbitration was not
good enough for the murder of British subjects.189 The next day Polo confirmed the
Spanish offer of arbitration, which Fish agreed to take into consideration. He then helped
Polo craft a carefully worded reply to Madrid that laid out the main crux of the United
States position. “Mr. Fish:
cannot conceal the fact that there is great difficulty attending [the
situation]. He says that he has no knowledge as yet, of the release of the
embargoed estates, or any manifestations of the power of Spain, to enforce
in Cuba her orders or the reforms of which assurances have been often
given or to hope of the early pacification of the Island, or to assure the
protection of the lives and rights of American citizens therein.190
The Virginius affair, then, was the manifestation of the entire problem of Spain and Cuba.
Spain’s inability to control the island, its inability to protect the lives and property of
Americans living in Cuba, and its unwillingness to divest itself of the slave system had
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led to this situation. The Spanish Volunteers had felt compelled to capture a ship bringing
men and arms to the island, executed the miscreants, and set off an international incident
leading to the brink of war. Fish and the Grant Administration wanted a peaceful solution
not only to the Virginius affair, but also to the entire Cuban entanglement that continued
to engulf American citizens.
Sensing an opportunity, Fish approached his fellow diplomats in Washington with
a proposal to force Spain to address its inability to maintain order in Cuba. Thornton
wired London that Fish “had suggested that England might be of great service to Spain at
present time, by urging the possibility and importance of her complying with the
requirements of the United States.” Fish wanted to exert British influence over Spain
while asserting United States influence over Cuba. This two-pronged diplomatic move
sought to end Spanish procrastination and hasten a reparations settlement over the
Virginius. That same day, Fish presented the arbitration proposal to the cabinet. It led “to
a very long and protracted discussion and the conclusion was reached that, Arbitration as
proposed could not be agreed upon, the question of National honor and indignity to the
flag being involved.” Though Grant ordered Fish to decline arbitration, he told him to
“keep the door open” for more offers, contingent upon apologies and the handing over of
the ship. More offers came quickly.191
Polo and Fish met multiple times in late November to thrash out an agreement,
eventually producing a draft that Madrid deemed acceptable on November 28. The
protocol allowed both nations to save face, avoid war, and reassure American citizens
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that restitution for the atrocities meted out by the Spanish Volunteers had been
achieved.192 Spain agreed to return the ship to the United States, release surviving
passengers and crew by Christmas, and salute the United States flag. However, if “Spain
should prove to the satisfaction of the Government of the United States that the Virginius
was not entitled to carry the flag of the United States…the salute will be spontaneously
dispensed with.” If this was the case, then, it would be the Americans’ responsibility to
“institute inquiry and adopt legal proceedings against the vessel…and against any of the
persons who may appear to have been guilty of illegal acts in connection therewith.” The
Spanish agreed to implement their own legal inquiries into the officers who had detained
the Virginius. They also agreed to “other reciprocal reclamations to be the subject of
consideration and arrangement between the two governments, and in case of no
agreements, to be the subject of arbitration” if the United States Senate consents to
such.193
Congratulatory correspondence poured into Fish’s office on his successful
resolution of the Virginius affair. “I heartily congratulate you in the bright prospect of the
Spanish question,” wrote Attorney General Edwards Pierrepont, “this will more than
compensate you, for all your anxieties and give you an enduring eminence among the
great statesmen.” Other well-wishers likened the peaceful agreement with Spain to the
Treaty of Washington with Britain. “I congratulate you on the arrangement you have
concluded with the Spanish Government,” Senator Oliver P. Morton wrote, “your success
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in this matter, and in the settlement of the Alabama Claims are among the greatest
achievements of American diplomacy and entitle you to the gratitude of the Nation.”
Fish’s colleagues viewed the two settlements as “gratifying victories” over European
powers that placed the United States on equal footing with the Old World. Even those
who had advocated war reluctantly offered well-wishes to Fish at the prospect of peace.
“I beg to congratulate you and the President on the adjustment with Spain,” wrote
William M. Evarts:
It was with great reluctance that I undertook to guide, in some sort, the
popular excitement which followed the news of the transaction of the
Virginius. This excitement was deep and sincere but not wholly rational,
and might have shown itself in extravagant pretensions not easily
reconsidered. I have no doubt, as I said to you four years ago, that our
Government will need to take a somewhat earnest and responsible interest
in relations of Cuba with Spain, which are, really, subordinate to our own
relations to Cuba which are permanent and paramount.
Possibly the most unexpected compliment came from President Grant who, upon
receiving his copy of the Protocol, offered the newly vacated Supreme Court Chief
Justiceship to a surprised Fish. “I told him that I could not [accept it],” Fish confided in
his diary, “that I did not feel myself competent for the place; he replied that he would be
the judge of that, and he thought I was.” Fish, though, successfully steered the president
away from any further consideration.194
The Virginius affair did not pass without further complications. There were
disagreements as to where Spain would hand over the ship, whether the Spanish saluted
the American flag, and the amount of monetary reparations to the families of victims,
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some of which dragged on for years.195 But the administration settled the crisis by the
time of President Grant’s Annual Message in December 1873. In the Alabama and
Virginius episodes, the Grant administration had resolved two important international
disputes that dealt with national sovereignty and Grant’s pledge to protect the rights of
American citizens “whether native or of foreign birth.” The citizenship claims, the
neutrality proclamation, the Treaty of Washington, and the ongoing Cuban insurrection
culminating in the Virginius affair, all brought the United States, at various times, to the
brink of war with a European power. Yet President Grant and Secretary Fish were able to
utilize international arbitration and exert the United States’ influence to bring about
peaceful resolutions to these episodes. The Cuban rebellion tested the relationship
between Grant and Fish and tested the stability of Grant’s foreign policy. The Grant
Doctrine developed into a policy that saw the United States as an aspirant for the peaceful
negotiation of international incidents and not a nation that utilized them to justify
imperial acquisitions of territory. Grant’s policy of exporting republicanism, then, would
have to happen through the transmission of ideas and not through acquisition of
territories.
The Reconstruction period, then, can be seen as one in which the United States
struggled with how to come to terms with the meaning of citizenship, not only for
African Americans, but also for the millions of foreign-born Americans who carried their
republican experiences with them in the United States. Yet, the methods by which these
naturalized citizens exported their republicanism often created difficulties for American
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diplomacy and even threatened to push the United States into war. The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bancroft Treaties forced the Grant Administration to redefine
exactly what constituted a citizen of the United States and what that citizenship entailed
as American citizens engaged with the world.
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CHAPTER V
RECONSTRUCTING THE UNCIVILIZED: NATIVE AMERICANS,
MORMONS, CHINESE, AND RECONSTRUCTION IN THE WEST
Ulysses S. Grant used the occasion of his first inaugural address on March 4,
1869, to promote his ideas about who should be included in the republican experiment.
Toward the end of his address, he mentioned the plight of Native Americans and, for the
first time for an American president, outlined a path to citizenship for them. “The proper
treatment of the original occupants of the land, the Indian, is one deserving of careful
study,” he told the crowd, “I will favor any course towards them which tends to their
civilization, Christianization and ultimate citizenship.” Grant’s short statement
encapsulated his republican ideology: a color-blind faith that men, once civilized and
faithful Christians, accepting of Western civilization, were welcome into the body politic
of the United States. This statement prefigured the themes of the Grant Doctrine. Grant
saw the Reconstruction era as a time when people long left out of the republican
experiment could finally enjoy the blessings of liberty. Nevertheless, Grant still held to
nineteenth-century concepts of Western Civilization that considered Native American
culture to be uncivilized. Once the Native American accepted republican norms,
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however, Grant believed that he would be worthy of being counted as an equal citizen of
the republic.196
Grant’s idea of a pathway to citizenship for Native Americans aligned with his
larger vision for the United States during the Reconstruction era. He understood that the
American Civil War had fundamentally changed the United States into a nation that was
finally living up to the ideals of its founders. African Americans were enjoying freedom
and citizenship through the ratification of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution, and Grant hoped to export these tenets of republicanism to the
Caribbean through the Grant Doctrine. This Doctrine spurred Grant’s attempt to annex
the Dominican Republic to the United States as a territory with a path to statehood,
guaranteeing citizenship rights for the Dominicans and offering the island as a safe haven
for African Americans fleeing the onslaught of racist whites in the former Confederacy.
Grant’s plan for Native Americans would mirror this approach. Much like his Dominican
scheme, Grant relied on the assistance of a former military aide, this time to implement
his plan to civilize Native Americans with a view to organizing the Indian Territory in
Oklahoma that would eventually attain statehood. Grant hoped that Native Americans
would populate this territory, as full citizens, entering into the Union as equals. If the
Oklahoma Territory could enter into the Union as a state, perhaps the Dakota Territory
might follow. Grant’s vision failed for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was
racial prejudice within his own party, but also the prevailing view of many Americans
that Reconstruction was a pathway to national reunification and nothing more.
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For Grant and the Republican Party, the American West represented the new
frontier for republicanism on the continent, but his administration faced three significant
challenges. American business, technology, and labor was moving west, and Grant
understood that Native Americans stood in the way of this progress. Rather than having
them pushed aside, Grant sought to incorporate them into the body politic once they
embraced the civilizing forces of republicanism and Christianity. At the same time, Grant
and the Republican Party rejected Mormonism as a form of white civilization and
Christianity in the West. Though white and ostensibly American citizens, Mormons were
foreign in nature to most Americans and they violated the Republican Party’s sense of
morality and republicanism by practicing polygamy, which Grant viewed as a form of
slavery and utterly anti-republican, and embracing a theocracy that placed the Church at
the center of all spiritual and legal decision-making. Mormons also put their religious
leadership, in the guise of Brigham Young, above the supremacy of the federal
government, placing the Church over the state. To Grant, this was anathema to republican
morality and represented behavior that flew in the face of civilized society. Finally, Grant
and his administration had to tackle the politically tricky question of Chinese
immigration. As discussed above, the Grant administration struggled to come to grips
with the meaning of naturalization for European immigrants who became American
citizens. The introduction of Chinese immigrant labor in the West complicated the issue
further as questions of labor and race collided in California and cut across party lines.
Both Democrats and Republicans engaged in anti-Chinese rhetoric and advocated
limiting the level of Chinese immigration. Grant entered the fray as he sought to restrict
the flow of forced labor and Chinese sex slaves coming through American ports. His
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support for the Page Act of 1875, which barred Chinese women from entering the United
States, signaled to Americans his support for limits on Chinese immigration. Grant
believed that his position was consistent with his goal of eradicating slavery in the
Western Hemisphere, as enshrined in his doctrine.197
This chapter, then, will examine the issues of citizenship and Reconstruction as
they unfolded in the West. It will examine how Grant and his first Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, Ely S. Parker, attempted to implement a civilizing path toward citizenship
for Native Americans that was in line with Grant’s approach toward Santo Domingo as
envisioned in the Grant Doctrine. It will show how Parker influenced the decisionmaking in the Bureau of Indian Affairs and how Grant looked to Parker as the archetype
of the civilized Native American. Parker’s example convinced Grant that Native
Americans were quite capable of attaining citizenship and becoming full participants in
the republican experiment. This chapter will also show that Grant’s civilizing Native
American policy constituted part of his larger Reconstruction policy of exporting
citizenship beyond the traditional boundaries of the United States and represented his
desire to bring republicanism to the entire Western Hemisphere as a source of stability in
the post-Civil War era.
Reconstruction was a nationwide program that encompassed not only the former
Confederate states, but also the rapidly expanding Western territories as well. As such,
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this chapter examines the movement of peoples into the American West, white, Native
American, and Chinese, and how the Grant Administration interpreted their movement as
part of the republican experiment. In so doing, this chapter will examine how the Grant
administration dealt with Mormon settlers in Utah and how these settlers sharply
contrasted with Native Americans, in Grant’s eyes, as suitable candidates for republican
citizenship. Grant formulated his views on the fitness of people for republicanism and
citizenship not by race but by standards of morality and civilization. The Mormons, then,
as fully civilized individuals who were born into the republican system fell outside of
Grant’s and the Republican Party’s views of morality and republicanism and were just as
foreign to Americans as Native Americans or Chinese immigrants. While they ostensibly
held citizenship in the United States, their status as residents of the Utah Territory and
their embrace of polygamy put them at odds with the type of republicanism that
Reconstruction promised for the nation’s future. Finally, this chapter will examine the
issue of Chinese immigration in the West, and the policies enacted by the state of
California and the United States Congress to exclude Chinese women. The California
legislature designed these policies, which Grant believed to be fully in line with
republican principles, to prohibit the trafficking of Chinese women for the purposes of
sex slavery. Regardless of their intent, though, these policies became the foundation for
later racist immigration legislation which targeted the Chinese specifically because of
their race. For Grant, however, ending this form of slavery aligned squarely with his
Doctrine of liberty and free labor. He did not base his Reconstruction policy, then, upon
race but rather the degree of civilization, as measured by the acceptance of what he
considered the essential political and social norms of a republican society.
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Grant’s ideas about Native American citizenship reflected his belief in the tenets
of republicanism that rewarded hard work with political participation. Grant drew from
his personal experience with his military aide, Ely S. Parker, a Seneca Chief and Union
staff officer who had been present at the Confederate surrender at Appomattox. Grant
thought that Parker epitomized the civilized Native American. As such, Grant named
Parker his Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the highest position for
any non-white man in the entire administration. The president hoped to reform the bureau
and provide a path toward citizenship for Native Americans. Under Parker’s leadership,
Grant envisioned an American West composed of distinct Native American territories,
populated by American Indians who embraced Western civilization, modern agricultural
methods, Christian religious beliefs, and, most importantly, a republican form of
government. Grant hoped that the United States Congress would accept these Indian
territories just as he envisioned that they would accept the Dominican Republic, as a
territory with a path toward statehood. Native American leaders would constitute the
governments of these territories and exercise the rights of United States citizenship
enshrined in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. This vision of Native American
citizenship and participation in the body politic grew from his relationship with Parker
and developed out of his Reconstruction policies of reorienting American republicanism
to include all civilized men willing to participate in the republican experiment. For Grant,
the key to Native American participation lay in their willingness to embrace the trappings
of civilization and the authority of the federal government. By doing so, Native
Americans were as welcome into the body politic as any other citizen of the United States
and then free to move anywhere in the country. The failure to incorporate themselves into
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the fabric of American society meant leaving themselves vulnerable to the full weight of
the onslaught of the approaching American businesses, railroads, and settlers moving
further west. These entities would then encroach upon their land and Native Americans
would have no recourse or support from the federal government, testing the ability of the
United States military to honor its treaties with the various tribes.198
One problem with Grant’s civilizing path to citizenship was that the United States
Constitution did not require “civilization” as a precursor to citizenship. The Fourteenth
Amendment required only birth or naturalization for citizenship and, save for a reference
to Native Americans not taxed, not counted for purposes of Congressional representation,
the amendment did not mention any racial exclusion. Grant’s ideas of civilization were
therefore ambiguous and open to interpretation by both whites and Native Americans.
For many whites, no amount of assimilation would suffice to consider Native Americans
equals as citizens. For many Native Americans, the ambiguity of Grant’s call for
civilization offered possibilities for them to convince whites that they had assimilated
into white society, accepted republican norms, and willingly participated in the body
politic, but all the while maintaining their distinct culture. Parker attempted to use this
ambiguity to his advantage to develop an Indian policy that incorporated Native
American culture and political structures into republican forms of government that would
meet with Grant’s approval as an acceptable policy in the West.199
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Parker had first met Grant in Galena, Illinois before the outbreak of the American
Civil War, where the Treasury Department had sent him to build a post office.200 His
work as an intermediary for the Seneca kept him traveling back and forth between Galena
and Washington, where he worked to secure deals for the Tonawanda Seneca in Western
New York that prevented whites from settling on their land. This included convincing the
federal government to purchase land once taken from the Seneca and then deeding it back
to the tribe.201 This work on behalf of his people impressed many of the leaders of the
Treasury Department who, when faced with a petition from Galena area Democrats who
wanted to remove Parker from his position, came to his defense, describing him as a
gentleman and a testament to his race.202
Grant anticipated that his political opponents would have questions about the
constitutionality of Parker’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs soon after his inauguration in March 1869. As a Native American Parker did not
have full citizenship rights. Although he had voted in municipal and some statewide
elections in New York, he was not a citizen of the United States. Nevertheless, he had
served in numerous positions in the federal government prior to the Civil War and been
an officer under Grant during it. The Grant Administration used the transformative nature
of the Reconstruction era laws to overcome a major hurdle in the question of Parker’s
eligibility as a citizen. With Grant’s election in 1868, the previous commissioner,
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Nathaniel Taylor, offered his resignation in early March 1869, freeing the position for
Parker. Republican Senator John M. Thayer of Nebraska wrote to Grant two days after
the inauguration to nominate Parker for commissioner. “I desire not to be officious, but I
will take the liberty of recommending the appointment of Gen. Parker, of your late Staff,
to be commissioner of Indian affairs,” he wrote, “I can think of no one whose
appointment to that position would give greater satisfaction to the country. What
appointment so appropriate? Who could exercise so favorable an influence upon the
Indians?” Thayer articulated what Grant was thinking as well: that Parker was in the best
position to represent the interests of, and to facilitate the path to civilization and
citizenship for, Native Americans. However, Secretary of the Interior Jacob Cox was
unsure if an Indian could serve in such a high-level administration position, so he asked
for an opinion from Attorney General Ebenezer R. Hoar. Hoar wrote to Cox that “on the
facts presented, I do not perceive that he is disqualified from holding such office under
the Constitution and laws of the United States.” According to the attorney general, Parker
qualified as a citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment which stated that representatives
to Congress were apportioned by the whole number of persons in the state “excluding
Indians not taxed.” As Parker had been a taxpayer in the state of New York, he qualified
as a citizen and was eligible for any post in the federal government. Based upon this legal
opinion, Cox recommended to the president that the nomination of Parker take effect
immediately.203
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This constitutional inquiry into Parker’s eligibility was an important episode in
the early days of the Grant Administration. Republicans redefined the Constitution’s
racial boundaries through the Civil Rights Amendments to secure African American
freedom, citizenship, and voting rights. Grant hoped to expand these same rights to other
races as well. By examining whether the Constitution expressly prohibited allowing
Native Americans, or any other non-whites for that matter, from serving in high-level
positions, the Grant Administration created a precedent that gave heft to Grant’s ideas. It
showed that Grant was willing to support and appoint people of color to positions within
his administration. Parker was one of several unprecedented appointments by Grant. He
also assigned a Jewish superintendent to a Bureau of Indian Affairs district office, Dr.
Herman Bendell, and he appointed an African American educator as Minister to Haiti,
Professor Ebenezer Don Carlos Bassett. While such appointments immediately broke
new ground, his policies toward Native Americans evolved more gradually.204
Initially, Grant continued his predecessors’ policy, recommending the removal of
Native Americans to designated reservation territories. Where he differed was in how he
intended to run these reservations. Rather than the political appointees who had managed
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Grant intended the military to oversee the reservations.
Parker wanted Native Americans to exercise decision-making on the reservations,
consigning whites to the periphery. Grant acquiesced with Parker’s policy because it fit
more closely with his views of self-determination and a republicanism that allowed
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civilized men to control their own economic and political lives. Much as African
American men were asserting political responsibility in the American South, Grant
accepted that Native Americans should make their own political decisions in the Indian
Territory. Grant believed that Native Americans needed the guiding hand of the federal
government to help them along the path to civilization, but Parker convinced him that
they would find their way “to assimilate into the expanding United States at their own
pace.” In this way, Grant’s plan for Native Americans paralleled his plan for the
Dominicans.205
Throughout Grant’s presidency, Native American delegations visited the White
House to make representations on behalf of their people as leaders of sovereign nations.
Grant saw them not as foreign representatives but as Americans whom he hoped would
become citizens. As shown in his dealings with Congress over the annexation of Santo
Domingo, Grant believed it was his prerogative as president to enter into treaties with
foreign entities, but the Native American peoples were a different matter. He was
seeking to replace the customary bonds of allegiance and leadership within Indian nations
and replace them with individual citizenship rights and allegiance to the Constitution and
laws of the United States. In late January 1870, Grant welcomed a delegation of chiefs
from the Cherokee and Creek nations who spoke warmly of their relationship with the
president. “Mr. President,” a representative spoke, “we call here to-day to offer our fealty
to you as our recognized guardian and ward, and to pray to you, Sir, to continue as our
good friend and father.” The chiefs used submissive language to flatter Grant and show
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that they were accepting of his civilizing policies. Grant turned the language back upon
the chiefs in order to show that he viewed them as his equals as Americans. “You are
welcome,” he replied:
and in reference to continuing your ‘good father,’ as you say, I must
answer that I have long thought that the two nations which you represent,
and all those civilized nations in the Indian country, should be their own
wards and good fathers. I am of the opinion that they should become
citizens, and be entitled to all the rights of citizens, --cease to be nations
and become States.
Grant saw the path forward for the Cherokee and the Creek the same as he saw as the
path for the Dominicans: an organized territory of non-white citizens, accepted into the
United States with the civilizing force of republicanism that would lead these territories
to inevitable statehood. With statehood would come participation in the body politic
through representation in Congress, municipal and statewide elections, taxation, and
military service. Late in his first term, Congress passed a rider to an appropriations bill
that effectively ended Native American sovereignty. This rider stated that “hereafter no
Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or
recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may
contract by treaty.” This did not negate existing treaties, but the administration could not
negotiate new treaties in the future. The government treated Native Americans as wards
but the peace policy was rather similar to the policy enacted for the freedman in the South
in the early days of Reconstruction. Many political leaders, however, viewed the
Reconstruction peace policy in much the same way they did the policy of equal rights, as
a distraction from the goal of national reunion and strengthening the republic.206
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While Grant and Parker hoped for Native American citizenship, most of his
contemporaries, did not share this stance. Thomas Nast, the famous cartoonist for
Harper’s Weekly and a Grant supporter, used the exchange between Grant and the chiefs
to mock the idea of a civilized Native American citizen. In his cartoon titled “Robinson
Crusoe Making a Man of his Friday” (see Figure 1), Nast depicted Grant dressing a
Native American man into an ill-fitting suit stuffed with notes on “taxation” and the
“vote.” A mantelpiece in the background held the vestiges of the Indian’s savagery, a
bow and arrow, a tomahawk, and a bottle of “fire water,” while the trappings of
modernity and civilization, a hoe, a plow, a spelling book, and a copy of Harper’s
Weekly, lay about his feet. Nast indicated that the president’s task of civilizing and
making a citizen out of the Native American would be difficult.207
Significantly, Grant and Parker saw the civilizing force of the federal government
in different ways. While Grant desired that Native Americans accept western civilization
and turn from their cultural heritage, Parker wanted Native Americans to hold on to their
traditional structures of power. Prior to the Civil War, while working as a low-level
federal bureaucrat, Parker had designed a system of tribal governments, modeled after
republican forms of government, which reclassified traditional tribal ranks of chiefs and
warriors into a municipal administration. Parker encouraged tribes to establish this
structure of governance in order to ensure control over their own development. White
control would mean a total loss of their culture and traditions. Following the war, Parker

Mark Wahlgren Summers, The Ordeal of the Reunion: A New History of Reconstruction (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2014) 181-183.
207

“Robinson Crusoe Making a Man of His Friday,” Harper’s Weekly, February 12, 1870.

192

hoped to implement a similar political structure under the Grant administration, with the
president’s blessing. Parker’s concept evolved into Grant’s plan for an Indian territory
that would enter the Union as a state with a citizenry made up entirely of Native
Americans. Native Americans organized this enclave in 1871 in the Oklahoma area
known as Okmulgee.208
On January 30, 1871, Grant prepared a message to Congress relating to the
Council of tribes held at Okmulgee. The tribes had adopted “a declaration of rights, and
a constitution for their Government.” Some of these Native Americans had been among
the delegation to Grant the previous year. This constitution represented their first step
along the path that Grant had laid out for them, and he presented it to Congress as a
positive step toward their inevitable citizenship. “It [would seem] highly desirable that
the civilized indians [sic] of the country should be encouraged in establishing for
themselves forms of territorial government,” Grant informed the Congress, “compatible
with the Constitution of the United States, and with the previous custom towards other
communities laying outside of State limits.” This was an important point for Grant. The
Native Americans at Okmulgee were taking the proper steps that any territory should take
toward applying for statehood, the same steps that other territories in the West were
taking, the same steps just denied to the Dominican Republic. However, Grant believed
that the Okmulgee territory was not ready for statehood, and the Native American tribes
there had a long way to go before they could qualify for statehood, but he believed that
the Congress should accept the proposal for Native American sovereignty over their own
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legislative affairs. This would allow them to establish republican institutions that would
lead them to become better citizens. The territory was in its infancy and was just
beginning to establish its governmental functions, but Grant agreed with Parker and
Secretary of the Interior Columbus Delano that the Native Americans should hold the
local positions of power. “I do not believe [that] it would [not] be advisable to receive the
new territory with the constitution precisely as it is now framed,” he advised, “So long as
a territorial form of government is preserved Congress should hold the power of
approving or disapproving of all legislative action of the territory.” By this, Grant meant
that Congress should have the power to approve the constitutional language of the Native
American territory. Grant advised, though, that it was within his power to appoint the
officials in the territory and, undoubtedly taking Parker’s advice, he informed Congress
that “It might be well to limit the appointment of all territorial officials, appointed by the
Executive, to native citizens of the territory. If any exception is to be made to this rule I
would recommend that it should be limited to the Judiciary.” Like Santo Domingo, Grant
envisioned a racially distinct state, run and populated by Native Americans that would
enable them to participate in the body politic insulated from the animosity of white
settlers. “It is confidently hoped that the policy now being pursued towards the indian
[sic] will fit him for self government [sic],” Grant ended his message, “and make him
desire to settle among people of his own race where he can enjoy the full privileges of
Civil, and enlightened government.”209
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Grant saw the constitutional meeting at Okmulgee as a positive step toward the
inevitable inclusion of a Native American state into the Union. Expanding the Union
would strengthen the republic’s economy and increase the rolls of the Republican Party.
Yet the Native Americans in the Indian Territory were less interested in statehood than
self-government. Historian C. Joseph Genetin-Pilawa notes that Parker saw the
Okmulgee constitution as “a chance for [Native Americans] to block any future attempt
‘of having territorial government forced upon them.’” However, Grant suggested just
such a plan of enforcing congressional control over the territory, albeit while allowing
Native American officials to remain in place. Genetin-Pilawa casts Grant’s stance as “a
paternalistic action that effectively killed the constitution itself.” Indeed, by March 1871,
Samuel Checote, Chief of the Creek Nation had written to Grant to protest the
congressional interference in the Indian territorial government. Checote expressed the
hope that “our constitution…may remain unchanged—and that the Teritorial [sic] forms
of Government may be of our own creation—and not one created by parties who are
entirely unacquainted with our manners, Customs—or wants.” The Creek chief expressed
the worry of many nations in the Indian Territory that the federal government would
force them to abandon their entire culture and customs, something Parker was unwilling
to concede but which Grant accepted as a precondition for assimilation into the body
politic. While this was certainly paternalistic, it was consistent with his Grant Doctrine,
the idea that a strong republican government should establish the structures for citizens to
succeed. Grant believed that the Native Americans assembled at Okmulgee were well on
their way toward the path to citizenship; their declaration of rights and constitution
demonstrated their understanding of republican political ideology. Like the Dominicans,
195

they needed the guiding hand of the United States government to lead them to the
inevitable end of statehood. Parker lobbied the Secretary of the Interior for individual
allotments of land for the Native Americans in Indian Territory as he understood that men
such as Grant saw private land ownership as one of the first steps toward citizenship and
republicanism. While Grant’s move for federal intervention was indeed paternalistic, it
was not out of line with his attempt to export republicanism and to reconstruct the
uncivilized.210
In late February 1871, Nag-ga-rash, head Chief of the Iowa tribes, and 36 other
chiefs, petitioned Grant, Parker, and Secretary Delano to authorize a reservation for their
tribes. They asked for a farm “to each of our young men and young women” and they
“also request[ed] that a manual labor boarding School may be established for the
education of our children.” Such a request was just what Grant and Parker were looking
for as further proof that their peace policy of transforming Native Americans into
republican citizens was working. Later, the same chiefs claimed “that we are adopting the
habits and Customs of Civilized life. That we are opening Farms, building Dwelling
houses, raising Cattle, using Agricultural implements, and educating our children in
school houses.” All they asked in return was for the proceeds from the sale of their
ancestral lands in Iowa, now that they had relocated to Nebraska and Kansas. The Iowa
tribes had done everything that Grant had asked of them in his inaugural address. They
had embraced the ways of western civilization, accepted his Indian reservation policy,
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and educated their children in the republican tradition. Now what they sought was direct
access to the funds raised from the sale of their ancestral lands, which the Interior
Department had deposited in a trust fund. They never received these funds as the Interior
Department chose to maintain them in the trust fund for the benefit of the Native
Americans, seemingly because departmental leadership subscribed to racial stereotypes
that Indians could not be trusted with money.211
As Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Parker endured constant assaults on his
character due in large part to his race and, al though he enjoyed the full support of
President Grant, he grew weary of the position and the toll it had taken on him. Early in
his presidency, Grant appointed nine men to the Congressional Board of Indian
Commissioners (BIC), a body designed by Congress to provide oversight of the Grant
administration’s control over Indian policy. William Welsh, a well-known leader of the
Episcopal Church in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and no friend of Ely S. Parker,
ostensibly led the BIC. The BIC had the authority to “inspect the records of the Indian
Office and to obtain full information as to the conduct of all parts of the affairs thereof.”
Welsh initially took this charge as his personal mission to root out perceived corruption
in the Indian Office, corruption that he believed was firmly due to Parker. However, as he
believed that the commission was too weak and that Parker was corrupt, Welsh resigned
from the commission, charging Parker with fraud in his resignation letter.212 After years
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of such harassment, Parker angrily resigned on June 29, 1871, citing the constant
harangues from former BIC Chairman William Welsh and the hamstringing effect of
congressional legislation and ongoing investigations of the Office of Indian Affairs
(OIA). Even after resigning from the BIC, Welsh used his position of authority to bring
charges in the form of a congressional investigation against Parker. While the committee
found Parker not guilty of fraud, and to have acted within his rights as the Commissioner
of the BIA, the political fallout proved too much for Parker to bear. “The effect of
Congressional legislation,” he wrote, “has been to almost wholly divest the Indian Bureau
of all its original importance, duties and proper responsibilities.” Parker complained that
the BIC had weakened his position to the point that he was working more for Congress
than for the Department of the Interior. “Under present arrangements the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs is nearly a supernumerary officer of the government,” he argued, “his
principle [sic.] duties being simply that of a clerk to a Board of Indian Commissioners,
operating wholly outside of and almost independently of the Indian Bureau.” Parker told
Grant that it was his sincerest desire to “aid in forwarding and promoting to a successful
issue, the Presidents [sic] wise and benificent [sic] Indian policy, but I cannot in justice to
myself longer continue to hold the ambiguous position I now occupy.” The president
accepted Parker’s resignation, taking the opportunity to reflect on their friendship and
careers together. “Accepting it severs official relations which have existed between us for
eight consecutive years,” Grant wrote to Parker, “without cause of complaint as to your
entire fitness for either of the important places which you have had during that time. Your
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management of the Indian Bureau has been in entire harmony with my policy, which I
hope will tend to the civilization of the Indian race. It has also been able and discreet.”213
With Parker’s departure from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Grant lost a strong
ally in his efforts to advance Native Americans along the path toward citizenship. More
importantly, Parker had been a guiding force in Grant’s policy for Native American
autonomy. Parker had convinced Grant that Native Americans should hold leadership
positions in their territories and that while the Army and the federal government could
implement laws and supply Native Americans with the goods they needed to establish
farms and schools, the Native Americans themselves should be the ones to institute the
changes on their reservations. With Parker gone, Grant lost an important voice on behalf
of Native American rights and culture, and Welsh and his allies were able to transform
Grant’s peace policy into an effort led wholly by religious groups focusing solely on the
Christianization of Native Americans rather than their path toward citizenship.214
Historians refer to Grant’s Indian policy as his “peace policy” due to his attempts
to quell violence against Native Americans perpetrated by white settlers in the West.
Grant intended to use the United States Army to implement this policy prior to his
election to the presidency by attempting to transfer the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to
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the War Department. When Congress refused to support this action, Grant accepted that
reform of the BIA was necessary to implement a fair peace policy that, as president, he
hoped would transition Native Americans to republican citizens. Without Parker, Grant
now had to rely on an element within the BIA that did not share his views on Native
American citizenship. Leaders in Congress, the BIC, and the U.S. Army all believed that
Native Americans were a threat to white men and western settlement and that Grant’s
peace policy and the BIA were thus hindering the tide of progress. Native Americans
stood in the way of industrial development through the building of railroads, and
Congress supported business interests that pushed tribes off coveted land. In 1872 and
1873, in the Pacific Northwest, the United States Army engaged with Modoc Indians in
Oregon, suffering numerous defeats. Throughout 1873 and 1874, Generals Philip
Sheridan and William T. Sherman made frequent requests to mount expeditions against
Plains Indian tribes in Indian Territory they deemed hostile, yet Grant refused to
authorize the use of force. Finally, in the summer of 1874, forced off their lands due to
the slaughter of the buffalo herds by white hunters, Comanche, Kiowa, and Cheyenne
warriors launched raids into Kansas and Texas in search of revenge on the hunters. The
Grant administration could not overlook these extra-territorial raids and, in late July
1874, The Red River War began.215
The Red River War was one of several clashes between Native Americans and
whites during Grant’s second term that essentially put an end to his peace policy and
undermined his attempts to civilize Native Americans and make them into citizens. The
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United States Army initially failed in engagements against Modoc warriors due to poor
training and lack of resources, but Sheridan’s troops initiated combat with the Plains
Indians better prepared for a longer fight. Whereas Grant’s peace policy had focused on
securing and protecting the supplies and foodstuffs of the Native Americans in Indian
Territory, the Army now targeted the Indians’ food supplies and horse herds in an effort
to degrade their capability to mount raids against white settlements. This direct challenge
to the peace policy, which President Grant sanctioned because he could not allow the
Plains Indians to attack white settlements in adjoining states, showed the weakness of
Grant’s position in terms of sustaining his civilizing policy. He had made efforts to
distinguish between peaceful Native Americans and outlaw bands of Indians who acted
on their uncivilized nature, when he told Chiefs Red Cloud and Spotted Tail that he
hoped “to keep the peace between [Indians] and the whites.” However, the Army
eventually exhausted the supplies of the Plains Indians and those who did not perish had
no choice but to accept surrender and forced relocation to reservations in Florida.216
Grant’s Native American policy suffered another hit when white settlers and
Northern Pacific Railroad interests violated the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 and
encroached upon the Sioux Reservation of South Dakota. Sioux warriors reacted
violently to the interlopers. Grant’s peace policy should have honored the treaty and
enforced the rights of the Sioux. Members of the BIC implored Grant to halt the use of
military force for fear of inflaming a war that would end the peace policy for good.
Secretary of War William Belknap claimed that U.S. troops were there to “prevent, and
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not to cause, hostilities. It was supposed that these troops would be used as a protecting,
and not as an aggressive, force.” When settlers discovered gold in the Black Hills on
Sioux hunting grounds in 1874, however, Colonel George Armstrong Custer insisted that
a fort would be necessary to protect white miners in the region and disregarded the fact of
white incursions into Sioux lands. The Sioux, naturally, attacked the white interlopers
and violence escalated as more whites flooded in seeking their fortunes.217
The president’s Native American peace policy deteriorated into outright war. The
United States Army went on the offensive against Indian tribes across the West, white
settlers continued to encroach upon Indian territories, especially in the Black Hills region
of South Dakota as gold mines became more prosperous, and Grant’s Bureau of Indian
Affairs was ineffective in dealing with the situation. The Great Sioux War in the Black
Hills lasted through the end of Grant’s presidency, but he began his final year with a
moment of hope. Board of Indian Commissioners Chair Clinton Fisk reported to the
president in early January 1876 that the Black Hills Sioux were peaceful and the peace
policy was a marked success. “There have been those who have cruelly asserted that
these Indians should be exterminated to make room for white men,” he wrote the
president, “Such advocates are found plentifully on the borders of Indian reservations and
on the march to the Black Hills. Indeed, wherever the Indian has desirable lands, men of
this class can be found looking eagerly for an opportunity to enter in and possess them.”
Fisk worried that these same men were behind the renewed effort to relocate the Bureau
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of Indian Affairs to the War Department, “These men to-day are all of the opinion that
the Indians should be handed over to the care of the military.” As far as the commissioner
was concerned, in early 1876, the peace policy was working, if the president would allow
the Bureau, and not the Army, to manage interactions with Native Americans.218
The Sioux and the Army continued to clash throughout 1876, culminating in the
June 1876 Battle of Little Bighorn where a contingent of Sioux and Cheyenne met
Custer’s Seventh Cavalry and decimated the battalion in a major victory for the Plains
Indians. Custer’s death spurred increased calls for violence and vengeance against the
Sioux, and Grant called on Congress to authorize between 2,500 and 5,000 additional
troops, effectively ending his peace policy. Critical members of Congress and the public
demanded to know whether Grant was fighting a defensive war against the Sioux or
whether he was fighting to secure the gold discovered on their land. In July 1876, the
Senate resolved that the president answer:
whether the Sioux Indians made any hostile demonstrations prior to the
invasion of their treaty reservation by the gold hunters.—Whether the
present Military operations are conducted for the purpose of protecting
said Indians in their rights under the Treaty of Eighteen hundred and sixty
eight, or of punishing them for resisting the violation of that treaty.
Grant responded by submitting a statement from General Sherman blaming Sioux
warriors, but not the Sioux people as a whole, for the violence. Sherman claimed
that the discovery of gold was a complication and not a contributing factor in the
military expeditions. Grant’s new Secretary of War, J. Donald Cameron, endorsed
Sherman’s views. Grant similarly endorsed the operations when he spent
218

Clinton Fisk to USG, January 1, 1876, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant Digital Edition. Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2018. Volume 27: January 1–October 31, 1876.
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/GRNT-01-27-03-0001-0001 [accessed 02 Sep 2019].

203

$200,000 for the construction of military posts in the region. By the time Grant
left office in March 1877, the Army and the Sioux were in a state of constant war,
and his peace policy of gradual progress toward civilization and citizenship was
finished. Only the Christianization project remained.219
From the outset of his administration, President Grant had welcomed the
involvement of religious groups in implementing his Indian policy. He saw their help as
one means of eliminating the corruption rampant in the practice of awarding Indian agent
positions as patronage. He also understood that a first step toward the civilization of
Native Americans would be their acceptance of Christianity. While mostly focusing on
Protestants, the Grant Administration did allow Catholics to join the Indian agent corps,
though not without some trepidation. Grant and the Republican Party had grown out of
their anti-Catholicism by the 1870s, although the president maintained a distrust of the
papacy when it came to the divide between church and state in the field of public
education. In his famous secular education speech delivered in Des Moines, Iowa on
September 29, 1875, Grant expounded upon the use of state funding for Catholic and
other religious schools:
Resolve that either the state or Nation, or both combined, shall support
institutions of learning sufficient to afford to every child growing up in the
land the opportunity of a good common school education, unmixed with
sectarian, pagan or atheistical [sic] tenets. Leave the matter of religion to
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the family circle, the church & the private school support[ed] entirety by
private contribution Keep the church and state forever separate.
Without noting the irony of his peace policy, Grant set off a firestorm of questions as to
whether he was promoting anti-Catholicism. Grant, though, argued that he was promoting
good old-fashioned republicanism, “of Free Thought, Free speech, a Free Press, Pure
Morals, Unfettered Religious sentiment, and of Equal Right & Privileges to all men
irrespective of race Nationality, Color or Religion.” Grant’s hesitation about allowing
Catholic groups into his peace policy stemmed from his worry that they would put their
religion before the state and that their loyalty was to Rome before the Constitution.
Allowing Catholics to educate Native Americans in a Catholic sectarian school would be
unrepublican. In the end, though, Grant did allow Catholic groups into his peace policy.
The Mormons, however, were quite another matter.220
Months after Parker’s resignation Grant focused his attention on the Mormons’
organization of the Utah Territory and their attempts at entering the Union as a state.
Polygamy had been a target of the Republican Party since its founding platform in 1856.
The Republicans referred to the “twin relics of barbarism-polygamy and slavery” and
Grant’s administration continued the offensive against this Mormon practice throughout
his presidency. When federal authorities attempted to enforce the law against polygamy,

220

For correspondence from Catholics unhappy with the imbalance of the distribution of Indian agencies
among religions see: Archbishop Francis N. Blanchet to USG, January 13, 1872 and George Dobson to
USG, May 13, 1873, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant Digital Edition. Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2018. Volume 22: June 1, 1871—January 31, 1872.
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/GRNT-01-22-02-0022 [accessed 28 June 2019]; USG Speech,
September 29, 1875, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant Digital Edition. Charlottesville: University of Virginia
Press, Rotunda, 2018. Volume 26: 1875. http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/GRNT-01-26-02-0123
[accessed 02 Sep 2019]; For more on connections between Catholicism and Mormonism as it relates to
faith over politics see: Richard White, The Republic For Which it Stands: The United States during
Reconstruction and the Gilded Age, 1865-1896 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 386-388.

205

Utah Territorial Governor George L. Woods expressed concern about violent intrigues
against federal officials by Mormon forces. “The populace have been arming for ten
days, or more,” the governor wrote to Grant, “and many violent threats have been made
against the Federal officials,--threats to assassinate etc.” Woods understood that these
threats stemmed from the impending trial of Brigham Young, the leader of the Mormon
Church in Utah, on charges of violating the federal statute against polygamy. “Brigham
Young was Arrested [sic] to-day,” Woods informed the President, “on a charge of lewd
and lascivious cohabitation with Sixteen different women.” Authorities arrested many
other prominent Mormon men on similar charges and Governor Woods asked Grant to
send troops to Utah to safeguard the legal proceedings from the gathering Mormons.
Grant was pleased with Woods’s forcefulness. To Grant, the Mormons represented the
antithesis of the civilized republicanism that he hoped to instill in the Native Americans
in the West. Not only did Mormons practice the immoral act of polygamy, which made
them more savage and more foreign than Native Americans in Grant’s eyes, but they also
flouted federal authority by disregarding territorial and federal laws. Such hostility
toward Mormonism was not unique to Grant but rather was a major tenet of the
Republican Party. If the United States were to become a civilized republican nation, it
would do so through eradicating the barbaric practice of polygamy. Republicans like
Grant equated the practice of polygamy with slavery, where male authority figures
subjugated women and girls, forcing them to satisfy their whims through plural
marriages. Their lives seemed akin to those of the former slaves and Mormon men to
slave masters. Grant similarly linked the subjugation of Mormon women with the plight
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of Chinese women, signaling his belief that polygamy degraded women much as slavery
had done to African Americans.221
Young remained under house arrest for months and was still awaiting trial when
he received an unexpected reprieve. In the spring, an important Supreme Court decision
forced Governor Woods and his prosecutors to release the Mormon leader and many
others due to problems with grand jury selections. In April 1872, the United States
Supreme Court ruled in Clinton v. Englebrecht that the territorial courts, while appointed
by the president and under the jurisdiction of the Congress, were not “courts of the
United States.” This ruling meant that the federal officials in Utah had erroneously run
the legal system as official U.S. courts, rather than following the territorial legal rules set
up by the Utah Jury Law of 1859. As such, Governor Woods and Chief Justice James B.
McKean had to throw out all existing indictments and set Young free. Woods expressed
to Grant his fears that the Mormons would continue their anti-republican ways, writing
“Under the law as laid down by the Supreme Court, a Mormon Marshall will summon a
Mormon Jury to try Mormon Criminals, each, and all of whom regard their duty to the
Church as above all law.” Justice McKean wrote to Grant that “Brigham Young is very
rich—made so by the most high-handed impositions of his deluded people” and utilized a
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group of lobbyists in Washington to defeat any national legislation that would take away
power from the Mormon majority in the territory. Young had shown he was capable of
bribery in the spring when he wired thousands of dollars to surrogates in Washington
who forwarded the money to members of Congress to defeat the “Voorhees Bill.” This
legislation would have addressed the problem identified in the Englebrecht decision by
allowing federal officials to control the grand jury selection process in territories.
Young’s influence mobilized just enough opposition in the House to block the Voorhees
Bill. Woods predicted that its demise would only embolden the Mormons’ antirepublican spirit, “They feel, now, that all power is in their hands.” This was precisely
Grant’s fear.222
Grant underscored his hostility to the Mormons in his Annual Message to
Congress in December 1872. “It seemed to be the policy of the legislature of Utah,”
Grant complained to Congress, “to evade all responsibility to the government of the
United States, and even to hold a position in hostility to it.” Such an attitude by the
Mormon-dominated body was anti-republican in nature, rendering Utah unfit to be a fullfledged member of the United States. Grant asked the Congress to examine all laws
relating to the territory, “as will secure peace, the equality of all citizens before the law,
and the ultimate extinguishment of polygamy.” If the barbaric practice of polygamy
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continued unabated in Utah, Grant reasoned, the United States should not admit the
territory into the Union.223
Months later the events in Utah worsened to the point that President Grant again
called upon the Congress to recognize the deteriorating conditions due to the Mormons’
flouting of federal authority. The problem was how to select juries out of a pool of
Mormons whose loyalty was to the church first and to the law second. Grant argued that
he was “convinced that so long as Congress leaves the selection of jurors to the local
authorities, it will be futile to make any effort to enforce laws not acceptable to a majority
of the people of the Territory or which interferes with local prejudices, or provides for the
punishment of polygamy, or any of its affiliated vices or crimes..” As the government
once again attempted to bring charges against Brigham Young for polygamy and indicted
other Mormons on charges of murder, when brought to trial, local juries continued to find
defendants not guilty. “I am convinced that so long as Congress leaves the selection of
jurors to the local authorities,” Grant informed the Congress, “it will be futile to make
any effort to enforce the laws not acceptable to a majority of the people of the Territory,
or which interfere with local prejudices, or provides for the punishment of polygamy or
any of its affiliated vices or crimes.” Around the same time, Joseph Smith III had written
to Grant to argue that his father had never authorized polygamy and that Brigham Young
and the Mormons in Utah had committed “crimes against the moral sense of the nation.”
To Grant, all these reports reinforced his belief that the Mormons were uncivilized,
unrepublican, and unfit for full membership in the Union. Republicans regained some
223
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control over the territorial court system and the fight against polygamy through the
passage of the Poland Act of 1874, which provided for a balance between Mormon and
non-Mormon jurors in jury selection in Utah.224
One of Brigham Young’s wives, Ann Eliza, helped the Poland Act legislation
along when she sued the church leader for divorce and regaled Washington politicians
with tales of the suffering of Mormon women. These tales fed into the Republican
perceptions of polygamy as enslavement and barbaric uncivilized behavior and of the
wives as pawns and unwilling participants. Yet some studies reveal that many Mormon
women enjoyed a social equality that non-Mormon women did not possess elsewhere in
American society. Utah had one of the most liberal divorce laws in the United States and
women, more often than men, were the applicants seeking to dissolve the marriages.
Mormon women involved in plural marriages reported that they had “more time and
independence than monogamous wives.” Grant and Republican antagonism to polygamy
also discounted the genuine spiritual devotion that many women held toward their
Mormon faith, and no secular political belief system could undermine their value system.
While some Mormon women reported feelings of “psychic trauma” or emotional
problems, many still argued that their faith in the practice and in the eternal rewards they
would receive guided their decision to participate in plural marriage. The irony, then was
that Mormon women in Utah often had more social and religious rights than did their
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anti-polygamy counterparts. When Ann Eliza visited Congress in 1874 to push for the
passage of the Poland Act, she was exercising a right to divorce that many other women
in the United States did not enjoy in a republican society.225
In his 1875 Annual Message, Grant once again took the opportunity to call to the
attention of Congress of the sins of the Utah Mormons in order to outlaw the practice of
polygamy. “In nearly every annual message that I have had the honor of transmitting to
Congress,” Grant wrote, “I have called attention to the anomalous, not to say scandalous,
condition of affairs existing in the Territory of Utah, and have asked for legislation to
correct it.” Grant was incredulous “that polygamy should exist in a free, enlightened, and
Christian country, without power to punish so flagrant a crime against decency and
morality, seems preposterous.” Though Grant considered it an immoral practice, he also
looked to republican institutions to end polygamy in the United States. “True, there is no
law to sustain this unnatural vice,” he argued, “but what is needed is a law to punish it as
a crime, and at the same time to fix the status of the innocent children, the off-spring of
this system, and of the possibly innocent plural wives.” While Grant held sympathy for
the innocent, he insisted that the “institution, polygamy should be banished from the
land.” It would take until the Supreme Court ruled anti-polygamy laws constitutional in
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1879 and the passing of the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887 which dis-incorporated the
Mormon Church for the United States to outlaw polygamy completely.226
Interestingly, Grant also asked the Congress to consider another immoral and
uncivilized act occurring in the West that violated his republican sensibilities. He
invited, “the attention of Congress to another, though perhaps no less an evil, the
importation of Chinese women, but few of whom are brought to our shores to pursue
honorable or useful occupations.” This surprising admonition against the importation of
Chinese sex slaves shows that Grant remained true to the Grant Doctrine’s intent to end
slavery in the Western Hemisphere, in all of its forms. By linking sex slavery to
polygamy, Grant showed that he viewed both immoral practices as wholly uncivilized
and unrepublican. They were entirely out of step with a modern United States and
unwelcome in a post-Civil War America.227
In an effort to normalize relations between the United States and China, the two
countries had agreed to a set of policies under the terms of the 1868 Burlingame Treaty.
These included reciprocal trade and immigration, but Chinese immigrants could not
become naturalized citizens of the United States. This provision stood in marked contrast
to the Republican Party platform embracing immigration and naturalization for European
226
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and African immigrants. The treaty did grant Chinese immigrants the right to practice
their religion freely, study in the public schools and universities, and travel freely in the
United States. Espousing a basic tenet of republicanism, the treaty made it “a penal
offense for a citizen of the United States or Chinese subjects to take Chinese subjects
either to the United States or to any other foreign country…without their free and
voluntary consent respectively.” This provision hit at the heart of the Chinese
immigration labor movement and Grant’s republican policies toward immigration and
slavery in the Western Hemisphere. Grant defined forced Chinese labor, or “coolie
labor,” as slavery. The Burlingame Treaty defined coolie labor in the United States and
beyond as illegal. As Grant tackled the question of Chinese immigration in the West, he
did so in the belief that he was upholding the republican principle of free labor and the
nation’s treaty obligations toward China. The problem was that the prohibition against
the coolie trade “would remain practically unenforced.”228
Grant began receiving reports of anti-Chinese fervor in the West as early as June
1869. Nevada Governor Henry G. Blasdel drew attention to the growing ill-will toward
the Chinese in the West in the hope of obtaining military protection for the immigrants.
“They are peaceable, industrious and very usefull [sic] in the development of our
resources,” the Republican governor wrote to Grant, “they have…been driven from their
homes…It has come to my knowledge that organised bodies of men are threatening to
drive them from the State [California].” The governor noted that many of the local militia
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members were also anti-Chinese, therefore he suggested to Grant that he might require
outside military assistance. The problems of Reconstruction in the West, then, mirrored
the South. Like the freedmen, Chinese workers required a military presence to protect
them from harassment driven by racial animosity. Grant addressed these developments in
his first Annual Message in December 1869.229
Grant framed the Chinese issue in terms of the larger republican commitment to
free labor and anti-slavery. Grant and the Republican Party sought legislation that would
specifically bar the involuntary immigration of Chinese workers and the continued
enslavement of people in the Caribbean nations of Cuba and Puerto Rico. The United
States could enforce penalties against those who brought Chinese laborers to the United
States under false pretenses under the auspices of the Burlingame Treaty, yet the
administration did not do so. A report commissioned by the Chinese government found
that “eight or nine out of every ten [Chinese laborers in Cuba] have been conveyed there
against their will.” Grant’s Annual Message therefore requested legislation that would
“forever preclude the enslavement of their people, upon our soil…and also prevent
American vessels from engaging in the transportation of ‘Coolies’ to any country
tolerating the system.” From the outset, the Grant administration made clear that the
enslavement of peoples in any form would not be tolerated in the Western Hemisphere
and that any participation in such trade violated core republican principles.230
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At the same time, Grant pledged to support the rights of Chinese immigrants who
came to the United States of their own volition to labor industriously. Anti-Chinese
sentiment in the West, however, threatened to undermine this pledge, and in California,
party loyalty took a backseat to anti-immigrant sentiments. Republicans and Democrats
alike vowed to end Chinese immigration and won election to local, state, and
Congressional offices by promising to send the Chinese back across the Pacific. Such
rhetoric raised fears of violence and Attorney General Amos T. Akerman consulted
President Grant on the prudence of applying the 1870 Enforcement Act, often referred to
as the anti-Ku Klux Klan Act, against the anti-Chinese agitators. While Akerman
questioned the necessity and legal basis for federal intervention, he worried “where
popular passions are so inflammable, it may grow to be serious. Possibly it may be well
to have some of the military at hand for emergencies.” Whether it was violence against
African Americans in the South or against Chinese in the West, the Grant administration
considered the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts as a means to sustain order if necessary
and to maintain republican norms of peaceful labor relations.231
One of the aspects of Chinese immigration that Grant took up as pillar of
republican virtue was the plight of Chinese women forcibly brought to the United States
as sex slaves. Their condition, Grant argued, contributed “to the disgrace of the
communities where settled and to the great demoralization of the youth of those
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localities.” Prostitution and slavery, both moral failings, were unrepublican and required
legislative action. In fact, Grant and Republicans in California who reported this
immorality, significantly overestimated the number of Chinese women forced into sex
slavery. Grant claimed that “hardly a perceptable [sic] percentage of [Chinese women]
perform any honorable labor.” But only half of the nearly 2,000 Chinese women in San
Francisco were prostitutes; the remainder were wives, daughters, mothers, and
grandmothers who had arrived with their families. Thus, while the Chinese sex slave
trade was definitely problematic, and worthy of Grant and the Republican Party’s
attentions, the anti-Chinese rhetoric lumped all Chinese women together and Grant
latched onto it because it fed into his republican belief system of anti-slavery.232
California Republican Representative Horace F. Page spearheaded his party’s
adoption of anti-Chinese rhetoric for political purposes after witnessing California
Democrats successfully employ the same tactic. Page, like Grant, had focused on the
Burlingame Treaty’s article that prohibited contract Chinese laborers immigrating to the
United States. While Republicans viewed these laborers as no more than slaves, local
California labor groups viewed them as competition and stirred up anti-immigrant
sentiment in the state Democratic Party. As that party enjoyed electoral success in the
California state legislature, as well in the U.S. House and Senate, Page and fellow
California Republicans jumped on the anti-Chinese bandwagon. Page introduced a
number of anti-Chinese bills to restrict Chinese immigration. They failed in the House in
1873, but Senator Charles Sumner’s actions the following year presented him with a new
232
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opportunity. Sumner proposed amending federal naturalization laws to include Chinese
immigrants along with European immigrants, negating the prohibition in the Burlingame
Treaty. Sumner argued that Chinese immigrants had just as much of a right to citizenship
as any other civilized immigrant who wished to become American. This prospect enraged
Californians of both parties and the senators from California voted against the measure.
Page introduced a bill in the House that would not only keep the Burlingame Treaty
clause preventing Chinese naturalization but would also forbid anyone of Chinese
descent from becoming a citizen. Although this bill also failed, Page began gaining
traction for his anti-Chinese legislation. In 1875, he drafted a bill consistent with the
Burlingame Treaty but took the first step toward barring Chinese entry into the United
States by banning the immigration of Chinese women. Page based his legislation on the
clause in the Burlingame Treaty that prevented forced immigration of laborers from
China. He claimed that Chinese immigrant women were slaves of the Chinese
underworld, unwitting pawns of a barbaric culture. Under the treaty, he argued, the
United States was obligated to prevent this slave trade which also violated republican
morality. Like Grant, Page conflated all Chinese women with prostitutes, concluding that
the United States should not allow them into the country. As the new bill comported with
both the Burlingame Treaty and the Republican Party’s anti-slavery principles, it
successfully made it through Congress “with virtually no opposition,” and President
Grant signed it into law on March 3, 1875.233
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Grant considered the Page Act’s exclusion of Chinese women to be consistent
with his republican principles as it squared with anti-slavery and notions of morality and
civilized society. When Grant left office for his famous world tour, his time in China only
reinforced his belief that underworld gangs enslaved Chinese laborers to work abroad.
Many Chinese asked about the Chinese exclusion bills making their way through the U.S.
Congress in 1879, but the former president spoke only in generalities, arguing that he had
been out of the country too long. Grant did, however, support a moratorium on Chinese
immigration as a means of quelling anti-Chinese animosity in California, explaining to
Chinese diplomat Li Hung-chang that a five-year ban on Chinese immigrants would settle
the issue once and for all. In actuality, the Page Act led to the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882 which directly discriminated against Chinese immigrants. The Exclusion Act
initially established a twenty-year ban on Chinese immigrants, but President Chester A.
Arthur vetoed it with Grant’s approval. Congress reduced the ban to ten years but
regularly extended it until becoming permanent in 1902. The Page Act and the
subsequent Exclusion Act represented political victories for labor but a loss for
republican principles of a race neutral immigration policy.234
The final two years of Grant’s presidency saw no change to the path to citizenship
for Native Americans, the outlawing of polygamy, or the settlement of the Chinese
question outside of the Page Act, which was the first in a series of federal exclusion
measures against the Chinese. Grant no longer had any hope for the establishment of an
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Indian state. Such an objective had seemed to be realistic in the early months of his
presidency as long as Parker, who understood Grant’s desire to create a path to
citizenship for Native Americans, was leading Indian Affairs. The antagonism in
Congress toward Parker and the establishment of the Board of Indian Commissioners by
Congress quickly curtailed the president’s plans. Grant considered his Native American
policy to be an honest attempt to protect the rights of Native Americans and allow them
to participate in the republican experiment. Religious leaders who believed they
controlled the Indian agent assignments balked at taking orders from a Native American
commissioner of Indian Affairs who had control over the work of the agents and they set
about levying charges of fraud against him to drive him from office. This was in part due
to the fact that he encouraged President Grant to support Native American autonomy on
reservations, allowing them to govern themselves in an effort to instill the republican
virtues that Grant expected would make them successful citizens in the future. It was also
due to the fact that if Native Americans governed themselves then whites would lose out
on highly coveted patronage appointments and lucrative supply contracts that had led to
the corruption of the Indian Office in the years prior to Reconstruction. The influx of
religious groups into the decision-making process and the loss of Parker as Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, coupled with an ever-expanding war with the Sioux, effectively killed
off the Peace Policy by the final year of Grant’s presidency. In his final Annual Message
to Congress in December 1876, Grant lauded the peaceful relations with Native
American tribes outside of the Black Hills region. As for the war with the Sioux, Grant
placed the blame on white settlers, arguing that “hostilities there have grown out of the
averice [sic] of the white man who has violated our treaty stipulation[s] in his search for
219

gold.” Grant rhetorically asked why the government did not just remove these white
settlers and honor the treaty with the Sioux. His argument was that the soldiers sent to
remove the miners would desert their posts and hunt for gold themselves. This laughable
excuse belies the point that the administration, without the consent of Congress,
negotiated an agreement in October 1876, moving the Sioux onto the reservation, taking
the Black Hills land away from the Sioux and giving it to white miners.235
The failure of Grant’s peace policy and his inability to rein in Brigham Young did
not mean an end to his Reconstruction policies throughout the West. Though the
president still desired a place for Indians in the body politic, he drew a sharp distinction
between the relative fitness of Native Americans and Mormons for incorporation into the
Union. For Grant, Native Americans, though widely viewed in the nineteenth century as
uncivilized, were entirely capable of accepting republican institutions and modern
technological advancements that constituted Western civilization. Nineteenth century
notions of race and inequality saw Native Americans as inherently inferior to whites, but
Grant did not subscribe to such notions. He based his views on civilization not on race
but on culture and politics. He believed that once Native Americans accepted republican
ideals, they could be welcomed into the body politic as equals as personified by his
friend, Ely S. Parker. Mormons, on the other hand, had no path to citizenship in Grant’s
eyes. Mormons derived from western civilization and republicanism but were alien to
most Americans and had flouted civilized norms through their immoral practice of
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polygamy. To Republicans, Mormons and the practice of polygamy resembled the antiUnion Slave Power of the Confederacy and were unrepublican and a threat to
Reconstruction and its goal of a strong republic. Grant could not countenance polygamy
as a tenet of any religion, viewing it rather as a form of slavery and a barbaric practice
out of place in a modern republican society. Grant’s view of Mormon polygamy
resembled his view of state sponsorship of religious schools, seeing both as state
sanctioning of anti-republican practices. To Grant, the Mormons’ devotion to their
religion ahead of the state made them irredeemable in a republican society. Brigham
Young and other Mormon leaders in Utah had used fellow church members to rig juries,
upend the rule of law, and violate numerous federal territorial edicts. By their actions,
Mormons were uncivilized, unrepublican, and thus unfit for incorporation under the
Grant Doctrine.236
Grant held similarly complex views regarding European and Chinese immigration
to the United States. The Republican Party encouraged the immigration and
naturalization of European and as Cuban immigrants. At the same time, Republicans in
the West joined with Democrats to vilify the increasing number of Chinese immigrants
arriving in the United States. Between 1869 and 1877, San Francisco saw nearly 126,000
Chinese immigrants come through its port alone. As they took up jobs in cities, mining
towns, and on railroads, American labor groups viewed them as pariahs. Grant joined his
Republican colleagues in decrying Chinese immigration, but framing his argument in
republican terms of free labor. Arguing against the rise of “coolie” labor, the president
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supported full Chinese immigration of free labor, but stated that he would exercise his
power to stop the importation of Chinese slaves into the Western Hemisphere. Among
these coolie slaves were Chinese women who, Grant and Republicans argued, came to
the United States as prostitutes. To Grant, this form of slavery was an affront to the
republicanism that the Union Army and the Republican Party had fought to uphold
during the Civil War. Reconstruction in the West, then, represented an effort by Grant
and his party to complete their work to end the practice of forced labor. It also offered
Grant the opportunity to provide a path to citizenship for Native Americans, a path that
would be unattainable in his presidency, but one that reflected his approach to
Reconstruction as a race neutral policy based on the acceptance of the tenets of Western
civilization.237
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CHAPTER VI
“THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENT SINCE THE NATION CAME INTO LIFE:”
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS, AFRICAN AMERICANS,
AND THE GRANT DOCTRINE
Ulysses S. Grant ended his first inaugural address with a plea to the American
people to support the newest citizens of the nation, African Americans. “The question of
suffrage is one which is likely to agitate the public so long as a portion of the citizens of
the nation are excluded from its privileges in any state,” he intoned, “It seems to me very
desirable that the question should be settled now, and I entertain the hope and express the
desire that it may be by the ratification of the fifteenth article of amendment to the
Constitution.”238 The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution stated that “The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”239 This
supposedly permitted all former slaves, free African Americans, naturalized citizens of
color, and, if Grant’s proposal was successful, Native Americans, the right to vote in all
elections. For Grant, the Fifteenth Amendment was the epitome of the Grant Doctrine’s
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core values of liberty and freedom and individual rights. Alongside the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the Fifteenth Amendment (known collectively as “The
Reconstruction Amendments”) fulfilled the promise of the nation’s founding. Grant
wrote that the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment “completes the greatest civil
change and constitutes the most important event since the nation came into life.”240 He
believed that this amendment was the final “realization of the Declaration of
Independence.”241
Grant’s presidency represented a unique moment in American history for the
United States to realize the promises of the Declaration of Independence that “all men are
created equal” through enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments. The Grant
Doctrine advocated exporting these Reconstruction ideals beyond the traditional
boundaries of the United States into the Caribbean, the territories of the American West,
and eventually, throughout the Western Hemisphere. Grant also hoped to utilize the
expanding concept of citizenship inherent in the Reconstruction Amendments to redefine
naturalization laws internationally, thus solidifying the United States’ position on the
world stage as a champion of republican values. Through all these changes to the greater
world around the United States, the rights of the newly freed African Americans and the
changing nature of liberty and citizenship as it related to their experiences, were
paramount to Grant’s conception of Reconstruction. The Grant Doctrine could not
succeed if domestic Reconstruction at home failed. This chapter will analyze the

240

USG to Congress, March 30, 1870, John Y. Simon, ed., The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Vol. 20:
November 1, 1869-October 31, 1870 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1995), 130-131.
241

USG Speech, April 1, 1870, PUSG, Vol. 20, 137-138.

224

experiences of African American political leaders, either politicians, orators, religious
leaders, or activists, during Reconstruction. It will also discuss their reactions to, support
of, or challenges to the Grant Doctrine. This chapter will show that African American
leaders differed on various aspects of Grant’s Reconstruction policies as they moved
beyond African American citizenship into the areas of Dominican annexation and
incorporation, recognition of Cuban belligerency, and Chinese exclusion. This chapter
will also examine the western migration of African Americans from the South, the
diverging views of African American leaders on the subject, and how the debate over the
migration aligned with the principles of the Grant Doctrine.
African American political leaders held varying views not only toward the
administration but with one another, arguing what was best for African Americans as a
whole and for the cause of liberty in the Western Hemisphere. While African Americans
supported the Republican Party, they did not wholly support the Grant Administration’s
foreign policy initiatives in the matter of Dominican annexation or denying Cuban
belligerency. In fact, many African American leaders openly challenged President Grant
for his decision-making in matters of foreign policy. African American leaders criticized
the president’s Caribbean policy, yet they were conflicted about Chinese immigration;
they both supported free labor for Chinese workers but prioritized Black employment
over Chinese when labor conflicts arose. This chapter examines the various points of
view of leading African Americans toward the Grant Doctrine, including Frederick
Douglass, John Lynch, Hiram Revels, Sojourner Truth, and P. B. S. Pinchback, as
expressed through their correspondence, speeches, and in the pages of their B lack-owned
newspapers. By examining their opinions of the Grant Doctrine, we can better understand
225

the successes and failures of Grant’s Reconstruction policy as it expanded beyond the
traditional confines of the American South.
African American citizenship was one of the most important issues to the Grant
Administration and the idea of equality before the law laid the foundation for the eventual
Grant Doctrine. The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, which made all persons born
in the United States citizens, including those born prior to its passage, incorporated the
millions of former slaves into the citizenry and, for the first time, enshrined equal
protection under the laws into the Constitution. Grant’s inaugural address implored the
states to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment thereby providing African American men the
right to vote in all local, state, and federal elections. By fulfilling the nation’s founding
promise, Reconstruction could finally begin in full force and, by allowing African
American men to vote, they could enter the body politic as equal participants and stand
for office as members of Grant’s Republican Party. While Grant genuinely believed in
equality between whites and Blacks, he also understood that he was cultivating a political
base and that African American men would vote Republican. At the same time, he
understood that the only way to reconstruct the American political system after the Civil
War was through the implementation of the Civil Rights legislation of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments and the exporting of these ideals beyond the South into the new
territories which Americans were settling.242
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It is important to understand that Reconstruction meant different things to
different Americans, both white and Black, North and South. While Black Republicans
and their white Radical Republican allies understood Reconstruction as the chance to
create a racially equal society, many other Republicans saw Reconstruction as simply a
method for reunion with the formerly seceded states. These latter Republicans held a
conservative view of Reconstruction which sought to end slavery forever and to
strengthen the Union by, as Mark Wahlgren Summers wrote, “returning America to a
peacetime footing…strengthening and devising new connections, and at all hazards
making a nation made to last.” The reunion of the states and the writing into the
Constitution Amendments that strengthened the Union and forever ended the threat of
slavery was enough for many of them. Equality of the races, though, was not a high
priority for many whites and, as such, African Americans and their white allies struggled
not only against the former Confederates but also against fellow Republicans to enshrine
equality.243
Grant’s Reconstruction policies required Southern states to ratify the Fifteenth
Amendment and adopt new state constitutions that protected the rights of African
Americans. Grant understood that the Fifteenth Amendment would ensure that
Republican majorities comprising freedmen would control these states. When Mississippi
rejoined the Union in January 1870, the Washington, DC, African American newspaper
owned by Frederick Douglass, the New Era, commented on the revolutionary nature of
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Hiram R. Revels’s election to the United States Senate as the first African American
member of that chamber and the courage of African American leaders in the South:
Escorted by Senators representing the two opposite complexions of the
continent, Mississippi returns to her place in the Union. She comes with a
proud pre-eminence of loyalty over all Southern States. She brings [a]
forty thousand majority for the Republican Party. Here is a repentance that
needs not to be repented of. Mississippi, more than any other State in the
Union, will furnish the proof our friends I have been anxious about, that,
namely, of negro capacity in statesmanship. Senator Revels and the Hon.
James Lynch went down into the State with only the experience of
Methodist preachers, without political training, without even an elector's
knowledge. They went into a community chagrined under defeat, spiteful
in feeling against the colored victims who had helped to overthrow
oppression into a community destitute of capital, bristling with Ku-Klux
rifles and bowie-knives, Slippery with blood from assassination.244
As the former Confederate states reentered the Union, Black voters reshaped the face of
politics in the state legislatures, creating Black Republican majorities in most Southern
states. While this era of Reconstruction created a revolutionary political atmosphere, at
the same time, Black southerners faced an onslaught of Klan violence and oppression
from former Confederates attempting to nullify African Americans’ right to vote.245
African Americans readily accepted their chance as participants in the body
politic and they displayed a keen understanding of both the domestic and international
forces that threatened to derail the Reconstruction agenda of the Republican Party. Black
leaders such as Frederick Douglass, Hiram Revels, P. B. S. Pinchback, Henry Highland
Garnet, Blanche K. Bruce, William G. Brown, Sojourner Truth, and many others
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discussed these issues in their speeches, sermons, and editorials. In doing so, they
debated the Grant Doctrine of exporting Reconstruction beyond the rights of Black men.
They championed the cause of liberty and republicanism for their people in the United
States, North, South, and West, and advocated the cause of liberty for those still in
bondage in the Caribbean and Brazil. They believed that their cause was the Republican
Party’s cause, and African American support for the party was nearly unwavering
throughout the Reconstruction period. African Americans embraced the party’s ideology
of free labor and supported Grant’s policies of equality and suffrage for all men.246
Frederick Douglass recognized that the Republican Party’s power grew from
being a national party committed to equal rights. “It was from the National Government
that the colored men had received all they have,” Douglass told African American
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mechanical students in New Orleans in 1872, arguing that the states had done all they
could to limit the rights of African Americans. “The Republican is the national party and
the other is the State party.” For African American leaders like Douglass, the alternatives
to the Republican Party, be they the Democrats or later the Liberal Republicans, were
anathema.247
Though African Americans were willing members of the Republican Party, they
were not always accepting of the party’s policies or, for that matter, the policies of the
party’s president. Grant’s plan to incorporate more peoples into the body politic met
resistance from some white Republicans and received mixed support from Black
Republicans. His diplomatic handwringing on the Cuban question angered many Black
leaders who believed that the United States was morally obligated to support the cause of
liberty and freedom in a slave rebellion so close to its shores. At the same time, many
African American leaders lined up just as strongly against Grant’s annexation scheme for
Santo Domingo. Rather than follow Grant’s lead as the head of the Republican Party,
several Black leaders agreed with Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner that the
annexation of the Dominican Republic would be the first step toward the eventual
overthrow of the Black Republic of Haiti. Thus, Grant struggled to build a coalition of
African American leaders behind his various Reconstruction policies. However, when it
was time for his reelection bid in 1872, the strength of the African American voting bloc
in the Republican Party, buoyed by the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in
February 1870, secured his easy victory.248
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For all their disagreements on policy, Ulysses S. Grant and Frederick Douglass
knew that they could rely upon one another as staunch Republicans. The Grant Doctrine
of exporting republicanism throughout the Western Hemisphere appealed to Douglass’s
sensibilities as both a member of the Republican Party and an African American activist
who championed freedom and liberty. Douglass eventually supported Grant’s pet project
of annexing Santo Domingo, begrudgingly accepted Grant’s and Secretary of State
Hamilton Fish’s decision to remain neutral in the Cuban rebellion, and favored rapid
settlement of the West, although he later decried the exodus of Black southerners to
Kansas. Through all these initiatives, Douglass championed the Grant Administration’s
domestic Reconstruction plan of enforcing freedmen’s civil rights across the South. As
Douglass wrote to Grant’s private secretary, Orville E. Babcock, late in the second term,
“[Grant’s] name stands for national peace, Liberty prosperity and stability. He has been
the shelter and savior of my people in the hour of supreme danger and naturally enough
we feel great concern as to who is to come in his stead.” Grant’s actions had earned him
political capital with African American leaders such as Douglass, who endorsed his party,
backed his reelection, and even considered supporting him for a third term. Buoyed by
thousands of new voters, with African Americans reporting 90 percent voter turnout in
elections, Grant hoped that the Republican Party would reshape the political landscape of
the South, implement new state constitutions that protected the rights of newly-
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enfranchised citizens, and provide a template for the incorporation of additional
territories and citizens into the body politic.249
Frederick Douglass used his position as a leader in the African American
community to champion the cause of the Republican Party in the Reconstruction era. He
established a national newspaper, The New National Era, as a voice for Black issues in
the United States. His sons, Frederick, Jr. and Lewis, assisted him in editing and
publishing the newspaper, printing articles and editorials that challenged the southern
Democrats and the rise of the Ku Klux Klan, and offered support for the Republicans in
the southern states. African Americans relied on The New National Era as a leading voice
“in the political center of Reconstruction.” Thus, Douglass’s steadfast support for Grant
and the Republican Party against newspaper editor Horace Greely, Missouri Senator Carl
Schurz, and even long-time friend Charles Sumner and the Liberal Republicans in the
1872 election showed that he considered Grant’s policies to be better than the
alternatives. Douglass wholeheartedly supported Grant’s plan for annexation of Santo
Domingo.250
As a member of the President’s Commission of Inquiry into the purchase of
Samaná Bay, Douglass’s interactions with the Dominican people, who expressed the
desire to enjoy the freedoms of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments,
convinced him to embrace annexation. This visit to Santo Domingo opened a fissure
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between him and Sumner who steadfastly opposed annexation and a U.S. presence in
Santo Domingo in any guise. Through the pages of the renamed New National Era and
his speeches, Douglass stumped for Grant’s expansionist proposal. The newspaper
warned against division and strife within the Republican Party over Santo Domingo at a
time when unity in defense of African Americans’ rights and liberty was essential to
keeping Democrats from power. “We shudder at the possibility, and every enlightened
colored man,” the newspaper opined, “must shudder at the possibility of the accession of
this old party of rebellion and slavery to power.” Moreover, Douglass saw annexation in
the same terms as Grant, as a method for exporting the republican virtues of the United
States to the Dominican people, enveloping them into the body politic of the nation as
citizens, and protecting them with the Reconstruction Amendments. Douglass likewise
saw Dominican territory as a haven where African American citizens could escape the
violence of the South and make their way as citizens of the United States.251
The Republican Party did not, as a whole, agree with racial equality as the
purpose of Reconstruction, and the annexation scheme widened numerous fissures within
the party. For a majority of Republicans, the overriding goal of Reconstruction was the
preservation of the Union and the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment was a means by
which to insure the southern states rejoined the Union, strengthening the nation forever
more. By 1872, Senator Schurz had organized a constituency of Republicans under a
reform movement they called Liberal Republicanism. These Republicans pushed back
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against racial equality, arguing that Grant’s Dominican scheme would import people
“incapable of the self-discipline necessary for productive free labor and active
citizenship.” Liberal Republicans were more interested in a Reconstruction that produced
a United States that “rekindled the sentimental nationalism of the antebellum period, with
northerners and southerners accepting a common destiny borne of common feeling rather
than coercion.” Reunion was their goal, and when they achieved, “a reunited nation, a
free labor system, and a formal guarantee of equal treatment before the law,” they
considered Reconstruction complete. This contrasted with the view of African Americans
that the national government’s role was to protect the rights of individuals against white
Americans’ disdain for equality.252
Sumner and the Liberal Republicans attempted to use Douglass’s position as
assistant secretary of the commission as a wedge issue to pull African American support
away from President Grant. Sumner focused upon a White House dinner for the Santo
Domingo Commissioners, to which Douglass was not invited. Democrats latched onto
Sumner’s stance echoing many of his anti-annexation speeches and, charging Grant with
racism for failing to invite Douglass to the event while the all-white commissioners dined
in the Executive Mansion. Douglass thought that the entire affair was ridiculous. “When
did any Democratic President invite any Negro to dinner?,” Douglass asked a crowd in
Maine. “That the President has no prejudice of color that debars him from recognizing all
men alike I know from the fact that he extended all the courtesies to the Black Minister
from Hayti [sic] that he has to white Ministers from other countries.” Douglass noted that
252
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Grant did not invite the white General Franz Sigel, also an assistant secretary to the
Commission, to the dinner either and that the group had called upon the president
informally and were only invited at the last minute. Douglass also pointed to the
president’s friendship with Native American Ely S. Parker as further proof that Grant
would not shun him based on his race because Parker “darker than I, has dined with him,”
and Grant assured him that he would have been invited had he been with the
Commissioners on that day. The supposed dinner scandal came on the heels of a very real
scandal in which a ship’s captain had refused to allow Douglass to dine with the
commissioners while traveling up the Potomac River. The commissioners had refused to
dine with the captain in solidarity with Douglass. Sumner conflated the two events to
cast aspersions on Grant, which Douglass refused to endorse. During the 1872 election
campaign, Douglass’s stump speeches defended Grant’s record as a Republican leader
and friend of African Americans.253
Other former abolitionists and Black leaders were not as supportive of Dominican
annexation. Louisiana Governor P. B. S. Pinchback’s newspaper, The Semi-Weekly
Louisianian, argued that the scheme was splitting the party and “should never had been
an administration scheme…Let San Domingo stand on its own.”254 Former abolitionist
and Republican Party stalwart Gerrit Smith echoed fellow white abolitionist Charles
Sumner and deployed biological racism against annexation. “The tropic belongs to the
sable races of men,” he argued, noting that Black men were free to live among whites but
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they were biologically predisposed to living in the tropics. He also charged that Grant
was interested in annexing the entire island. “I say the island—for, I see that the President
goes for annexing the whole of it” including Haiti. Smith believed Grant’s arguments on
behalf of the Dominican people to be disingenuous. He thought that Grant meant to
enrich the nation by exploiting Dominican resources. Douglass disagreed, believing that
it was possible both to enrich the United States and uplift the Dominican people by
bringing them into the institutions of the American republic.255
Former abolitionist leader Peter H. Clark recognized the annexation scheme as
central to Grant’s policy agenda but hoped that the president would be willing to move on
for the betterment of the Republican Party. In a speech honoring the anniversary of
emancipation in the West Indies, Clark acknowledged that Grant had near complete
support from African Americans because of his record as both the general who won the
Civil War and as the president who championed Black rights through the Reconstruction
Amendments. However, Clark conceded that many Black Americans believed that Grant
had deviated from his promise to “not enforce [ideas] in opposition to the will of the
people” by pursuing the annexation of Santo Domingo. By submitting the Commission of
Inquiry report to the Congress and leaving the matter to the chamber of the people, Clark
noted, Grant had ultimately remained true to his pledge by allowing the Congress to
decide rather than pushing the question further. More important to Clark, though, was the
hypocrisy of the Democrats who now opposed annexation because prior to emancipation
southern Democrats had been strong proponents of Manifest Destiny, including
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annexation of Santo Domingo, to expand the slave empire. Surely, the addition of
thousands of free Black and brown men into the body politic, rather than slaves, was now
undesirable to southern Democrats and a factor in their opposition to Grant’s plan.256
Reminiscing in the years after the Grant administration, African American
Congressman John R. Lynch of Mississippi argued that Senator Sumner’s opposition to
the annexation had been justified because he represented the entire nation rather than just
Massachusetts. Lynch likened Sumner’s humiliating loss of his chairmanship of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to a misstep in Congressional history. “[Sumner]
knew and appreciated the fact that when he spoke and voted as a senator,” Lynch wrote,
“he did so, not merely as a senator from the state of Massachusetts, but as a senator of the
United States. He belonged to no one state, but to the [nation].” Lynch’s lauding of
Sumner exemplified the issue that many Black leaders confronted in the Santo Domingo
scheme, forcing them to choose between President Grant and his Reconstruction policy
and Senator Sumner, long known as a champion of African Americans’ rights.257
Unlike the split over the annexation of Santo Domingo, many Black leaders were
in concert when it came to the Cuban insurrection and supported emancipation of the
slaves there. This was also problematic for the Grant administration, however, especially
Secretary of State Hamilton Fish who wanted to delay recognizing the Cuban rebels’
belligerency for fear of undermining the ongoing Alabama claims negotiations. Fish
persuaded Grant of this view, much to the chagrin of the Cuban Junta, the Republican
Party, and many of Grant’s most vocal African American supporters. Black leaders
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challenged the president’s stance on the Cuban rebels, claiming that the mission of the
Junta and the Republican Party were inseparable. “There is no halting an idea at a
national boundary,” P. B. S. Pinchback’s Semi-Weekly Louisianian opined in August
1871. “From being the gloomy bulwark of slavery and the accursed African slave-trader,
we have become by the silent force of our example the pioneers of freedom and
emancipators of nations.” This echoed the Grant Doctrine as Pinchback and other African
Americans proclaimed that it was now the duty of the United States to support the
emancipation of slaves in the Western Hemisphere and to support those seeking liberty
and freedom through republicanism. Although Grant and Cabinet members agreed with
these sentiments, the realpolitik of the Alabama claims took precedence even over the
Grant Doctrine.258
Nearly all Republicans sympathized with the plight of Cuban slaves, but white
party members split over whether to intervene in the rebellion. Conservative Republicans
decried expansionism and worried that intervention was the first step toward annexing
Cuba and introducing the island’s inhabitants into the body politic of the United States.
They saw intervention as expansionism, which many in the Republican Party looked
down upon, evidenced by the fact that annexation attempts during Grant’s presidency
always failed (not to mention Sumner’s rhetorical attempts at acquiring Canada as the
price for the Alabama claims). The emancipation of the Cuban slaves, not the acquisition
of Cuba, was a central tenet of the Republican Party’s ideology and of the Grant
Doctrine, and African American leaders believed that the president should take a
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proactive stance toward recognizing Cuban belligerency and intervening in the
insurrection on behalf of the rebels. When Grant chose political expediency in the
Alabama claims over party ideology, he alienated African American leaders whose
sympathies lay with the enslaved in Cuba.259
Chief among Grant’s critics on the subject of Cuba was the abolitionist and
African American preacher, Henry Highland Garnet. Speaking to the Cuban AntiSlavery Committee meeting at the Cooper Institute in December 1872, Garnet harkened
back to the same imagery that abolitionists had used in the antebellum period of the
bloody and violent slave south. “Slavery shall be blotted out from every island in the
Western Sea,” Garnet declared in a manner akin to the Grant Doctrine, “as it has been
banished from the Western continent. The shores of our continent shall not be washed by
the waves made bloody by Cuban slavery.” Garnet told the assembled Cuban refugees
and supporters that he was sorry that the federal government prohibited him from sending
material support but that the Cuban people, particularly the Cuban slaves, had the moral
support of the African American people and former abolitionists in the United States. He
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and the Cuban Anti-Slavery Committee voiced their displeasure when President Grant
announced he would not recognize the Cuban rebels.260
While Frederick Douglass, like Henry Highland Garnet, P. B. S. Pinchback, and
many other African American leaders, hoped that the United States would help
emancipate the enslaved persons in Cuba and Puerto Rico, he was less critical of Grant.
As both an African American and a Republican, he hoped that President Grant would
champion such views. When Grant decided not to recognize Cuban belligerency,
Douglass admitted his confusion and disappointment in the president’s stance. In a letter
to African American inventor and fellow abolitionist Samuel Raymond Scottron,
Douglass proclaimed that he fully supported Cuban freedom, but trusted that Grant knew
what he was doing:
The first gleam of the sword of freedom and independence in Cuba
secured my sympathy with the revolutionary cause, and it did seem to me
that our government ought to have made haste to accord the insurgents
belligerent rights. Why it did not is still a mystery to me. Nothing but my
high confidence in its wisdom, knowledge and good intention has
restrained me from joining in reproaches. I have deemed our government,
with all the facts of the situation before it, a safer guide than my own
feelings. I have assumed that President Grant and his cabinet were better
judges than myself of the international duties of the Republic though I
think with my limited knowledge that a great opportunity has been lost.
Douglass believed that an anti-slavery feeling was growing in Spain and that
emancipation was inevitable in Cuba. He favored any course that led to the eventual end
of slavery in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Douglass understood that Grant and Fish had larger
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diplomatic issues at stake and that Cuba was a single spoke in the wheel of foreign
policy. Douglass’s acknowledgment that the Cuban decision might be part of a wider
foreign policy strategy showed an adept understanding of the international complexities
facing the Grant administration.261
Douglass’s newspaper, The New National Era, remained steadfast in its support
of the Cuban belligerents. During the Virginius affair in November 1873, Douglass’s son,
Lewis, reported on the killing of the crewmembers and passengers as an outrage against
the United States. He also saw the incident as a potential rallying cry for the rebellion.
“Freedom for the slave will follow the success of the attempt to free Cuba from the
Spanish yoke,” he stated in the Era, “and if the seizure of the Virginius and the murder of
its passengers will aid the strugglers for liberty in the isle, though we deplore the loss of
the brave men, we feel they will not have died in vain.” Other African American
newspapers viewed the Virginius affair as an inevitable precursor to war. Even after the
Grant administration had settled the Virginius affair, the Maryville, Tennessee
Republican argued that the constant warfare and rebellion on the island, and the
continuing anger in the wake of the crisis would lead to war. While African Americans
shared in the larger public’s clamor for a forceful response to the Virginius affair, the
episode further strengthened their belief in the cause of the Cuban rebels and the
emancipation of Cuban slaves.262
The interests of African Americans did not always align with the interests of
immigrants, even if Black Americans supported equal rights for those immigrants
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regardless of their race or national origin. Black Americans, like many white Americans,
did not welcome foreigners into the United States even as African Americans were
fighting for acceptance as citizens. While African Americans supported an end to the
exploitation of Chinese contract workers in Cuba, both Black and white Americans,
however, held strong anti-Chinese views when confronted with these same Chinese
workers immigrating to the United States. Chinese “coolies” as they were known,
immigrated into plantations in Louisiana and railroad and mining operations in
California, with more than 320,000 laborers supposedly taking jobs from both African
American and white workers between 1850 and 1882. Plantation owners in Louisiana
believed hiring Chinese laborers could save them money in the long-run: “with Chinese
gangs the planter knew 'just how many mouths he had to feed. No women, no children,
no hogs, no ponies, no forecastle lawyers, and no howling preachers.'” Black leaders such
as Douglass saw immigration to the United States as a proving ground for Reconstruction
and citizenship, but for other African Americans Chinese immigrants stood in the way of
that progress. When Charles Sumner advocated the end of the coolie trade and providing
citizenship to Chinese immigrants, Douglass informed him of his full support for such
measures. “Upon the Chinese question I rejoice to see you in the right place, far in the
advance and the country as usual behind you,” Douglass wrote to Sumner. “A bitter
contest, I fear, is before us on this question. Prejudice, pride of race, narrow views of
political economy, are on one, humanity, civilization and sound policy are on the other.”
Their support for Chinese citizenship went further than Grant, who only sought to end the
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coolie system which was “marked by all the horrible and infernal characteristics of the
slave trade,” but did not support citizenship rights for Chinese immigrants.263
Douglass’s New National Era supported Chinese immigrants as fellow victims of
Democrats who claimed that Chinese laborers stole jobs from whites. “They profess to
fear the competition of cheap labor and at the same time advocate free-trade,” Douglass
and his editors wrote, “Which would bring not only the labor of the Chinamen but the
labor of all the paupers of Europe in competition with American labor.” The paper argued
that the Republican Party would ensure equal rights for all laborers, regardless of race or
origin, noting that the party that ended slavery was best suited to protect the rights of
Black and Chinese labor. At the same time, the Douglasses chastised business owners
who forced all laborers to work for wages so low that Chinese immigrants, as happened
in Massachusetts when a shoemakers’ union went on strike, could replace them.264
Indeed, African Americans worried about Chinese laborers as much as did white
laborers. Black newspapers covered the influx of Chinese workers into the American
South with the same trepidation and xenophobia as white newspapers. With headlines
such as “The Heathen Chinee,” Black newspapers showcased their American-ness as
opposed to the un-American and un-republican Chinese. Mississippi Congressman Lynch
best exemplified this attitude in an 1876 statement made on the House floor after a white
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congressman had equated African American southerners to the Chinese. Admitting that
the remark “touched [his] sensitive feeling,” Lynch used the occasion not only to point
out the racial differences between Black and Chinese men, but also to assert the
American-ness of African Americans. “It is certainly known by southern as well as
northern men that the colored people of this country are thoroughly American,” Lynch
told his colleagues, “born and raised upon American soil and under the influence of
American institutions.” Though newly made citizens, Lynch noted, Black Americans
worshipped the same God as their white countrymen and were loyal to the same
institutions as they. “For my honorable colleague,” Lynch continued, “unwittingly as I
believe, to compare this race with the untutored, the uncivilized, the non-Christian, and
the un-Americanized Mongolian…was unjust, ungenerous, and unfair.” Lynch was
indicative of African Americans who had certainly, by the end of Reconstruction, exerted
their birthright citizenship and American identity over that of immigrants whom they
deemed to be othered and uncivilized.265
Black newspapers reported on labor strife throughout the nation, noting the
importation of Chinese immigrants in California, Louisiana, and Alabama in an effort to
inform Black workers of mounting labor competition. The New National Era reported in
January 1871 that the end of coolie slave labor would inevitably mean an increase of
Chinese immigrant labor in the South, but it would not have an effect on the overall labor
of the region. The article called the Chinese laborers “slavish and cheap” with “no
aspirations above [their] daily routine of duties.” The newspaper carried tales of Chinese
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railroad laborers in Tuscaloosa, Alabama who fled to work on a New Orleans plantation
and of Chinese plantation workers in Louisiana who banded together and tied up their
Black overseer, marching him up to their employer’s house in protest of his harsh
treatment. The newspapers also featured stories of the wages that Chinese laborers
received ($13 a month in gold, though this was generally less than Black wages) on
Louisiana plantations, noting that readers should expect an influx of more Chinese
laborers in the months to come as plantation owners actively recruited them. Yet as
Chinese laborers were immigrating to the South, African Americans were moving
increasingly to the West. Many Black southerners, grown weary of constant violence
from former Confederates who would not let them practice their constitutional rights,
believed that they would find better opportunities and labor conditions in the Western
territories. Black Americans joined whites as they settled former Native American land,
spurred on by federal spending, private investments in railroads, and Black activists
leading the charge to move west.266
For African Americans one of the most important features of the liberty
amendments to the Constitution was the ability to move freely about the nation. This
concept of locomotion was key to free labor and a free society, and African Americans
used this new found mobility to their advantage during Reconstruction. Free labor was
central to the Republican Party’s ideology and an important aspect of African Americans’
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conception of free labor was land ownership. With land redistribution in the South
unattainable, many African Americans considered settling in the West. African American
newspapers promoted this region to their readers. The famous abolitionist and women’s
rights activist Sojourner Truth became a prominent proponent of Black settlement in the
West and the redistribution of western lands to African Americans. The Homestead Act,
which redistributed public lands, failed to meet the needs of Southern Blacks because
public lands in the south largely consisted of swamps, timberland, and rocky soil
unsuitable for farming.267 While some state legislatures and private African American
organizations attempted to purchase land for Blacks in the early days of Reconstruction,
the lack of good arable land remained problematic. Plantation owners already held the
best land. Truth argued that as the government had given land to the railroads in the
West, it should dolikewise for the mistreated African Americans in the South. She also
believed that it was the government’s responsibility to build schools for Blacks in the
West. “Let ‘em give ‘em land and an outset, and hab teachers learn ‘em to read. Den they
can be somebody. Dat’s what I want. You owe it to dem,” she told a white audience in
Rochester, New York. Truth and other Black leaders believed emigrating to the West
would open up more opportunities for African Americans to experience free labor and
land ownership.268
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Chinese laborers and Native Americans unhappy with settlers encroaching on
their land, however, posed potential obstacles to African Americans seeking new
opportunities in the West. Black editors discussed not only the increase of Chinese
immigrant laborers in the West but also the outrages committed by Native Americans
upon new settlers in the region. Interestingly, the New National Era noted that the antiChinese sentiment in California presented the first test case for the Enforcement Acts
recently passed in 1870 and 1871. Also known as the “Anti-Ku Klux Klan Acts,” the
United States Congress intended the Enforcement Acts to protect African Americans in
the South from white violence, safeguard their right to vote and hold office, and generally
give force to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Chinese immigrants in
California sued for the right to testify on their own behalf, a right denied to African
Americans in the antebellum era and now protected by the Enforcement Acts. “We are
informed that an effort will be made in San Francisco to practically and finally test the
question,” the Era noted, “whether the Federal Constitution and the Congress can be set
aside and nullified by the California Supreme Judiciary.” The Chinese defendant settled
out of court, but other test cases encountered California courts unwilling to allow Chinese
defendants to testify on their own behalf, in violation of the Enforcement Act (and the
Burlingame Treaty). The California legislature, though, rescinded its antebellum laws
which barred Chinese from testifying before these cases reached the U.S. Supreme Court,
thus eliminating “the ban on Chinese testimony in criminal and civil proceedings.” The
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editors of the Era understood that important Reconstruction legislation and case law
occurred beyond the South.269
Black Americans balanced their beliefs in equal rights and a race neutral society
with the idea that they lived in a Christian and civilized modern world. President Grant
had noted in his Native American Peace Policy that his path to citizenship for American
Indians was contingent upon their Christianization and civilization. African American
leaders expressed similar views about Native Americans and Chinese immigrants when
they considered the movement of free Blacks into the western territories. For black
intellectuals, being a civilized American often trumped racial equality, though that did
not mean African Americans did not sympathize with the plight of Native Americans or
Chinese immigrants. The New National Era argued that Democrats and Republicans in
California had developed anti-Chinese attitudes because “the trouble is the Chinese are
diligent and thrifty. They have no expensive vices and are willing to work cheap,”
therefore they took labor away from whites and did not spend their wages in the local
economy. The newspaper saw the exclusion legislation that California passed in the
1850s and 1860s as decidedly racist and unrepublican and was astounded that members
of the Republican Party would continue to support such measures. At the same time, the
Weekly Louisianian argued that the federal government was spending too much energy
promoting “the wholesale immigration of Chinese and other races, which is taxing its
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energies to civilize the Indian of the plains,” thus preventing Black Americans from
settling there. Complaints about the increase of Chinese immigrants in the Louisianian
took a biblical tone when the editors likened them to a plague. “What the grasshopper has
done for Kansas, and other eastern sections,” the editors wrote, “Coolie labor will do for
the Golden State.” Once the Chinese had overrun the West, the editors opined, the
Chinese would surely move to the South.270
While competition from the Chinese was certainly a concern for Black laborers
considering a move to the West, the more immediate problem was the presence of Native
Americans on coveted land in the plains. Many African Americans viewed Native
Americans in the same way as did many white Americans, as uncivilized barbarians, but
like Grant they believed that they could be taught to be civilized citizens. Frederick
Douglass, discussing the potential exodus of African Americans from the United States in
the 1850s, noted “there is little reason to hope that any considerable number of the free
colored people will ever be induced to leave this country, even if such a thing were
desirable. The Black man (unlike the Indian) loves civilization…individuals emigrate—
nations never.” Douglass’s views on Native Americans evolved so that by 1867 he saw
the nation as a single entity, drawn together by its many nationalities. “A Nation against
all ethnological classifications, identities, and differences,” Douglass told a crowd in
Boston, “Whether all these elements, so apparently opposite, can be freed from
antagonism, and rendered homogenous, is the great and all commanding question now
remaining to be solved.” Douglass acknowledged that Native Americans stood in the
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middle of the harmonious interactions between whites and Blacks, and he noted that even
while they both attempted to civilize and welcome the Indian as “a new candidate for
membership in the national family,” the Chinese, “knocks for admission.” Douglass’s
speech, delivered two years before Grant’s presidency, prefigured an important facet of
not only the Grant Doctrine but also the Republican Party’s Reconstruction ideology. The
republican ideals of liberty, freedom, free labor, and economic stability embodied in the
Reconstruction Amendments and which Grant hoped to export not only into the
Caribbean but also into the American West, called out to peoples around the world.
Douglass viewed the United States as “the most perfect national illustration of the unity
and dignity of humanity.” Welcoming immigrants and civilizing the indigenous people of
the continent would send a signal to the world that the nation was living up to the
promises of Reconstruction.271
African Americans moved to the West during Reconstruction in search of jobs
and land and they had to fight white settlers and Native Americans for both. The Grant
Administration attempted to secure the rights of Black Americans in the South
throughout Reconstruction but the violent backlash from Southern Democrats was
widespread and constant. As such, many African Americans hastened to leave the region
for better opportunities away from the violence, much as Grant had predicted in his
reasoning for annexing Santo Domingo. Denied opportunity in the Caribbean, many
African Americans chose to move to the West. During Reconstruction, Kansas and the
Oklahoma territory saw some of the highest Black resettlement in the years after the
271
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American Civil War with over 27,000 African Americans leaving the South for the
west.272
Many Black southerners believed that the violence in the South would never end
once the Democrats regained control of state legislatures. Although the Enforcement Acts
had succeeded in driving the Ku Klux Klan underground in many states, they had not
stopped what Grant referred to as the “annual, autumnal outbreaks in the South” of
violence around election time. Whites in the country began to view the federal
government’s attempts to assist African Americans during Reconstruction as socialism
that propped up uneducated former slaves at the expense of white America. Edwin L.
Godkin, editor of the Nation, decried “Socialism in South Carolina” when he contended
that “It is not a question any longer about the more or less good government of the State,
or the rights of minorities, but whether the whites can stay in the State at all.” Godkin
argued that African Americans, with help from the federal government, were seizing
property from whites to the benefits of Blacks. “[Whites] are being driven out of the
State, and the only question remaining to be settled is how long it will take to make the
once ‘sovereign State’ of South Carolina, a truly loyal, truly Republican, truly African
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San Domingo.” Reconstruction South Carolina, to men like Godkin, was just as bad as
the Paris Commune, a Jacobin-bogeyman of the Reconstruction era.273
Whites, regardless of section, began to view Reconstruction measures that
benefitted freedmen as detrimental to the hopes of the full reunification of the nation.
Grant was not one of them, yet he did begin to grow weary of constant violence in the
southern states. By 1875, Grant refused to assist the state of Mississippi in its state-wide
elections and the Democratic Party used violence and terror to regain control of the
legislature. Hiram Revels, the former United States Senator and first African American
in Congress, wrote a letter to President Grant in November of 1875 seemingly advocating
for the Mississippi Democratic Party, turning his back on his Republican Party roots.
Revels explained the situation to Grant and his decision-making as to why he had chosen
not to support Governor Adelbert Ames and the Republican Party in the 1875 election.274
Revels noted:
I will premise by saying that I am no politician…I never have sought
political preferment, nor do I ask it now, but am engaged in my calling—
the ministry—and feeling an earnest desire for the welfare of all the
people, irrespective of race or color, I have deemed it advisable to submit
to you…a few thoughts in regard to the political situation in this State.
Revels argued that African Americans had been misled by the Republicans, “enslaved in
mind by unprincipled adventurers, who,” he claimed, “caring nothing for country, were
willing to stoop to anything, no matter how infamous, to secure power to themselves and
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perpetuate it.” African Americans in Mississippi had realized that they were “being used
as mere tools and…they determined, by casting their ballots against these unprincipled
adventurers, to overthrow them” and in doing so were seeking to coalesce again as
Republicans for the national election in 1876. The Republican state administration,
ostensibly Adelbert Ames, was “notoriously corrupt and dishonest” and “to defeat [him],
at the late election men irrespective of race, color, or party affiliation, united and voted
together against men known to be incompetent and dishonest.” Revels claimed that “the
great masses of the white people have abandoned their hostility toward the General
Government and republican principles, and to-day accept as a fact that all men are born
free and equal.” Mississippians were not at fault, Revels argued. “The bitterness and hate
created by the late civil strife has…been obliterated in this State, except in some
localities, and would have long since been entirely obliterated were it not for some
unprincipled men who would keep alive the bitterness of the past.” The Republican
administration, and not the racial animosity of white Democrats, then, was responsible
for any discord in the state.275
Revels’s assessment of the political situation in Mississippi was, of course,
wholly inaccurate. If anything, white Mississippians’ virulence toward the Republican
Party and the federal government was increasing. The passage of the Civil Rights Bill in
1874 further inflamed the animosity of white southerners toward African Americans and
the hatred of federal government intervention on their behalf. However, when the
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Supreme Court quickly overturned the law as unconstitutional, many white Democrats
and Republicans “agreed that there must be no extraordinary legislation on behalf of
African Americans who had to work their way up in society like everyone else.” This
republican attitude might explain why Revels turned away from the Republican Party,
however historian Robert Jenkins has argued that “Revels’s support of the Democrats
was simply revenge against Ames and the rest of the Republican Party for having ousted
him from his presidency at Alcorn College.”276
Revels’s support for southern whites was nothing new. Revels, as a member of
the Senate, introduced petitions on behalf of white southerners and even supported
legislation that would allow former Confederates to regain their political rights. A
Methodist preacher, Revels claimed his Christian faith led him to support Grant’s Santo
Domingo annexation attempt, therefore it certainly could have guided him in
reconciliation efforts toward white Mississippians. When he put forth legislation that
asked for magnanimity toward southern whites, Frederick Douglass surmised that
because Revels had been born free, he could not comprehend the feelings of former
slaves toward Confederates. “He [Revels] is an amiable man, has always been free,”
Douglass wrote, “and has, perhaps, not a ‘stripe’ on his back to forget. Such men are apt
to find it easy to forget stripes laid upon other men’s backs and can as easily exhort them
to forget them.”277
With the Democratic Party firmly in control of southern legislatures and
Republicans beginning to turn their backs on the plight of African Americans, many
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southern Blacks considered leaving the South their best option for maintaining their
rights as citizens. Following the 1874 mid-term elections, Grant no longer had the
support of a Republican majority in the House of Representatives and the party was
losing ground in state legislatures in most of the southern states. At the same time, Grant
grew weary of the violence and the constant need for federal intervention in the lives of
African Americans. After the 1876 elections, which resulted in Rutherford B. Hayes’s
election to the presidency and the subsequent end of federal Reconstruction in the South,
southern Democrats unleashed nearly unchecked violence against Black Republicans
across Louisiana and Mississippi. Without the safety net of overt federal government
support, Black southerners increasingly packed up their belongings and headed west. Of
the 16,250 African Americans living in Kansas in 1870, over 5,500 were from the former
Confederate states (and Kentucky) while the rest came from Missouri or were native
Kansans. By 1880, 43,110 African Americans lived in Kansas with the largest group of
non-Kansas born Blacks coming from Kentucky. African Americans from the former
Confederate states and West Virginia accounted for 14,570 of Blacks in Kansas. Though
a comparatively small number, Black leaders could not ignore thousands of Black
southerners migrating from the South to the West. While many African American leaders
supported the move, understanding that the violence had reached untenable levels in the
South, not all African American leaders supported the Kansas Exodus. Some, such as
Frederick Douglass, decried the movement. He argued that if the federal government
allowed scores of African Americans to flee the South amidst such violence it was
conceding that “on the soil of the South, the United States Constitution cannot be
enforced; that the laws of the land cannot there command obedience; that the ballot Box
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in that section cannot be kept pure.” Douglass stated that the Exodus from the South was
a costly “side issue” on which the Black people of the South and the federal government
could not afford to waste their time, when they should be focusing on protecting the
liberty and freedom of African Americans at home. He submitted a Resolution in
advance of a debate against Professor Richard T. Greener, the Dean of the Howard
School of Law, which read:
Resolved: That they who would solve the problem of freedom and free
institutions by emigration rather than protection, by flight rather than by
right, by going into a strange land rather than by staying in our own, by a
change of soil rather than by a change of heart; instead of an egg would
give us a stone, instead of a fish, a serpent, instead of substance, a shadow;
and would leave the whole question of equal rights upon the soil of our
birth still an open question, with the moral influence of Exodus against us
as a confession of the impracticability of equal rights upon the soil of the
South.
Douglass argued that it was not right to force Black Americans to wander aimlessly from
place to place in search of a home that would provide them freedom. It was the
government’s responsibility to provide that freedom where they already lived.278
Douglass’s stance against the western Exodus ironically undercut Grant’s
argument for Santo Domingo’s annexation. Grant foresaw an inevitable clash between
white and Black southerners over racial issues and understood that African Americans
might want to migrate to another section of the country where they could enjoy their
liberty and freedoms in peace. Grant considered Santo Domingo a more suitable climate
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and welcoming locale for African Americans based upon his understanding of the racial
biology of the mid-nineteenth century. But the failure of the Santo Domingo treaty led
African Americans, like their white counterparts, to view the American West as the
Promised Land for opportunities of land ownership, business partnerships, and
educational access. Many of Douglass’s contemporary Black leaders, such as George T.
Downing, Richard T. Greener, and Sojourner Truth, supported the Exodus to Kansas and
other Western locales in an effort to send a signal to white southerners that their power
over African Americans was tenuous and that a Black exodus could destroy the southern
economy. While Douglass had supported the annexation of Santo Domingo, he had done
so both to provide a haven for southern Blacks and to bring Dominicans into the body
politic of the American system.
By the time the Exodus gained momentum, Grant was out of office on his World
Tour, traveling through Europe with his family and newspaper reporter John Russell
Young. During a “table talk” interview with Young, Grant brought up Santo Domingo
and the plight of African Americans in the South. “[Santo Domingo] would have settled
many problems that now disturb us. It would have given a new home for the Blacks, who
were and as I hear are still oppressed in the South,” Grant told Young. “If two or three
hundred thousand Blacks were to emigrate to St. Domingo under our Republic the
Southern people would learn the crime of Ku Kluxism, because they would see how
necessary the Black man is to their own prosperity.” White southerners, though, did not
learn this lesson from the exodus to Kansas. Instead, they rationalized and trivialized the
reasons why African Americans left the South, including blaming Kansas land agents for
poisoning the minds of southern Blacks, saying “good-riddance” to Black laborers they
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deemed unworthy as laborers, and rationalizing that the exodus was only temporary.
Relatively few concluded what Grant had hoped and as the New York Times stated, “this
exodus has revealed to Southern men the humiliating fact that the prosperity and
civilization of the South are at the mercy of the despised and hated negro [sic].” Grant,
then, saw the Exodus as both an economic and a personal move for African Americans
and he lamented not having Santo Domingo as a safety net for their protection.279
African American leaders in the Reconstruction era understood that the American
Civil War markedly changed the nation and that the Reconstruction Amendments had
created a new republic for their people. The Grant Doctrine, the attempted annexation of
Santo Domingo, the rebellion in Cuba, and the questions of immigration all reflect the
Grant’s administration attempts to mold this new republic through the changing
definition of citizenship and the role that the federal government played in defining the
rights of American citizens. Black leaders supported the Republican Party’s platform and,
by extension, the platform of President Grant, and sought to challenge those who
undermined the Reconstruction of the South. At the same time, African American leaders
had widely differing perspectives on foreign and domestic policy. As the Grant
Administration attempted to annex Santo Domingo, remain neutral in the Cuban
rebellion, curtail Chinese immigration, or enforce Reconstruction with limited success,
Black leaders challenged Republican politicians and each other to support the rights of
African Americans and to continue to put the integrity of the newly defined Constitution
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above all else. Others in the Republican Party sought only to utilize the new amendments
to the Constitution as a means of securing national reunion and strengthening a
nationalism that was more interested in safeguarding republican institutions than in
promoting racial equality. Grant struggled to secure the complete support of the
Republican Party, but he knew he could rely on African Americans at the ballot box. By
securing the right to vote for all African American men, the Grant Administration earned
the near complete support of Black Republicans in the 1872 reelection, but the president
could not secure unequivocal Black support for all his foreign and domestic policy
initiatives. Black Republicans showed a nuanced understanding of a variety of political
issues and supported them accordingly. They supported equal rights for all men, but also
understood them through a nineteenth-century concept of civilization. The Grant
Doctrine underscored the Grant Administration’s attempt to make the Reconstruction
Amendments a reality beyond the confines of the American South, but that did not
guarantee support for these policies from African Americans who analyzed each policy
on its merits and considered how it affected the freedmen. It also did not guarantee
support from a fractured Republican Party regarding Reconstruction’s ultimate goal:
either equal rights for African Americans or national reunion and strengthening the
national government and “making a nation made to last.” Unfortunately, for African
Americans, many white Republicans prioritized reconciliation with former Confederates
and Black Americans would lose the equal rights that they had briefly enjoyed during the
Reconstruction era for nearly a century thereafter.280
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Historians of the Reconstruction era often overlook the fact that the Grant
Administration’s foreign policy was an important aspect of his domestic Reconstruction
policy. The foreign and domestic concerns of the Reconstruction era cannot be divorced
from one another. Reconstruction was about a redefinition of the American republic’s
ideology, a new understanding of the founding principles finally put into practice by the
Reconstruction Amendments, and the redefinition of citizenship rights. These
Amendments established citizenship rights not only for African Americans, but for
thousands of others outside the traditional boundaries of the United States, including
immigrants who sought out the economic, political, and social opportunities available in
the nation. At the same time, Reconstruction was about returning the nation back to the
status quo, reuniting the seceded states into the Union and strengthening the republic
politically and economically. To many Americans, the Reconstruction Amendments were
the price to pay for reunion, but racial equality was never the endgame of Reconstruction.
Heather Cox Richardson argued that “what we now know as ‘Reconstruction’ is
being redefined as the Era of Citizenship, when Americans defined who would be
citizens and what citizenship meant.” This is precisely what the Grant Administration
tackled during Reconstruction, not merely as a function of foreign policy, but as part of
an overall policy of Reconstruction that brought both the foreign and domestic policies
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into one course of action, seeking to determine who deserved to be counted among the
citizenry of the United States. The Grant Doctrine was an unsuccessful attempt to
redefine the place of the United States in the world and how American citizens
functioned within that world. The United States Congress drafted the Reconstruction
Amendments to secure the reunion of the southern states into the Union and to provide
measures of equal rights for African Americans in the wake of the Civil War,
fundamentally altering the Constitution. Grant chose to interpret them as tools for the
incorporation of Dominicans and Native Americans into the republican experiment.
Without the amendments, these marginalized groups would not have been in the
conversation for citizenship, let alone on a path toward the body politic. While many of
Grant’s initiatives failed, it is important to remember that the Reconstruction
Amendments lived on and forever altered the Constitution. Grant’s attempts to
incorporate new peoples into the American citizenry did not die with his failed policies.
African Americans, Chinese immigrants, and Native Americans all continued to fight for
their equal rights throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Though Grant’s
policies were detrimental to some of these ethnic groups (such as his support for the Page
Age, the first of many Chinese exclusion acts), the ideas behind the Grant Doctrine, free
labor, eradicating slavery in the Western Hemisphere, and expanding citizenship to nonwhites in territories outside of the South, lived on in the American consciousness.281
For Grant, the Grant Doctrine was about exporting ideas and having people accept
those ideas within the confines of the international system. While the Grant Doctrine was
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a nationalist project designed to preserve free labor, protect and stabilize the Union, and
establish citizenship rights within the United States, the administration confronted a host
of transnational issues along the way. Grant was hopeful that slaves would flee slavery in
Cuba, but American citizens could not foment rebellion there and violate international
norms to free them. It was acceptable for Native Americans to hold onto traditional
leadership systems if they incorporated them into republican structures, but it was
unacceptable for Mormons to put their Church above the State. The balance of these
choices was about the responsibilities of republican citizenship. Republican citizens
accepted their place in a republican society, eschewing that of their old lives that was
unrepublican, but incorporating American political, economic, and social ideals into their
daily existence. Accepting this transaction of ideals was imperative to any immigrant
hoping to join the citizenry of the United States. It was the duty of the United States to
offer these ideals within the acceptable existing international norms, by not defying
existing treaties, not violating stances of neutrality, and seeking arbitration of
international disputes. For Grant, it was the duty of the United States to export these
ideals to new peoples, but not at the expense of sacrificing the country’s position and
security as a world power.
The Grant Doctrine grew from the Reconstruction Amendments, which
revolutionized the Constitution, forever changing the meaning of the document. The
Amendments changed the nation itself fundamentally, as millions of former slaves
became citizens and hundreds of thousands of black men temporarily became voters. The
addition of millions of immigrants from Europe, the Caribbean, South America, and Asia
changed the complexion of what an American citizen could look like and how the body
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politic should define citizenship. However, to many Americans Reconstruction was an
era that redefined the nature of their relationship with the federal government, as they
saw government intervention in the political sphere of the nation on behalf of the
freedmen as problematic. Because of this, many white Americans viewed Reconstruction
as a process by which the government reunited the southern states into the Union and
nothing more. Equal rights was not the main goal. Therefore, even if it took well over one
hundred years to realize, it was through the implementation of the Reconstruction
Amendments, the redefinition of citizenship, the realization and reinterpretation of who
could be a citizen, and the struggle of non-white Americans to force whites to accept
them as equal citizens, that the nation eventually implemented Civil Rights for all.282
Many historians who study the post-Civil War era have examined Grant’s
attempts at exporting Reconstruction as nothing more than imperialism, but his attempts
are significantly different from the imperialism of the late nineteenth century. Presidents
Theodore Roosevelt and William McKinley, famous for their late nineteenth and early
twentieth century imperialism, looked to exploit the peoples of foreign lands for their
natural resources in the name of American values, but did not intend to incorporate those
people into the body politic of the United States as equals. In fact, as Eric T. L. Love
showed in Race over Empire, the race and culture of these people were detriments to
these colonial ventures as Americans saw their possible incorporation into the United
States as having a deleterious effect on American society and morals. The Grant
Doctrine sought the exact opposite. Grant saw the people of the Dominican Republic as
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republican in nature, civilized individuals who, ignoring their race altogether, were
welcome as citizens of the United States. He intended for these people to become
citizens, not wards, of the United States; laborers, taxpayers, voters, and more than likely,
members of the Republican Party. Grant saw the strategic nature of the location of the
Dominican Republic as beneficial to the United States, but he also saw the republican
ideals of the nation as something worth exporting to neighboring countries. In fact, he
believed in a domino theory of republicanism in the Caribbean. Grant believed that
exporting republican ideals and truly sharing those ideals, by allowing people to
participate in the body politic, to vote, to have a say in the electoral process, and to
express their views in a society that valued freedom and liberty, would mean that
neighboring nations would soon adopt similar republican systems. He believed
slaveholding in the Western Hemisphere societies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Brazil
would crumble under the weight of an American economic system no longer dependent
upon them for tropical goods, and he believed laborers and former slaves would travel to
the shores of the Dominican Republic to taste the freedom of the United States. He
wrong-headedly believed that the only way to incorporate Native Americans into the
American system was to make them accept western values and join with their neighbors
to become American citizens, rather than remain separate nations within the North
American continent. He believed these non-republican neighbors would fall like
dominoes to the newly redefined America whose Constitution promised a racially blind
Republic that championed free labor and liberty.283

283

Eric T. L. Love, Race over Empire: Racism and U. S. Imperialism, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2004).

264

This was important because, to Grant, the Grant Doctrine was about behavior.
Grant needed to see that people were practicing republicanism correctly, that they were
fully civilized in the right way. He sent Orville Babcock to Santo Domingo to view its
republican institutions up close in order to find proof of their existence. If the United
States annexed Santo Domingo, Grant argued, republicanism would call to laborers and
slaves in Cuba. The proof of the abilities of the Dominicans and the rightness of the
Reconstruction Amendments, and by extension republicanism, would be in the thousands
of Cubans fleeing to the United States. There would be no need to acquire or intervene in
Cuba because the United States’ force of example would be enough to end the system of
slavery there as laborers and slaves alike would desire to join the United States. Cubans
would adopt republicanism by first, seeking it out, and then emulating the American
system.284
Cubans were among a number of immigrant groups seeking freedom and liberty
in the Civil War-era. Alongside Irish Americans who invaded Canada and stoked
rebellion at home in Ireland, naturalized Cubans also brought the ideals of republicanism
back to their homeland as they attempted to foment rebellion in Cuba during the Ten
Years’ War. The Grant Administration’s handling of naturalized citizens embracing
republican ideals to foment revolution ran counter to Grant’s doctrine of republicanism,
yet diplomatic necessities and power realities mitigated intervention in these
revolutionary causes. The ever-present Alabama claims discussions with Great Britain
prevented U.S. intervention in Canada and Cuba, and the execution of American
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insurgents on board the Virginius brought the U.S. and Spain to the brink of war, in the
press at least. These revolutionary moments, augmented by naturalized Cuban and Irish
Americans who had embraced the republican values of the United States, challenged the
Grant Administration’s doctrine of exporting republican ideals throughout the Western
Hemisphere. Realpolitik concerns took precedence over ideals. However, Cuban
Americans showed that they had embraced republicanism, representing to the president
that Caribbean peoples were capable of accepting liberty.
The same need to see republicanism in practice held true with Grant’s Native
American Peace Policy. Grant moved Native Americans on to reservations in order to
civilize them and to provide them with a path to citizenship. Looking to his friend Ely S.
Parker as the example of a “true civilized Indian,” Grant needed to see that Native
Americans could be civilized into good republican citizens who farmed, worshipped a
Christian God, and learned to read, write, and speak English. They also had to understand
the tenets of the republican political system. In this case, Parker designed republican
institutions for the Native American people to run for themselves, implementing political
structures that mirrored tribal hierarchies but maintained American political
nomenclature. This was good enough for Grant. The appearance of republicanism, even
one adapted by Native Americans to fit into their cultural beliefs, was acceptable if
Parker vouched for the system. Once Parker resigned from the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Grant’s Peace Policy regressed.
In contrast, Mormons were entirely unfit for citizenship because they rejected
many of the basic tenets of republicanism. Mormons were born into the Republic but by
embracing their religion and rejecting the national government in favor of their faith, they
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had turned their backs on republicanism. Mormons were foreign to most Americans, and
the practice of polygamy (a form of slavery) was wholly uncivilized and representative of
the slave culture that Grant and the Union Army had defeated during the Civil War.
Mormonism undermined Reconstruction’s goal of strengthening the Union and creating a
national republic forever free of slavery. Worse than choosing their faith over the State,
Mormons chose the immoral practice of polygamy, a practice unrepublican in nature for
the way it treated women. They chose clannishness over the republic, undermining
republicanism by flaunting the despotism and authoritarianism of loyalty to Brigham
Young and the Church. This separation of church and state was another key component
of Reconstruction republicanism and a platform of the Republican Party that continued
into the twentieth century.285
Grant made the policy of his administration clear when, in Des Moines, Iowa in
late September 1875, he delivered his famous speech on non-sectarian public education.
Grant’s speech laid out an argument for free public education that was devoid of any
religious influence and made a case for no public funding for religious education. Grant’s
words to the gathered Union veterans spoke to his beliefs in the ideals of republicanism.
Indeed, Grant prefaced his lecture by telling the crowd:
Let not the results of [our fallen comrade’s] sacrifices be destroyed. The
Union & free institutions for which they fell should be held more dear for
these sacrifices… Let us then begin by guarding against every danger
enemy threatning [sic] the perpetuity of free republican institutions.
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Harkening back to the sacrifice of his men who fought and died in the Civil War, Grant
wondered aloud to the crowd what had they died for. “It is important the sovereign—the
people,” Grant noted, “should possess intelligence. The free school is the promoter of that
intelligence which is to preserve us as a free nation.” Grant worried that if the nation was
to fight a Civil War again it would not be along the lines of North and South but
“between patriotism and intelligence on the one side and superstition, ambition and
ignorance on the other.” Grant argued that it was time for Americans “to add all needful
guarantees for the more perfect security of Free Thought, Free speech, a Free Press, Pure
Morals, Unfettered Religious sentiment, and of Equal Right and Privileges to all men
irrespective of Nationality, Color, or Religion.” However, Grant argued, the state should
use no public money for sectarian schools. “Leave the matter of religion to the family
circle…Keep the church and the state forever separate,” Grant concluded.286
To Grant, the ideals of republicanism were just as important as preserving the
Union and eradicating slavery. American citizens, and in Grant’s estimation none more
so than the citizen-soldiers in the crowd in Iowa that day, understood that the nation’s
free institutions had been built on sacrifice and those institutions were crucial to its
existence. The Grant Doctrine sought to bring new peoples into these national institutions
to show that the sacrifices of the Civil War had not been in vain.
The success or failure of the Grant Doctrine was not tied to the fate of
Reconstruction as much as it was tied to the fate of the Grant Administration.
Reconstruction’s hugely ambitious goals meant a variety of successes and failures that
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historians have argued over ever since the experiment ended. The reunification of the
Southern and Northern states, the strengthening of the Union, and the permanent
eradication of slavery from the United States were immediate successes, as were the
ratifications of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
These successes forever altered the United States, strengthening the republic and altering
the Constitution to the point of providing the federal government with the power to
enforce Constitutional Amendments for the first time. These Amendments banned
slavery, bestowed citizenship upon millions of Americans, and guaranteed African
American men the right to vote. However, these successes were limiting, as the
reunification of the states came at the price of former Confederate redemption of
Southern legislatures and a return to the status quo. The end of Reconstruction brought
about an end to many of the hard-earned rights for African Americans in the South while
many whites, both North and South, Democrat and Republican, embraced a return to
normalcy. Had the Grant Doctrine succeeded, which would have added hundreds of
thousands of non-white citizens from the Caribbean and from Native American territories
into the body politic, would Reconstruction have ended any differently? Probably not, yet
Grant’s attempts show that had others shared his understanding of the changing nature of
citizenship, it might have meant that the American people would not have had to wait
nearly a century for the Civil Rights Movement to complete the work of Reconstruction.
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APPENDIX A
REASONS WHY SAN DOMINGO SHOULD BE ANNEXED TO THE UNITED
STATES
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It is an island of unequaled fertility. It contains an area (that part of it known as
the republic of San Domingo) of 20.000 square miles, or 12,800.000 acres. One half of
this is now covered with the most valuable timbers known to commerce; at an elevation
above the diseases incident to a tropical climate, and is capable of producing, when
cleared of the native forrest, 1500 lbs. of coffee pr. acre. The valleys and low lands are of
great productiveness, the sugar cane requiring re-setting only once in twenty years, and
producing, [to the acre] with much less labor, nearly double [that] of the best sugar lands
of La. to the acre. Tobacco, tropical fruits, dyes, and all the imports of the equatorial
region, can be produced on these lands.—San Domingo is the gate to the Carib[b]ean
Sea, and in the line of transit to the Isthmus of Darien, destined at no distant day to be the
line of transit of half the commerce of the world. It has but a sparce population and that in
entire sympathy with our institutions, anxious to join their fortunes to ours; industrious, if
made to feel that the products of their industry is to be protected; & tollrent as to the
religious, or political views of their neighbors. Caste has no foothold in San Domingo. It
is capable of supporting the entire colored population of the United States, should it
choose to emigrate. The present difficulty, though sensless, to in bringing all parts of the
United States to a happy unity and love of country grows out of the prejudice to color.
The prejudice is a sensless one, but it exists. The colored man cannot be spared until his
place is supplied, but with a refuge like San Domingo his worth here would soon be
discovered, and he would soon receive such recognition as to induce him to stay: or if
Providence designed that the two races should not live to-gether he would find a home in
the Antillas.
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A glance at the map will show that England has now a cordon of islands
extending from southern Florida to [the] East of the Island of Cuba, with Jamaca, and
Grand Cayman south of that island, and a succession of foothold upon the main land in
cCentral America, thus commanding [on both sides of Cuba] the entrance to the Gulf of
Mexico, both sides of Cuba, a gulf which borders upon so large a part of the territory of
the United States. Again she has a succession of islands runing from [the] East of St.
Thomas to South America, with another foothold upon the main land, British Guiana,
thus nearly surrounding the Caribean Sea. The coasting trade of the United States,
between the Atlantic seaboard and all ports wWest, and sSouth west of the Cape of
Florida, has now to pass through forign waters. In case of war between Great Bri England
and the United States, New York and New Orleans would be as much severed as would
be New York and Calais, France.
Our imports of tropical products, exceed and products of slave labor, exceed our
exports to the countryies producing them more than the balance of trade against the
United States.
San Domingo can produce the sugar, coffee, tobacco, chocolate and tropical fruits
for a population of 50.000.000 mill of people. Coffee and sugar there can be produced,
with free labor, at but little more cost pr. lb. than wheat is now produced in our great
North West. With the acquisition of San Domingo the two great necessities in every
family, sugar and Coffee, would be cheapened near one half.
San Domingo is weak and must go some where for protection. Is the United
States willing that she should go elsewhere than to the herself [seek protection from a
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foreign power]? Such a confession would be to abandon our oft repeated “Monroe
doctrine.”
San Domingo in the hands of the United States would make slave labor
unprofitable and would soon extinguish that hated system of enforced labor. To-day the
United States is the largest supporter of that that institution. More than 70 pr ct. of the
exports of Cuba, and a large percentage of the exports of Brazil, are to the United States.
Upon every pound we receive from them an export duty is charged to support slavery and
Monarchy. A prohibitory duty, almost, is placed upon what we have to sell. Get San
Domingo and this will all be changed.
San Domingo from its exposeure to the trade winds, and its elevation is, in large
part, free from the diseases of the tropics. It is nearer New York City, and all the North
Atlantic Sea ports, than any American Sea port in the Gulf of Mexico. It can be reached
without passing through the waters of a foreign country. In case of a Maratime War it
would give us a foothold in the West Indias of inestimable value. Its acquisition is
carrying out Manifest destiny. It is a step towards daring Europe all European flags from
this Continent. Can any one favor rejecting so valuable a gift who voted $7.200.000 for
the icebergs of Alasca?287
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Reasons why San Domingo should be annexed to the United States, Memorandum [December 1869],
Series 3: Speeches, Reports, Messages, 1863-1876, Ulysses S. Grant Papers, Library of Congress; John Y.
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Figure 1

“Robinson Crusoe Making a Man of His Friday,” Harper’s Weekly,
February 12, 1870.
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